Busy Brazil

Attention to South American security politics tends to gravitate towards its most colorful and belligerent constituent state, Venezuela. With its oil reserves, multi-billion defense contracts, vocal opposition to US and Colombian policies, and occasional saber-rattling, it is easy to overlook the emerging power broker on the continent and wider Latin American affairs (besides, of course, the US), Brazil.

When Manuel Zelaya chose to return to Tegucigalpa, he did not go with Hugo Chavez, who previously threatened to militarily depose the transitional government. He stays in the embassy of Brazil. While controversy follows Venezuela's decision to purchase old missiles, tanks, and aircraft from Russia for $2.2 billion, Brazil is making a $4-7 billion deal to purchase state-of-the-art Rafale fighters from France, and is also seeking to buy submarines. Of course, Brazilian procurement politics mean efforts to produce its own nuclear submarines and helicopters will intensify, and fears of a Latin American arms race have ensued.

Most recently, the Brazilian Vice President, Jose Alencar, suggested that Brazil should seek nuclear weapons. Alencar has served as defense minister and ideologically, is a businessman of the Brazilian center-right, who Lula de Silva brought on to calm fears of his leftism. He is not the final word on Brazilian policy, but given Brazil's history and its current arms buildup, it is an opinion worth considering.

Brazil and Argentina pursued sophisticated and simultaneous nuclear arms programs during the Cold War. They bilaterally chose to scale them down for peaceful purposes, the but the capability to militarize these efforts remains. Taken in context with Brazil's role in the Honduran dispute and its military build-up, government officials pondering a nuclear program is an important reminder that even in a relatively peaceful region, military strength is still a vital element of national power. Democratic states pursuing idealistic goals (like supporting democracy abroad) are not content to rely on their virtue or economies in the pursuit of their national interest.

That Brazil might seek nuclear arms and a strong military, the accoutrement of a "20th century" power, even though the thought of this clearly bothers its neighbors, while seeking a greater role in Latin America and in the world (perhaps as a Latin American UN Security Council representative), is hardly contradictory. While the US declares a new "21st century" of shared interests, cooperation and de-nuclearization, Brazil seeks to be recognized as a great power on its own terms. Of course, Brazil is not about to embark on a war against anyone. But as new powers rise, let's remember that hard power, not just wealth or international goodwill, is still on the agenda.

What we meant by 'compromise...'

... Was Russia conceding to us. Joe Biden, after convincing the Arab media that we were going to let Israel go and bomb the Iranians, continues to tactlessly undermine Obama's diplomacy. This isn't a "good cop, bad cop" thing, this is a "good cop, incompetent cop" sort of thing. The headline in the WSJ says it all; Biden Says Weakened Russia will Bend to U.S. Money quote:

"It won't work if we go in and say: 'Hey, you need us, man; belly up to the bar and pay your dues,' " he said. "It is never smart to embarrass an individual or a country when they're dealing with significant loss of face. My dad used to put it another way: Never put another man in a corner where the only way out is over you."

This is correct. Usually, when the US wants to embarrass countries, this sort of thing only works after we've totally devastated them. So too is it correct to note that Russia's demographic situation is terrible, as we keep getting stories about campaigns for state-sponsored babymaking. It is also true that the economic crisis has cut the legs out from under Gazprom, and that trying to paper over chronic institutional failures to develop a market system that is not always prefaced with terms like "mafia" or "oligarchic" with resource revenues may not be a viable strategy.

But please, did this sort of thing work in the '90s? Russia was weaker then and saying, "Well Russia, there are no more spheres of influence, your economy is in the toilet, you're just going to have to shut up and let us run things from here" got us to exactly where we are now. Just because we won the Cold War doesn't mean that Russia must ask "how high" when we say "jump." As far as making commitments or claims to influence countries don't have the influence to back up, could we note our continued commitment to let Georgia enter NATO? After all, how much value does NATO-membership have if we showed we clearly weren't interested in defending Georgia?

Now, I am not saying that the US must necessarily be so conciliatory as the "reset" policy requires. Frankly, if the US thinks "reset" is a way to solidify its primacy among the world powers, it is quite mistaken. "Resetting" would require a substantive acknowledgement of a multipolarity that Biden is clearly not interested in and that I do not think the American public is particularly interested in either. If we think we're going to try and play nice with Russia by simply dismantling BMD but still insisting on NATO expansion and criticizing the Russian government, we might fool ourselves but we will not fool Russia. Russians are not so enraptured by Obama as much of the world is, and we are quickly exhausting Russian goodwill with statements like this, and they will refuse to concede to save face for the weakness we have illuminated.

