It's over when the Post says its over

Ordinarily I'd hesitate before going against a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist (and one who has exposed some of the darkest aspects of the GWOT at that), but this article from Dana Priest seems wildly off the mark.

Since there is (free) registration required, I'll quote the parts that seem off base.

The problem starts with the title: "Bush's 'War' On Terror Comes to a Sudden End."

Tell it to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But what's the reasoning behind such a sweeping declaration?

While Obama says he has no plans to diminish counterterrorism operations abroad, the notion that a president can circumvent long-standing U.S. laws simply by declaring war was halted by executive order in the Oval Office.

Key components of the secret structure developed under Bush are being swept away: The military's Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, facility, where the rights of habeas corpus and due process had been denied detainees, will close, and the CIA is now prohibited from maintaining its own overseas prisons. And in a broad swipe at the Bush administration's lawyers, Obama nullified every legal order and opinion on interrogations issued by any lawyer in the executive branch after Sept. 11, 2001.

Keep in mind that these "counterterrorism operations" include occupying an invaded country, bombing targets inside its neighbor and other countries, and in some cases special operations incursions. These, to me, seem to be the "war" in the war on terrorism. I simply can't follow the train of thought here. If the argument is that Bush used war as an excuse to do illegal things, then how does no longer doing illegal things (while still fighting the war) mean the war is gone? To me, this just seems to say that the War on Terror will now be waged within certain legal limits... Which war, by the way, has regarding these sorts of issues.

Over the next 2 1/2 years, as Democrats gained power in Congress, as the violence in Iraq sapped public support for the president and as the fear of another terrorist attack receded, the debate over secret prisons, renditions and harsh interrogations grew louder. Presidential candidates felt comfortable to include these sensitive subjects in the debate on the efficiency of Bush's war against terrorists, and even on the notion that it was still a war.

Yes, but the main aspect of a war on terror, and indeed wars in general, is that they are conducted using military force. Obama has not in any way significantly reduced the use of state violence against terrorism. If anything, he is bringing the war on terror within the legal restraints we expect in our usual conflicts. Philip Bobbitt supports closing Guantanamo and ending official sanction of torture, too. But he believes more than most that fighting terrorism is still a war. Will Dana Priest tell him that he no longer believes in a war on terror?

During his campaign and again in his inaugural address Tuesday, Obama used a different lexicon to describe operations to defeat terrorists. "As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals," he said. ". . . And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you."

This is just the absurd punchline to the argument. Priest could have drawn a contrast to Bush by emphasizing the section of the speech in which he extended a hand to the Muslim world and cooperative states, but no, she chooses the section that everyone from Marc Ambinder to Jon Stewart has said sounds the most like W's rhetoric in the war on terror.

Summary: Priest first defines the war on terror as the aspects that have the least to do with military combat operations, which are in fact illegal under the laws of war, and then says that since Obama is ending those aspects, the war itself is over. In other words, we have a writer projecting their desires and opinions onto the President. The real question is, how long is this free credibility going to last?

What next for a war on terror?

The war on terror doesn't seem to be much closer to being over. Gitmo changes aside, Obama still thinks it exists, we're in it, and that we'll win it.

We will not apologize for our way of life nor will we waver in its defense. And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, "Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you."

Is there really anything about this statement which differentiates it from the rhetoric of the past eight years?

Much as Eisenhower was able to reject Truman's failed management of the Korean War while still prosecuting and expanding the Cold War as a whole, Obama may have rejected the Bush administration's choice of battlefields and conduct of warfare, he has not rejected the war itself. Even as the British government reaffirms its disdain for the language (and the implicit structure contained within) of the "war on terror," Obama seems neither prepared nor interested in treating the battle against terrorism as anything less than a war. Obama reinforces the narrative of neoconservatives who treat the struggle against terrorism as on par with WWII or the Cold War, not by downplaying the importance of the war on terror but merely suggesting it be conducted differently - that we cooperate with countries we might otherwise not and moderate our campaigns when possible. Perhaps one could argue such forceful language is more rhetoric than heartfelt belief, but Obama's promotion of talks with Iran and derision of the invasion of Iraq should not detract from a record that is in favor of escalation in Afghanistan and, if necessary, military action in the wider region.

Now, there is a case to be made for the "war on terror" being treated as a sort of era-defining generational conflict on par with WWII and the Cold War (though its best proponent would consider those two conflicts part of one war, and prefers the plural "wars on terror"). This would rest on the presumption that modern terrorism (the focus here is on terrorist organizations and capabilities, not on the 20th century methods we conceive of as terrorism) presents a fundamental threat to constitutional order within states and the process of globalization that dominates the state system. Without a concerted effort in both specific regions and our broader global policy - a war on terror - modern terrorists will hollow out and struggling states and undermine strong ones. There is evidence the former is a real possibility, and the capability of terrorist organizations to acquire the resources to deal serious blows to modern states is a looming, if still distant, threat.

