The Myth of Omnipotence

A big commonality between any two American Presidential candidates these days is an overwhelming belief in American power. While candidates may argue that their opponent or predecessor has squandered this power and influence, rarely will they ever argue that they have permanently diminished it. Even if they privately feel their country is in irreversible decline, it's politically infeasible to admit as such - American exceptionalism is not dead, and will not be for some time. With the "good" people in charge, the problems that prevented the previous administration's grandiose schemes from working will disappear.

Neither candidate is immune from this fallacy. John McCain, despite his criticism of the Bush administration's implementation of neoconservative strategy, still thinks that those same botched wars could have worked if only someone who put "country first" and devoted the country fully to the task was in charge. So too does he believe that "big government" would work a lot better if the government shaped up to his values. Obama, for his part, holds some similar beliefs. America can undertake unilateralist actions - like attacks against Pakistan - so long as somebody sufficiently "understanding" of our allies is there to soothe their concerns. Similarly, many Democrats (likely Obama included) argue that if only "someone else" had been in charge, regulation could have been put in place to stop the current economic crisis - despite a lack of any clear steps the government could have taken to prevent it. So too has the government's heavy-handed response been underwhelming. But Bush is "laissez-faire," so if we had people who believed in government, it would have worked, right?

Returning to foreign policy and, (once again), Pakistan, there's one further danger to bring up. Obama, to his credit, has staked a huge amount of his foreign policy experience on nuclear nonproliferation. A successful nuclear attack could derail globalization, a constructive post-Bush fight against terrorism, and intensify animosity among great powers. However, it is impossible to develop an effective nonproliferation regime without the cooperation of Pakistan - a nuclear power and serial proliferator of technology. Between its offers to help other Muslim countries to develop nuclear technology or AQ Khan's black market, viewed in light of the cozy relationship between most organs of the Pakistani security establishment and Islamist militants, securing Pakistani arms and technology is absolutely essential to effective nonproliferation. However, it is difficult to imagine Pakistan cooperating on an issue it views as essential to its own security while the US violates its borders. Worse, the Pakistani nuclear program could easily be detached from civilian control, and a humiliated military would likely cling to its nuclear arms to compensate for its inability or unwillingness to retaliate to American attacks.

There are other dangerous precedents. Just as the next American President will want to rebuild America's relationships with its allies, America is demonstrating (and the candidates often affirming) that some allies (and the American national interest) are more important than others. This would be sensible and acceptable were not so much of Obama's campaign staked on rebuilding America as a moral leader in the world. Many Americans speak of rebuilding America's relationship with Europe - but Europe itself does not have a unified foreign policy. It will be difficult to please both pro-Russian natural gas customers like Germany and paranoid post-Soviet states like Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltics.

Meanwhile, the American abandonment of Georgia will likely lead other minor states near regional powers to question our commitment. When America will not even protect their territorial integrity, it may seem like a better idea to accommodate rising regional powers (Russia, China, Iran) rather than rely on the US Cavalry that may never come. There are fears this is already happening in the Persian Gulf. Allowing relationships between the US and states on the peripheries of rising powers to erode will be especially dangerous. If a strategy of negotiations and engagement fail, the US will have to turn to a strategy of containment. Without those peripheral states, such strategies can become much more difficult.

Ultimately, successful diplomacy cannot occur without clear objectives, and we cannot have clear objectives without acknowledging what concessions we will make and what goals we will not pursue. Is the United States willing to make concessions on free trade, environmental regulation, military aid, and tolerance of human rights abuses to keep other countries working with us? Sure, there are unilateral decisions the US can make - closing Camp X-Ray, ending torture, taking the lead on climate change legislation - but eventually the US will have to sacrifice degrees of either its idealistic aspirations or material ambitions to make multilateralism work. Rejecting the Bush Doctrine is not a concession; declining to invade other countries without the sanction of the international community is the bare minimum of accepted behavior for most states. Undoubtedly, the candidates do privately know what specific goals and concessions they are willing to work towards. The problem of course, is getting the American people to accept them when the illusion of Washington's omnipotence can no longer be upheld.