Now, never mind that Russia is still aiming (if not necessarily succeeding) to reestablish its sphere of influence and that we're not doing much about it but talking and expecting them to stop. Georgia proved that we didn't actually see our new NATO members as worth going to war, but now we're supposed to add them despite proof that we don't particularly care enough to die for them? We have to remember that part of what made NATO an effective deterrent was placing US soldiers in Europe. Are we going to commit the resources to show we're willing to defend Georgia or Ukraine in the future? I know I have advocated NATO expansion in the past, but my opinion is either we don't expand it or if we do, we make sure it actually has a deterring effect on war. A middle course is just kidding ourselves. I have similar views on the "reset." If we want Russia to concede out of weakness, we're playing hardball, not "resetting" anything. If we want to make concessions of our own, then a "reset" will seem realistic. But refusing to make concessions and then expecting Russia to "bend" will require putting more pressure on Russia than we are willing to pursue. The best Russia policy is an open question. I can definitely say it isn't the self-contradicting one Biden is advocating now.

This moment in geopolitics...

In the spirit of posts that aren't too long, here's some interesting news from places we haven't been hearing too much about in the mainstream news sources (with one exception for Pakistan and Afghanistan, which I hope everyone has been hearing about).

While Clinton has been touring Asia and making headlines about India and Iran, a few papers picked up on some of her comments about another possible nuclear threat to the region - Burma (Yes, I call it Burma). Though Clinton has tried to remain somewhat ambiguous about Burma's nuclear ambitions and capability, I can understand why we might not want to make too big of a fuss about this yet. After all, it wasn't too long ago Clinton lent credibility to a baseless conspiracy theory about Iran penetrating Central America through some sort of "mega-embassy" in Nicaragua. While Burma is probably somewhat far off in terms of its technical capability, it is certainly something to be concerned about. North Korea will sell nuclear technology to just about anybody willing to pay, and Burma, a partner of Russia and China despite international calls in the wake of protests, devastating typhoons, and the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi, might be resistant to further isolation. After ratcheting calls for intervention or infringing on Burmese sovereignty after each incident (and the DPRK's mockery of international nonproliferation efforts), a nuke might look pretty attractive to Naypyidaw.

Elsewhere, the Hague arbitrated the Abyei dispute between Sudan proper (north Sudan) and south Sudan. While Darfur captures most international attention, problems between north and south Sudan are gaining more attention. Rightly so - the 2011 referendum on independence, and this disputed territory here discussed, could give us the 3rd Sudanese Civil War, a continuation of one of the post-WWII era's bloodiest conflicts. On top of that, both sides are rearming - with a bit of US training assistance for the south, too. Keep an eye on this one.

Biden, in addition to being the de facto "special envoy" to Iraq (a country he tried to all-but-dismember circa 2005-2006), is busy repeating the American line in Georgia. Biden argues that the notion of a sphere of influence belongs in the 19th century. I would argue in response that yes, we can wish that, but that naive hope we can prevent great powers (especially Russia) from believing they should pursue a sphere of influence when it is within their power without actual deterrence is a naive notion that belongs to the utopians of the late 20th century.

On to bigger things - the Pakistani military, after the near-debacle that was its counterinsurgency campaign in Swat, is not exactly eager to deal with Baluchistan or the retreating Taliban from the offensive in Afghanistan. The military still seems to be pushing for the "make India give up Kashmir" option. However, Obama's done a good job, like Bush, of resisting the absurd Kashmir scheme and pursuing constructive great power diplomacy with India. Dealing with Afghanistan isn't getting any easier...

Back to East Africa, it seems conflict from Somalia is spilling over its borders again. With the TFG holding something like a few blocks of territory in Mogadishu, it's no surprise to me that Al Shabab ("The Youth," or "The Lads") is looking to go after countries like Kenya which generally oppose the Islamist movements and fighters in the horn. Over a decade ago Kenya was the victim of a major attack that helped put AQ on the international radar - now it seems that violence might come from closer to home.

A while back Daniel Drezner pointed out that the financial crisis would test theories of international great power relations that have been sidelined in favor of the debate over the war on terror and the neoconservatives vs. all-comers debate. Some scholars went so far as to point out Bush's relatively successful handling of East Asian affairs as evidence the administration did not fail on the "big" issue of great power politics.

