Firstly, the world is officially unipolar no longer. While some would call other events in the past few years the "high water mark" of America's status as hyperpower, there can no longer be any question to America's ongoing unipolar "moment." It is over. In a fait accompli, Russia has demonstrated it too now has a sphere of influence, one from which it can effectively deny the United States. Russia does not have any apparent intent to recreate the Soviet Union by force of arms. Instead, it seeks to do what the United States has traditionally done in Latin America - exclude its "backyard" from major foreign influence. It still has a long way to go, but it may have had its first success. Russia's actions in Georgia serve as a valuable demonstration to Ukraine and other states - go too far towards the West, and Russia will make you suffer as soon as it has an excuse. While Georgia clearly offered one, Russia would not have found one in the Ukraine. Now, however, Russia can confidently interfere with whatever non-NATO members it wants. To grant Russian citizenship to the Crimean Tatars or Russians in Donetsk is not so difficult, and Russia could, in a decade or so, separate these provinces with greater ease. The Ukrainians, knowing that NATO will not commit to a non-member, would be far less likely to attempt Saakashvili's military leap of faith.
That Russia can rely on this exposes another major consequence of the Georgian invasion, that the interests of Western Europe and the United States are gravely divergent on Russian issues. Russia is still fundamentally doomed as a superpower - but on a solid foundation as a great power. As such, the consequences of angering Russia are far greater for Europeans than for Americans - no longer because Russian tanks threaten to cross Europe's borders, but because Russian natural gas pipelines already do. When European nations stand against the NATO bids of Georgia and the Ukraine, they do so not primarily because of fears of war, but of the diplomatic consequences. Even admitting more Russian border states into NATO might trigger pipeline shut offs, diplomatic lockouts, or the nationalization of European assets in Russia. As such, cheerleaders for the EU as a new, "moral" world superpower should quiet. Many Western papers hail Sarkozy, the EU's nominal representative, for the cease-fire; Europhiles should take this news with a shaker of salt at least. For one thing, the "cease-fire" is questionable at best. Not only that, but the decision to even claim an end to combat is likely motivated by Russian convenience - Russians do not want to have another Chechnya on their hands - and desire to put a PR smiley-face on the 58th's tanks, which still sit in Georgian territory. As for the challenges to the European superpower, they are twofold. Firstly, the EU, if it is truly a power, is more than the United States bound to petty, mercantile self-interest. The EU's fundamental accomplishment is that it provides a framework for a Europe at peace - to idly allow such a war to occur in its own backyard undermines any notion of a European policy based on values of peace and sovereignty. Secondly, Russia's new "sphere of influence" excludes not only the United States, but the EU as well. Europe is not willing to maintain the politico-military infrastructure and policies necessary to extend them, which means that Europe as a whole is a paltry excuse for a superpower. Of course, soft power is still a factor - but what did it accomplish here? A cease-fire that has done anything but end the conflict or tensions? What use is soft power as a primary substitute for conventional power when it cannot accomplish the same goals? What lies for the future of European soft power when the EU is increasingly reluctant to lift a finger in service of its core values? Is "sticky" power going to save the EU? While it does have a large economy, its use of economic might is neither unified nor independent - Russia has an economic veto over Europe's interests and will for the foreseeable future, especially with regards to the post-Soviet world. Of course, some EU countries have offered peacekeepers, but this seems entirely contingent upon Russian approval. The answer from the Russians, who still title their forces "peacekeepers" and have no interest in foreign meddling, will likely be nyet. Again, if Russia possesses such a veto, how much can we truly call this power?
America, too, has demonstrably become unable to reconcile its principles and its interests. That America only now is sending aid to Georgia - aid that is not ending the conflict by any means - is a severe blow to America's credibility among Eastern Europeans and our remaining allies. The message is clear - you can bleed and die for us in Iraq when so many would not, but ultimately, we will throw you to the wolves when your most critical national interest of all - the integrity and sovereignty of your state - is in question. Saakashvili undoubtedly made a severe error in judgment when he forced this question. While true, it is perception, not the facts that will matter for many countries. Will Eastern Europeans be as willing to stick their necks out for the United States without NATO membership? Will other countries threatened by more powerful rivals risk reaching out to us? Will the fervor remain for "color revolutions" and liberalization? At the very least, we have not done much to promote our country or our ideas to the rest of the world. Hence, Americans must recognize that a new foreign policy based on multilateralism, soft power, and the international rule of law has become a much greater challenge. Western Europe, our "lost ally" has shown it has less common ground with American interests than we thought, while Eastern Europe has found that the reward for cooperation is not as high as they thought. Europe has made it clear it will not risk political action, let alone military cooperation, that will anger Russia, while America's new allies will think twice before committing to any military cooperation that does not shield them from their former master.
So, indulge me as I once again bring out our two unlucky candidates for President for another tongue (keyboard?) lashing. Let's assume this all happened in August 2009. What would this mean for an Obama administration? Well, his rapprochement with Western Europe would be in a bit of trouble, unless he too decided to abandon Georgia and anger Eastern Europe. I suspect that up until now, Obama's response would have been quite similar to Bush's - afterwards, though, he would have the choice between accommodating Russia (giving us multilateralism without principle) or ratcheting up pressure, and in turn driving Europe away. Either way, a strategy of multilateral cooperation would be even more difficult for all but the most brilliant diplomatic team. John McCain would be in perhaps deeper trouble - the Georgian invasion would force any "League of Democracies" to sacrifice legitimacy (ie, the opinions of Western Europe) or functionality in its response to this crisis. McCain is also more likely to turn the Georgian conflict into WWIII. Enough said.
Assuming, as I so often do, that the US should have a more substantive response to the Georgia crisis, what steps would such a policy involve?
- Major pressure to create an EU/multinational UN peacekeeping force for Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia used the presence of its so-called peacekeepers to gain casus belli against any attempt by Georgia to restore its sovereignty by arms. Meanwhile, Russia appears to be undermining the "cease-fire" by using irregular militants from the Chechen wars, and Cossacks. (Side note: What better example would there be of Putin's purported "Tsarist" tendencies than the use of Cossacks to terrorize challengers to Moscow!). However, given that Russia is likely continuing drives into Georgia, it is unlikely they would agree to such a measure, which would sap its appeal to the Europeans. Even if such monitoring was permitted, Russia would certainly not allow them to interfere with the Russian occupation.
- Make it clear the United States stands against regime change in Georgia or further combat operations, and provide non-combat (but militarily transported) aid to Georgia. Bush has taken these steps, and regardless of what happens in response, Georgia is going to need to be rebuilt anyway. Continued Russian presence in Georgia is unacceptable not only because it violates the agreement, but also because it likely signals an underlying desire to depose Saakashvili if negotiations do not go as planned (note the Russian tank commander's comment).
- Make Ukrainian membership in NATO a major US foreign policy objective. Of course, many will argue this would only further enrage Russia - but the Ukraine's already made their NATO intentions clear, while unlike Georgia, Ukraine's potential separatist regions would make clear Russian provocation necessary for such a conflict (handing out guns and citizenship). The best way to ensure that Crimea and Donetsk do not become Ossetia and Abkhazia II is to a) force the Ukraine to agree to a no-first-strike clause on those regions in return for NATO membership, which b) would force the Russians to press their interests through non-military channels - people forget NATO's deterrent effect. The US should also contemplate supporting a Ukrainian denial of Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
- Make any effort possible to gain Russian cooperation on Iran, Zimbabwe and other issues. If the US still has to sacrifice its interests in Georgia, it should make sure it gets something in return. Iran would be a good start, but it is a bit of a long shot they'll cooperate.
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