Obama's promises to revitalize NATO efforts in Afghanistan and rein in nuclear proliferation are, well... promising. It is also likely that only a more internationalist President like Obama will have the credibility necessary for a great power consensus on new international laws and norms, and campaigns to marginalize terrorist organizations. If Bobbitt is right (and there is a chance he is), then we really are at war against more than al Qaeda and perhaps more than radical Islam. Certainly we are at war with more than bin Laden, whose seclusion means killing him is unlikely to seriously hamper al Qaeda or terrorism in general. A war on terror treated as a war would become our overriding national interest. To adopt the rhetoric of war, or of the Cold War, or of another new notion of war that we must use to interpret fighting terrorism as a "war" while trying to insulate domestic society from its requirements is foolishness that will lead to disaster. We cannot continue the recent decade of bifurcation - where outside TSA check-in lines, the actual responsibilities and burdens of the war on terror are borne by a small segment of the population and the need for wider institutional reforms are ignored for political convenience.

We would of course like to do everything at once, but the war on terror has its own policy costs and public diplomacy can only go so far to prevent it from conflicting with some of our domestic, economic, and other international interests. If Obama is to speak of the war on terror without enacting the major changes necessary to prosecute it, then we as a country would be better off acknowledging that terrorism is not a priority and accepting a modus vivendi in which we pursue domestic concerns or progress on other international issues and terrorism is at least a thorn in our side. Terrorism will not go away simply with public diplomacy, more economic aid, and withdrawal from Iraq. Nor is certain that it poses a threat of the magnitude Bobbitt and others survive. We will have to live with the risk that terrorism would pose, and I would not consider this an admission of defeat or a disaster for American foreign policy under present circumstances. But if we are to lower terrorism on our list of national concerns, then we should not formalize this casual belligerence as a bipartisan policy where it will exacerbate the difficulties to the policies we would prefer to emphasize.

The men of the 3rd Batallion, 8th Marine Regiment, based at Camp Lejeune, are discovering in their first two months in Afghanistan that the tactics they learned in nearly six years of combat in Iraq are of little value here — and may even inhibit their ability to fight their Taliban foes.

Their MRAP mine-resistant vehicles, which cost $1 million each, were specially developed to combat the terrible effects of roadside bombs, the single biggest killer of Americans in Iraq. But Iraq is a country of highways and paved roads, and the heavily armored vehicles are cumbersome on Afghanistan's unpaved roads and rough terrain where roadside bombs are much less of a threat.

All that being said, whether we are engaged in just the first few battles of the "wars on terror" or merely preoccupied with righting the bungled execution of our response to 9/11, our national security priority should be resolving the wars we are presently fighting. While we have successfully negotiated a new SOFA that will let us withdraw from Iraq, Afghanistan is going poorly and unlikely to get any easier. Despite a drawdown in Iraq and the seeming success of insurgency tactics there, the "get out of Iraq to win Afghanistan" strategy is already showing its limitations:

The men of the 3rd Batallion, 8th Marine Regiment, based at Camp Lejeune, are discovering in their first two months in Afghanistan that the tactics they learned in nearly six years of combat in Iraq are of little value here — and may even inhibit their ability to fight their Taliban foes.

Their MRAP mine-resistant vehicles, which cost $1 million each, were specially developed to combat the terrible effects of roadside bombs, the single biggest killer of Americans in Iraq. But Iraq is a country of highways and paved roads, and the heavily armored vehicles are cumbersome on Afghanistan's unpaved roads and rough terrain where roadside bombs are much less of a threat.

So those MRAPs that Wesley Clark was previously fawning over seem not only to be rather unhelpful, but serious limitations on combat operations. Afghanistan doesn't just need infrastructure to win over hearts and minds - it needs it so our forces can even engage in combat patrols from their vehicles. But is that sort of strategy, necessary to the insulated bases Americans favor, even plausible in Afghanistan?

In Iraq, American forces could win over remote farmlands by swaying urban centers. In Afghanistan, there's little connection between the farmlands and the mudhut villages that pass for towns.

In Iraq, armored vehicles could travel on both the roads and the desert. Here, the paved roads are mostly for outsiders - travelers, truckers and foreign troops; to reach the populace, American forces must find unmapped caravan routes that run through treacherous terrain, routes not designed for their modern military vehicles.