But here we are in 2009, with a financial crisis throwing political and economic order into tumult across the globe. Theoretically, if globalization sputters to a halt and war breaks out between countries previously bound by international trade, we should deem liberal theorists correct. But perhaps of more interest to realists, or anyone concerned about shifting balances of power, would be the relative effects of economic decline. Certainly, global trade may face enormous setbacks. The G20's word on preserving free trade has been continually discredited by the actions of its member nations. It will not help that these international ties are weakened. But even if 5% of the world economy evaporates in a global market correction and the economy crashes, does that mean all countries are equally stricken by the loss? Of course not. Almost certainly, some countries have and will suffer more than others. The question is which ones, and what implications will their losses have on the global political order?

It is false to assume economic calamity automatically begets open state-vs.-state warfare. The 19th century panics produced no wars in their wake. WWI came at a time of unprecedented great power economic integration. (Internal conflict, on the other hand, is much more likely.)

Germany benefited disproportionately from the economic growth of the late 19th century thanks to the territorial acquisition of its predecessor states, while Russian economic growth in the early 20th century accelerated thanks to reform and investment (to some extent rearmament played a role in this, though arguably Russian rearmament was the reward, not the cause, of this growth spurt). The outcome, by the argument of some realists, was WWI - a nervous France and Britain seeking to hedge against Germany, and a Germany fearful of a modern, and thus preponderant, Russia on its border with its primary ally facing an existential threat. Economic changes altered the balance of power, and war was the result.

While history cannot tell us who will be facing down who in the aftermath of these recessions, it is likely the uneven setbacks and uneven recoveries that will drive great power political impacts, with the prospect of major combat delayed until revisionist great powers feel comfortable with challenging the ruling order. It takes time, after all, for economic disruptions to change the military status quo. The instruments of modern interstate warfare are costly and complex, and the tools necessary to challenge US air and naval superiority are especially so. Nuclear programs that could deter them take even more time, and are subject to international pressure. But the process by which a great power or minor power decides the US and its allies are unwilling or unable to prevent its gambit, by realist theory, would be inevitable.

Of course, this might not be the future at all. The US, contrary to worries that China is "buying low" on foreign assets and resources, might regain some sign of its traditional economic flexibility and come out the strongest. After all, China is wracked with all sorts of challenges to its seemingly permanent rise. Even if it does seem to come out ahead of the United States in relative terms, this recovery might require its government to forgo military spending so it can placate the population with developing schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure left behind by decades of short-term growth obsession.

With that in mind, I do not consider China's shenanigans in the South China Sea to be of profound consequence. They are not a harbinger of war, if anything they are a repeat of China's previous early-term showdowns as many commentators have pointed out. But they also serve to remind us of China's lingering (or growing, depending on your take) ambitions. China's interpretation of international law is ludicrous - exclusive economic zones are exclusive for economic purposes, they are not sovereign Chinese waters; China cannot exclude whatever vessels it will. The story is that the USNS Impeccable was mapping the seafloor, while China contends the hydrographic vessel was gathering military intelligence. Both could be correct. After all, scoping out the area around Hainan provides valuable intelligence for American submariners and subhunters, and as much of China's naval strategy relies on its southern approach, securing Hainan is vital to the PLA Navy.

Does the possibility of war between the US and China, or any combination of great powers, remain? Colin Gray believes so, and writes a convincing case for what is now an unfashionable argument: insurgency and terror are part of our present predicament but must not dictate strategy or force structure. But in America's Defense Meltdown, William S. Lind's chapter on the USN warns:

Overwhelming any comparison of fleets is the fact that war with either Russia or China would represent a catastrophic failure of American strategy. Such wars would be disastrous for all parties, regardless of their outcomes. In a world where the most important strategic reality is a non-Marxist “withering away of the state,” the United States needs both Russia and China to be strong, successful states. They need the United States to be the same. Defeat of any of the three global powers by another would likely yield a new, vast, stateless region, which is to say a great victory for the forces of the Fourth Generation. No American armed service should be designed for wars our most vital interest dictates we not fight.

Both economic and military catastrophe has the habit of producing insurgency. Earlier I parenthetically noted the danger to internal, not international peace, from this economic crisis. It is now cliche to cite Mexico and Pakistan as nearly-failed states, and it will likely soon be the same to lament Eastern Europe's financial insolvency. Then there are the already anarchic regions of Somalia and the DRC. Meanwhile America is still mired in Afghanistan and will have 50,000 "non-combat" (a meaningless distinction by most analysts' estimates) soldiers in Iraq. Despite the pressing need for successful counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, the financial crisis will test Europe's will in Afghanistan as NATO governments struggle to resolve the paradox of their commitment: the arbitrary limitations on the size and scope of European deployment will hinder the overall war effort, while the perceived failure of this effort further undermines Western support for the conflict's counterinsurgency campaign.

