The justice and (f)utility of force in Gaza

As Israeli troops enter Gaza and the human cost of Operation Cast Lead mounts, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify - on moral or strategic grounds - the actions of the IDF. While Israel does have a right to defend itself against attack, it is unlikely that by any standards of just war that Israel is acting proportionately. The morality of interactions between polities - the legalistic morality idealists would like to govern international affairs - does indeed entitle Israel to recourse through force of arms. But war is a broad thing - and it is the execution of this retaliation, not its initiation, that one must examine if one would like any claim to fighting a "just war."

There is a mode of thought, present among proponents of Cast Lead as it is among all modern belligerents, that cuts off its concern with moralism once victimhood entitles one to retaliation. After that point, the ends of retaliation justify the means - military necessity and political-self preservation take precedent. While this argument usually attempts to extend the morality of beginning retaliation to all aspects of its conduct, the underlying message that morality is less relevant, if not irrelevant once both sides are in combat. The only relevant morality is that which entitles the victim to retaliation. There is a case to be made for emphasizing the moral objective or achieving retaliation of winning a conflict at the expense of moral conduct in battle, but it is not one we associate with the notion of just war theory.

When a government wages a war on the proposition that protecting innocent civilians from being bombed, proportionality in its own measures, especially when they are concentrated against an enemy that is not distinct from the civilian population, is necessary. Even in WWII, when the Allies conducted a policy of "total war," that conflict's inherent basis in a state system provided grounds for waging wars against countries (ones that did not recognize in themselves a separation between people and government) with established governments. But Israel does not intend to recognize Hamas as a legitimate government, and therefore it cannot simply write off the Palestinian people's desire for safety and claim they are conducting a just war, and not just invoking the idea of one.

Our sense of proportionality is inextricable from our preferences among the belligerents. How many commentators who claimed Russia's actions in Georgia were disproportionate now support Operation Cast Lead? This is likely why the notion of just war will remain more an elastic clause for belligerents than what it was intended as - an actual constraint on the use of force. Instead, it has become an enabler.

That being said, the ultimate reality of the situation is that even if Israel were to embrace a consequentialist outlook and use whatever means necessary to destroy Hamas, it will doom Cast Lead to failure. Israel's goal of destroying Hamas will prove incompatible with its goal of protecting its population without being forced to conduct a long occupation. Even as the IDF estimates it is killing and capturing hundreds of terrorists a day, more rockets keep falling on Israel. Destroying Hamas would likely require a long operation that approaches the problem in keeping with successful counterinsurgency tactics. Because counterinsurgency and modern warfare has become population-centric, simply going out and killing all of the terrorists is not possible and will not be helpful. Without a significant and sustained military presence, it is unlikely Israel will be able to remove Hamas from the fabric of Palestinian society or , and once Israel does leave Hamas can claim a propaganda victory since Hamas, contrary to Israel's aims, still exists as an armed force. Even if Hamas were to be destroyed, Ehud Barak's objective of ensuring there is "no terror activity in Gaza" would not be achieved. More radical groups like Islamic Jihad, who've been waiting for this war all along, could step in to fill the power vacuum. Gaza without Hamas would be more anarchic and unpredictable than before.

I do not expect the United States to make an all-out effort to resolve this misguided conflict, (especially since our diplomatic sympathies lie deeply enough with Israel to favor its perspective). Nor, ultimately, would it likely be able to. Ehud Barak and the Israeli government are acting out of their own interests and needs, and we will not make much headway in convincing the Israelis not to do so. America has its own share of flawed wars that need attention, and regional crises of much more direct relevance to American interests. There are some who would like to hand Israel-Palestine over to Clinton as soon as Obama is in office (Israel's ground operations will most likely be done with). Some Clinton proponents believed she would be the perfect Secretary of State to handle negotiations, thanks to her credibility among Israeli hawks, past sympathies for Palestinians and association with the most peaceful and (potentially) productive periods in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. But in the wake of Cast Lead, staking her credibility and legacy to dealing with an intractable conflict that will be of secondary importance to our own wars (and their necessary regional diplomatic efforts) does not strike me as a particularly good idea.