In Iraq, a half-hour firefight was considered a long engagement; here, Marines have fought battles that have lasted as long as eight hours against an enemy whose attacking forces have grown from platoon-size to company-size.

We will not be able to conduct our war from the FOBs. Even with new roads, they would take years to develop and such construction would be marred by constant attacks. Without a real American presence in the countryside, our troops will make little headway against the Taliban. The article overall highlights the lengths to which a strategy of force protection in both our operations and our equipment have undermined our efforts in counterinsurgency. The failure to adequately win over and protect the population of Afghanistan, on the other hand, is quite clear. Instead of having to hide and fight amongst Afghans, the Taliban have adequate resources to field relatively large groups of combatants and have the good sense to clear out civilians before engaging. It is the Taliban, not NATO, that seems to be choosing when and where to engage, and whether or not civilians will be safe.

Perhaps one final passage from Obama's speech warns of a lesson yet to be learnt, and one of dire relevance to Afghanistan, the war on terror and foreign policy in general:

And because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.

Does the lack of historical perspective in this really scare anyone else? Americans cannot help but believe it, but as anyone (like Obama) who's read Niebuhr knows, Americans cannot help but believe a lot of things that are just wrong. Just because we believe that someday we will live in a utopia without ethnic grievance or blind vengeance does not mean we can base our policy on that hope. Winning the war on terror requires addressing the fears of populations which intentionally or inadvertently harbor terrorists. If we cannot understand the very real, very present desires for retaliation and the persistence of tribes, then we cannot understand the fears of anarchy and tribalism that might lead Afghans to support the Taliban rather than what they see as an inept government. It is well and good Obama wants to usher in a new era of peace. But we must begin by recognizing the world as it actually is, not by how we cannot but believe it must become.

A skeptic at the National Mall

I will admit it: my political affinity for Barack Obama has never been entirely consistent. But I did end up voting for him, and while it was incredibly moving to see him sworn in today, I cannot help but think that this day should be as much clarity and recognition of the difficulties that lay ahead as it is celebration. Election night's spontaneity was the best place for genuine, heartfelt happiness. We have known Obama would be President since November. Today should not be considered the start of a honeymoon, but of the real difficulties and challenges that come with actually being President.

To recap: I preferred the benediction to the invocation. Lowery was inclusive, genuine, and good-natured. Warren, on the other hand, seemed neither rhetorically impressive or able to reach far beyond his usual target audience. The poem seemed out of place, especially after a well performed speech.

I emphasize well performed. Because as Obama's first speech as President rather than candidate or President-elect, I found myself dwelling as much on the elements that originally left me skeptical of Obama as on those that lead me to eventually vote for him.

Perhaps the most troubling of the themes Obama outlined in his speech is the pervasive notion that the idea of trade-offs in a time of crisis are admissions of defeat rather than acknowledgments of reality (all emphasis in the speech is mine alone).

These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics. Less measurable but no less profound is a sapping of confidence across our land - a nagging fear that America's decline is inevitable, and that the next generation must lower its sights. Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real. They are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this, America - they will be met.

Obama is right that these challenges will be met. But we will not meet them if we refuse to accept that sometimes, our hopes are too high or misplaced. For example, if we hope for peace in the world, it is not reasonable that we attempt to meet the challenge of spreading democracy or fighting terrorism with unrelenting energy. This sort of message, though, is poisonous to the political discourse of the leader even if it is the tool of a wise critic.

We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began. Our minds are no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year. Our capacity remains undiminished. But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting off unpleasant decisions - that time has surely passed.

Now, of course Obama is going to talk about having to make unpleasant decisions. But there is little hint to what they will be. What I found most interesting about this passage however, was how it was essentially John McCain's argument about the fundamentals of our economy being strong repackaged in a much more rhetorically effective manner. Obama's choice of the word capacity is interesting too - especially as we find it is not the lack of capacity, but overcapacity that will bedevil our plans to speed ourselves out of a recession.

Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions - who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short. For they have forgotten what this country has already done; what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose, and necessity to courage. What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them - that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply.

