Arming a declining power

Although Biden has rightly highlighted the myriad weaknesses of Russia's socio-economic foundation, it's worth noting that Western powers have always been economically superior to Russia, and yet fears of rising Russian power persist throughout recent Western history. The ever-resurgent Russia threatened Britain in the mid-19th century, Germany (particularly Bethman-Hollweg) leading into WWI, and of course the US in the Cold War and now again in its wake.

Simplifying (crudely), many Russia hawks fear Russian military power enough to justify pushing NATO expansion further eastward, but believe Russia's latent weaknesses will grant the US leverage to undercut the Kremlin's response. Russia is up to little good, but this perspective is flawed. Russia has demonstrated throughout history its ability to function as a great power despite weak economic fundamentals. Not only that, but attempting to exploit Russian weakness to press further into its self-declared "sphere of influence" put us exactly in the situation we are in now.

Russia's declining economy can no longer support its massive Soviet-era military. The Russian government has both realized this, and realized it no longer needs to do so. Much like the United States, Russia has realized that its future battles will not be in the plains of Central Europe, and it is adjusting its procurement accordingly. For the first time in years, the Russian navy is purchasing new ships - not Russian designs, of course (the Russian defense industry is decrepit, especially shipbuilding), but French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. Russia is downsizing its army and creating more permanently-staffed units. While in previous decades the USSR has relied on maintaining divisions that exist only as officer corps and equipment and then calling up troops to staff them, this strategy of mass mobilization is now obsolete. Instead, Russia is modeling more of its units along the lines of its airborne troops (and that of professional Western military forces) to ensure the capability for rapid response and expeditionary missions.

This leaner military is, to paraphrase Spengler, for war, and it may want war. Russia's strategic deterrent remains its nuclear arsenal, which is why up until now most Russian naval efforts were directed (not always successfully) towards strengthening its submarine-based nuclear arsenal. Now, rather than fielding an army useful only for or deterring against mass invasion, Russia wants a force for waging short, decisive wars. Russia has learned from its experiences in Georgia, where the paratrooper forces were immediately deployed and effective in combat. So, let's remember that even though the old Russian way of war may not be economically feasible, Russia is certainly adapting its forces to compensate for past weaknesses. Russia may not overcome its faults, but it is certainly trying to adapt. Russia's military reforms demonstrate it will not simply roll over to Western demands and retains a strong national interest in a sphere of influence.

The Mistral, though, raises an interesting question. What sort of countries does Russia need an amphibious assault ship to fight? The first possibility would be the Ukraine, and the Crimea in particular. Coming on the heels of Medvedev's heated rhetoric and accusations of Ukrainian nationalists (probably true) and government soldiers (less likely) participating in the Georgia war, Russia may be trying to scare the Ukrainian government (or perhaps the population) into a less anti-Russian stance. But that's a possibility that needs to be addressed on its own.