Are our memories short? Obama is careful not to mention what big plans have been so successful - each can just laugh at those misguided cynics and let their minds wander to the good old days, whatever they are for each ideology. But the fact is that cynics do remember the New Deal, and they can recall the disastrous industrial and agricultural policies that delayed recovery, even if the optimists choose only to remember fireside chats, the FDIC, and Social Security. No, the ground has not shifted beneath cynics - it has shifted beneath the idealists. The past two decades have seen their plans torn asunder by historical force and human fallibility. The plans for a free, democratic and peaceful new world order were undermined by the realities of '90s military interventionism and ultimately shattered by 9/11. The plans for then protecting that order with force to defeat terrorism have squashed the dreams of a different sort of idealists. Domestically, anyone angry at the so-called legacy of deregulation or globalization in today's economic crisis should speak to the neoliberal idealists that permeated the Clinton administration (not just the Bush administration). The universal legitimacy of freedom, democracy, capitalism, and the American way of life and the American way of leadership, are no longer unquestionable. That is the change in ground, and it strikes against ambitious American Presidents, not cynics who are skeptical of the utility of American power abroad and planners' power at home. The prosperity of our lives and the legitimacy of our values are not natural facts.

The old arguments are not necessarily those of cynics - the clash between progressive left and "laissez faire" right on economics could have easily been described as idealist as cynical. Perhaps the use of idealist divisions by politicians who know the issues better is cynicism, but that does not make cynicism manifested as criticism of these idealist positions irrelevant too. Obama delineates that there are no false choices to be made between big and small government, market and intervention, liberty and security - all that remains is for the cynics to step aside, for their criticism and reluctance are the sole obstacle between vision and reality.

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

While I admire Obama's Niebuhrian rhetoric here, Obama grossly simplifies the nature of alliances and convictions. We sacrifice our convictions to maintain our alliances - the United Nations tolerated the totalitarian USSR to defeat fascism, and dictatorships to defeat communism. Nor do I particularly think Obama should dress up any of our challenges today in the garb of the simplified binary rhetoric of world war or cold war. We do not live in a world where our enemies are on one side and our friends another, nor is there any one single struggle that dominates our agenda that can sift nations in such a manner. We face a complex strategic environment where states that befriend us to solve one issue will stonewall us on others.

We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. And yet, at this moment - a moment that will define a generation - it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all. For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies.

I do not find the call to embody the nationalist ethos as disturbing as I am sure some on the libertarian right will, not because I support blindly a government that believes the main problem with its citizens is that they are too individualist, but because this sort of rhetoric is endemic to American politics. After reading Bacevich's New American Militarism, too, one might describe wrapping policies and attitudes in battle flags as the sort of militaristic rhetoric a cynical politician might employ. More importantly, though, we see the main obstacle to success is not the failure of our policies or an overconfidence in our capabilities, but the failure of Americans to adequately embrace the attitude of optimism. It seems like a rhetorical fail-safe - criticizing or resisting any aspect of this ambitious transformation sows the seeds for its failures. Obama may support bipartisanship, but in a campaign that was based on hope, his administration will need to fight not necessarily the voices of Republicans but of doubt. It is a tough fight and not one I think is particularly wise. Because ultimately, the voice of cynicism can be a voice of reason, and we should be careful in these four years of presumed change and renewed hope about making an enemy of it.

Confirmation

Steve Walt has an interesting take on the Clinton confirmation hearings. I tend to go on about how a major difference between partisan policies nowadays is ultimately not whether we exert too much power or too little, but who's exerting it. Hence a Democratic administration that speaks not of "soft power" but of "smart power." Now, while many progressives have cheered the latter as an effective re-branding of the former, Clinton explicitly states it will involve a mix of both military and diplomatic means - "the full range of tools at our disposal. With 'smart power,' diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy." Which all sounds well and good, but what really differentiates it from, say, the second term of the Bush administration? Or many other recent Presidencies? Clinton, as Walt points out, seem to think that if we can just not be the Bush administration, it will be the beloved 1990s again. Americans, remembering the other Clinton, may be inclined to agree. But we're not going back to the 1990s and we can't try acting like we did in the 1990s and expect it to work very well. But clearly, the overriding message throughout most Democratic candidates has never been to claim the exertion of power is wrong, but that power has been squandered or misused. The fundamental insight that we seem to be lacking is that we are becoming less powerful relative to other countries and certainly less powerful relative to our objectives. It is not a matter of "smart power," it is a matter of smart policy to guide that power.

Walt's enumeration of Hillary's unmanageably and impossibly large list of "priorities" is perhaps too kind. Delineating each distinct objective, there are maybe 37 priority items dealing with perhaps 70 or more countries, excluding the rest which would doubtlessly be involved given the profligacy of "global" objectives. Who can imagine what the secondary and tertiary goals of this Department would be? As Walt points out, Clinton's recognition that priorities must actually be prioritized and realistically evaluated does not seem to reflect in her list of primary goals. There seems to be little acknowledgement of what efforts will come at the expense of others, and what goals may prove to be contradictory. For example, the idea that America will have a foreign policy consistent with its democratic values and principles while promoting human rights everywhere possible without being ideological seems a bit dubious as a 'non-ideological' policy. To many in the rest of the world, our commitment to democracy and human rights appears very ideological, and thus pursuing these goals may not be compatible with say, winning the war on Afghanistan which will require the aid of Central Asian countries with some autocratic tendencies. Can we simultaneously engage and strengthen our alliances India and Pakistan in a productive manner? Strengthen NATO and pursue a pragmatic Russian policy? Our foreign policy seems to be not only that we can have our cake and eat it too, but also have NATO, the UN, the G8 bake us cakes that we can continue to both have and eat.

Don't worry, though. We'll sort it out with smart power.

Wars without ends don't easily justify means

The debate over Israel's alleged "war crimes" at the Atlantic lead Jeffrey Goldberg to bring up an interesting point: would we criticize American troops for killing hundreds of Somalis in the battle of Mogadishu?

First off, this seems to be false equivalence. It was not American bombing that inflicted thousands of casualties, nor was the decision to undertake operations that would directly lead to civilian casualties made at the operational level by American commanders. The deaths of American troops resulted from a "kill or be killed" decision made at the tactical level by individual soldiers. Somali gunmen firing from between the legs of civilians were a direct threat to the American soldiers who returned fire. The US did not set out seeking to destroy civilian infrastructure harboring militia members - firing at civilians was an inevitable necessity for individual American troops hoping to protect their own lives. Now, during the bombing one could make a similar argument, although less directly - those Qassam rockets were not going to kill IDF airmen - but the errors being made are slightly different. American troops killed hundreds of Somali civilians because of a lack of foresight by commanders who assumed a quick and easy operation could be conducted without engaging in a protracted urban firefight. Israel, on the other hand, has planned Cast Lead for months and deliberately targeted civilian-housed arms, militant, and Hamas infrastructure. Civilian casualties were treated as a lamentable consequence, but certainly not an unforeseen one. Indeed, some commentators have argued Israel is deliberately paying less attention to collateral damage to ensure the thorough destruction of the military wing of Hamas.

Morally, Israel's actions are lamentable even though they do not likely fall under the commonly enforced definition of war crimes. Legally, they are within Israel's rights and thus justified in that sense. But strategically, they are increasingly misguided. Israel is operating towards ambiguous ends that, as stated so far, seem vastly outstripped by the damage Israel is incurring. Means must be proportional to ends, too, and if Israel is pursuing legally proportional means to a strategically impossible ends, then they are not proportional in strategic terms. Nor, if the perception Israel is waging a pointless war at great human cost, will those deaths be viewed as ethically proportional even if they are in legal terms. International norms and international law are not necessarily synchronized, and not always (as is usually assumed) in favor of military action.

A military option - hot war, or hot air?

So, as the last few days of the Bush administration wind to a close, it's perhaps comforting to know we didn't live through the worst of possible outcomes. New reports reveal that, despite earlier fears and rumors, Bush ultimately rejected Israeli requests to facilitate an attack on Iran. (That being said, Sanger appears to be wrong about his first line. A JPost article I linked to earlier notes that not only did we sell Israel GBU-39s, but they're using them now in Gaza.) Now that the US has handed most of Iraqi airspace back over to Baghdad, it seems Israel's last realistic chance to hit Iran without alienating its allies has passed.

Even if you're of the persuasion that the Iranian nuclear program should be stopped by any means, you should be glad the Israeli option isn't on the table. Letting Israel attack Iran would still result in all the same negative consequences for the US (and Israel) without having anywhere near the military effectiveness of an American lead-strike. While the IDF is well-equipped, its ability to use airpower strategically pales in comparison to the United States and would fall short of the level necessary to land a killing blow on the Iranian nuclear program. The entire reason Israel needed to buy GBU-39s in the first place was so Israeli fighter aircraft (F-15s and F-16s) could project the bunker-busting power without sacrificing the range larger ordnance requires. Even then, it's questionable whether Israel could muster enough forces to hit Arak, Ishafan, or Bushehr, Iranian air defense sites and C4I centers, or significantly hamper Iran's ability to retaliate against Israel by unconventional means.

Furthermore, Israel's ability to permanently cripple the Iranian nuclear program is unlikely. Since Iran's nuclear program is far better distributed than Iraq's in 1980, their planned strike at Natanz would still leave other nuclear facilities open. Even if some of them were hit, Israel would substantially increase the incentive for Iran to develop nuclear arms to deter Israeli attack, while only setting the program back a few years. Iran would also likely expel the IAEA inspectors and reject any sort of international controls on its program. Such an attack would be politically embarrassing enough for the US and EU to allow Russia and China to quietly (if even that subtly) provide political cover and material support for Iranian military and nuclear programs.

Meanwhile, the US would hardly escape the political fallout. Using American designed planes, American built bombs, and flying through what was then American patrolled airspace, the US would have been held just as responsible even if its pilots and aircraft were not directly involved. Iranian retaliatory action in Iraq or the Persian Gulf would be likely. As for the Israelis, the fretting about the comparative handful of rockets from Palestinian refugee camps would be nothing compared to the violence of action Hezbollah could achieve with Iran's full support in a retaliatory operation (or even achieved during the 2006 conflict). While Khamenei stands opposed to utilizing Iranian volunteers as martyrs to retaliate against Gaza, there is little doubt in my mind he would be aggressively backing them to respond to an Israeli attack.

That being said, could the United States really have done any better? Would it be able to in the future?

While American strategic airpower is magnitudes greater than anything Israel could hope to muster (bombers, superior basing locations, carriers in the Gulf, and thus the ability to bring more and heavier firepower to bear), airpower alone might not have the ability to prevent an Iranian nuclear program from continuing. The Bush administration originally mulled tactical nuclear weapons to ensure the destruction of Iranian bunkers. Additionally, there's no guarantee that the people and technological skills can be bombed away with the bunkers.

So, John Robb proposed something different - but, by his own admission, still liable to unleash blowback. Instead of simply targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Robb proposes collapsing the Iranian state, and thus its capability to support a nuclear program at all - using Effects-Basd Operations (EBO) to systematically undermine the Iranian regime. But the notion of EBO was discredited the year that article was written - in Lebanon, Israeli reliance on EBO lead to a fiasco. The US military has effectively renounced the concept. So if the application of airpower at any level is unlikely to achieve the desired outcomes, and a ground intervention remains entirely out of the question, can the US honestly pursue a policy where the military option is kept "on the table?"

The credible deterrence value of such a policy is unclear. For Iran to believe we would allow an open-ended conflict we are unprepared to deal with across the Middle East (and into Central Asia where Iran's influence in Afghanistan might come into play), America would be the one playing the role of a "rogue state" that does not recognize Iran's deterrent through insurgency and state sponsored terrorism. But the military option has too much value as a political signal to voters scared of an Iranian bomb, and to countries thinking of withdrawing from the non-proliferation treaty, since the prospect of two countries withdrawing from the treaty and pursuing the nuclear bomb would undermine the NPT's credibility.

So even if diplomatic engagement with Iran is ultimately necessary, does the US really have a fall-back plan for Iran? I'll throw in my ideas later...

The justice and (f)utility of force in Gaza

As Israeli troops enter Gaza and the human cost of Operation Cast Lead mounts, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify - on moral or strategic grounds - the actions of the IDF. While Israel does have a right to defend itself against attack, it is unlikely that by any standards of just war that Israel is acting proportionately. The morality of interactions between polities - the legalistic morality idealists would like to govern international affairs - does indeed entitle Israel to recourse through force of arms. But war is a broad thing - and it is the execution of this retaliation, not its initiation, that one must examine if one would like any claim to fighting a "just war."

There is a mode of thought, present among proponents of Cast Lead as it is among all modern belligerents, that cuts off its concern with moralism once victimhood entitles one to retaliation. After that point, the ends of retaliation justify the means - military necessity and political-self preservation take precedent. While this argument usually attempts to extend the morality of beginning retaliation to all aspects of its conduct, the underlying message that morality is less relevant, if not irrelevant once both sides are in combat. The only relevant morality is that which entitles the victim to retaliation. There is a case to be made for emphasizing the moral objective or achieving retaliation of winning a conflict at the expense of moral conduct in battle, but it is not one we associate with the notion of just war theory.

When a government wages a war on the proposition that protecting innocent civilians from being bombed, proportionality in its own measures, especially when they are concentrated against an enemy that is not distinct from the civilian population, is necessary. Even in WWII, when the Allies conducted a policy of "total war," that conflict's inherent basis in a state system provided grounds for waging wars against countries (ones that did not recognize in themselves a separation between people and government) with established governments. But Israel does not intend to recognize Hamas as a legitimate government, and therefore it cannot simply write off the Palestinian people's desire for safety and claim they are conducting a just war, and not just invoking the idea of one.

Our sense of proportionality is inextricable from our preferences among the belligerents. How many commentators who claimed Russia's actions in Georgia were disproportionate now support Operation Cast Lead? This is likely why the notion of just war will remain more an elastic clause for belligerents than what it was intended as - an actual constraint on the use of force. Instead, it has become an enabler.

That being said, the ultimate reality of the situation is that even if Israel were to embrace a consequentialist outlook and use whatever means necessary to destroy Hamas, it will doom Cast Lead to failure. Israel's goal of destroying Hamas will prove incompatible with its goal of protecting its population without being forced to conduct a long occupation. Even as the IDF estimates it is killing and capturing hundreds of terrorists a day, more rockets keep falling on Israel. Destroying Hamas would likely require a long operation that approaches the problem in keeping with successful counterinsurgency tactics. Because counterinsurgency and modern warfare has become population-centric, simply going out and killing all of the terrorists is not possible and will not be helpful. Without a significant and sustained military presence, it is unlikely Israel will be able to remove Hamas from the fabric of Palestinian society or , and once Israel does leave Hamas can claim a propaganda victory since Hamas, contrary to Israel's aims, still exists as an armed force. Even if Hamas were to be destroyed, Ehud Barak's objective of ensuring there is "no terror activity in Gaza" would not be achieved. More radical groups like Islamic Jihad, who've been waiting for this war all along, could step in to fill the power vacuum. Gaza without Hamas would be more anarchic and unpredictable than before.

I do not expect the United States to make an all-out effort to resolve this misguided conflict, (especially since our diplomatic sympathies lie deeply enough with Israel to favor its perspective). Nor, ultimately, would it likely be able to. Ehud Barak and the Israeli government are acting out of their own interests and needs, and we will not make much headway in convincing the Israelis not to do so. America has its own share of flawed wars that need attention, and regional crises of much more direct relevance to American interests. There are some who would like to hand Israel-Palestine over to Clinton as soon as Obama is in office (Israel's ground operations will most likely be done with). Some Clinton proponents believed she would be the perfect Secretary of State to handle negotiations, thanks to her credibility among Israeli hawks, past sympathies for Palestinians and association with the most peaceful and (potentially) productive periods in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. But in the wake of Cast Lead, staking her credibility and legacy to dealing with an intractable conflict that will be of secondary importance to our own wars (and their necessary regional diplomatic efforts) does not strike me as a particularly good idea.

Finance, Industrial Policy and The Limits of Power

I've been reading a lot of Andrew Bacevich lately, and while I may not be enamored with all of his diagnosis or prescriptions for the ailing American hegemon, they are impossible to ignore. At the very least lend a very useful framework for analyzing our present predicament. One of Bacevich's most important observations on domestic politics is that an ideology of "National Security" has, for the past 60 years, justified a relentless expansion of executive power.

TARP has given this expansion new relevance. Because bailout plans are guaranteed to fail if their credibility is undermined by major changes, the short-term well being of the economy is hostage to the will and whimsy of the executive branch. In Bacevich's latest book, America's economic ills consist of its entitlement to a culture of consumption and its underpinnings - cheap credit, cheap oil, and cheap imported goods. As far as economic policy goes, the conservative Bacevich savages Reagan's rhetoric of indulgent individualism. Because economic debate in the United States remains a left vs. right, government vs. market affair (even as the President once decried as "laissez-faire" does more to move America towards "socialism" than any has in years), it is tempting to analyze Bacevich in the same way. Such rhetoric compels the disgruntled to come away from The Limits of Power with a worldview that finds free market ideology complicit with this culture of consumption, and thus the obvious solution with a stronger government that can rein in finance, promote alternative energy and rebuild American industry to wean it off of imports. Reject "market fundamentalism," and the culture of consumption might wither away.

But such an interpretation is naive, if not delusional. If anything, Bacevich's thesis that our economic addictions are rooted beneath the veneer of partisan politics requires us to recognize it as naive and delusional. We have already seen a massive expansion in government power and reining in of the free market, and it has only served to further promote the underpinnings of this "culture of consumption." We have spent over a trillion already and potentially guarantee trillions more to ensure access to credit. The business cycle has taken care of cheap oil for us. As for cheap imported goods, perhaps the government might take a step in the "right" direction. But if you asked me, the widening trade deficit is more a symptom of our refusal to save than of a dangerous reliance on foreign products.

The evolving manifestations of America's insatiable entitlement have substituted government for the market to facilitate its addiction to consumption-fueled growth. The ideology of "National Security" may now find a new place in the bailout debates and industrial policy. Wesley Clark insists that the maintenance of American military power relies on the protection of our auto industry, and justifies his claims with a variety of arguments similar to those The Limits of Power targets. Take one paragraph:

In a little more than a year, the Army has procured and fielded in Iraq more than a thousand so-called mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles. The lives of hundreds of soldiers and marines have been saved, and their tasks made more achievable, by the efforts of the American automotive industry. And unlike in World War II, America didn’t have to divert much civilian capacity to meet these military needs. Without a vigorous automotive sector, those needs could not have been quickly met.

The ideology of "National Security" in The Limits of Power functions as an elastic clause to justify whatever the United States would prefer to do in the interest of power. In this case, Clark identifies the interests of American national security not just with equipping its massive military, but in paving the way for its transformation into fighting counterinsurgency and the war on terror. But he also implies that such debt is necessary so that these wars can be fought without influencing civilian life, hoping to insulate Americans from even indirect civic liability in their conflicts.

We should not be surprised if economic nationalist rhetoric strengthens its rhetoric of national security. The steel industry is never far behind in making similar arguments. While it may seem outlandish to read all such articles through the lens of Bacevich's thesis, it is important to fully absorb the book's argument. The culture of consumption and faith in militarism that brought us to this point was not the making of any one person or party. Neither will the effort that overcomes it be. If we accept his criticism of the past, we must recognize its relevance to our present and future, regardless of who is leading us.

I do not consider Bacevich one of the best critics of the Bush administration because I agree with him entirely (I do not think we can so easily and confidently revert to the purely defensive, conventional military posture he advocates, among other things). I consider Bacevich one of the best critics of the Bush administration because he understands the Bush administration's worst flaws in their proper context - not as the sole responsibility of some cabal that has hijacked America, but as the manifestation of long-term trends at all levels of government and society that both parties and most Americans have comfortably allowed to run rampant, if not encouraged. The root problems will not disappear simply because the party has changed even if the symptoms manifest themselves differently. The most sobering part of The Limits of Power is that we can see the trends it identifies continuing to manifest themselves today. Obsession with immediate economic gratification at the expense of managing debt, messianic ambitions of America's role in world affairs, a national security strategy focused on the "imperial periphery" and the appropriation of the concept to justify the interests of selfish interests in a broken system - these have not disappeared. The current iterations of these actions - the financial bailout, the move away from reducing budget deficits, our desire to regain moral world leadership and fix Afghanistan, to help American industries - are arguably more justified and clear-sighted than those of the Bush administration. But as the country waits in anticipation of the inauguration and an era of change, it is important to remember not only the limits the Bush administration came up against in exercising power abroad, but the limits we will face in truly changing how it is exercised.

You Break America, You Buy American?

Chrysler is set to get a $4 billion loan from the US Treasury to aid its restructuring, the latest in a line of concessions to the American auto industry. I remain skeptical of the utility of these measures. At best, they will likely continue to struggle against foreign automakers with plants in other US States. At worst, there are now concerns we will set off a new wave of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, where "ghosts of Smoot and Hawley... will not announce themselves in their full protectionist garb."

Advocates of industry bailouts declaim criticism of these rescue packages as hypocrites and union-bashers, who would shovel trillions to Wall Street fraudsters whose con games with imaginary money created this mess, while scorning the real, Main Street Americans in Detroit who "make things" and are merely the victims of corporate greed and corruption. However, until financial liquidity is based on the provision of automobiles and not dollars, the same standards simply do not apply. Indeed, our government is theoretically ensuring trillions of dollars to prop up the financial sector. But that does not mean that other industries automatically deserve similar treatment.

No, the real problem with bailout hypocrisy will come when other American industries start demanding their own bailouts, handouts, and government directed favoritism. After all, Americans make more than just cars, and they have stopped buying more than just cars since this recession has hit. The process has already begun with Obama's proposed economic stimulus. The steel industry, for instance, has asked that a "buy American" clause be inserted into any stimulus legislation. Given that the most likely stimulus packages will focus heavily on infrastructure, this would amount to billions in guaranteed purchases of American steel. Theoretically the Keynesian multiplier effect would justify these costs, since the steel workers could in turn spend money and stimulate the economy further. But with the stimulus multiplier of 1.1 or lower likely and other potential pitfalls and inefficiencies to fiscal policy, it would make more sense to provide as many public goods as possible at the lowest cost. That means buying cheaper raw materials even if they come from abroad.

This is more important than just saving money by buying cheaper foreign products, though. Countries like China are desperate to provide some form of stimulus through exports, as their own citizens and governments are unlikely to provide an increase in consumption or spending significant enough to prevent serious slowdowns. In steel, for example, China may already be promoting its companies to export. Should we mix economic recovery with economic nationalism, these countries will have to respond with programs of economic nationalism of their own to compensate for being shut out abroad. Between Treasury involving itself in industry and not just finance and the potential of a "buy American" stimulus, perhaps these claims that fiscal policy might lead to global trade wars may not be so alarmist after all.