I do not hold the views of those fearing great power confrontation and state-vs.-state warfare and the "COINdinistas" and those focused on terrorism and "fourth generation" warfare to be necessarily incompatible. For example, while military conservatives argue that counterinsurgency campaigns will drain the country's military resources and willpower, counterinsurgents like David Kilcullen would respond that direct combat should be avoided until absolutely necessary. But there remain some glaring contradictions. Will non-state actors develop the capability to attack the modern "market-state" and thus force a revolution in strategic thinking, or does Thucydides remain the best guide for geopolitics? Should the US military strip down to fight the wars it is most likely to fight, or redouble its commitment to deterring great power conflict?

There are immediate limitations. On one hand, military spending seems like it will be crowded out by the massively expansionary spending of the Obama administration. For better or for worse, the government has reoriented towards domestic spending and the Obama-Gates team seems deadset on cost control for big projects like the F-22 and Future Combat System. This means the United States may not be able to ensure continued dominance in conventional affairs and restructure itself for COIN. Meanwhile, the wars America is presently fighting both dictate America's current military affairs (forcing America to learn COIN, leave, or lose - even former US commanders are saying America will be deployed in Afghanistan until 2025 to win) and circumscribe short and near term options. The consequence of the costly and difficult war on terror, piled on top of financial crisis, may be the sapping of American willpower and a retrenchment of power projection capability.

A possible, if hardly certain answer seems to be that warfare itself will, of course, evolve with the nature of the entities prosecuting it. War, by either the great power or COIN model, is still subject to Clausewitz's principles. But regular warfare is likely to become increasingly irregular, which means that state will adopt characteristics we identify with non-state actors, while irregular forces will become increasingly professional as they improve their technical capacities and the skill of their personnel. In other words, the true challenge is not necessarily to shift the military irrevocably in one direction or another, but to create a military (and a national security apparatus in general) that is flexible enough to respond to future threats. While it is likely impossible to satisfy both needs simultaneously, the military must become "a learning institution," while the procurement process must be radically overhauled so that weapons systems can at the very least be debated on their practical merit, not their political worth as jobs programs and corporate welfare.

This is, of course, easier said than done. Our Jominian, enemy-centric tendencies are still quite apparent in Pakistan, and the temptation now seems to be to kill as many AQ as we can, get out and leave, while hoping that any of the countless people we've alienated don't do anything else to disrupt our strategic interest. American politics, defense bureaucracy, and international institutions like NATO are not entirely conducive to counterinsurgency or anything that hints of a long term operation. Are we better off preparing for conventional war simply because that's what we know how to fight? Past experience tells us this is the case, and that the illusion counterinsurgency is something the US doesn't need to dirty its hands with will come undone eventually.

Confirmation

Steve Walt has an interesting take on the Clinton confirmation hearings. I tend to go on about how a major difference between partisan policies nowadays is ultimately not whether we exert too much power or too little, but who's exerting it. Hence a Democratic administration that speaks not of "soft power" but of "smart power." Now, while many progressives have cheered the latter as an effective re-branding of the former, Clinton explicitly states it will involve a mix of both military and diplomatic means - "the full range of tools at our disposal. With 'smart power,' diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy." Which all sounds well and good, but what really differentiates it from, say, the second term of the Bush administration? Or many other recent Presidencies? Clinton, as Walt points out, seem to think that if we can just not be the Bush administration, it will be the beloved 1990s again. Americans, remembering the other Clinton, may be inclined to agree. But we're not going back to the 1990s and we can't try acting like we did in the 1990s and expect it to work very well. But clearly, the overriding message throughout most Democratic candidates has never been to claim the exertion of power is wrong, but that power has been squandered or misused. The fundamental insight that we seem to be lacking is that we are becoming less powerful relative to other countries and certainly less powerful relative to our objectives. It is not a matter of "smart power," it is a matter of smart policy to guide that power.

Walt's enumeration of Hillary's unmanageably and impossibly large list of "priorities" is perhaps too kind. Delineating each distinct objective, there are maybe 37 priority items dealing with perhaps 70 or more countries, excluding the rest which would doubtlessly be involved given the profligacy of "global" objectives. Who can imagine what the secondary and tertiary goals of this Department would be? As Walt points out, Clinton's recognition that priorities must actually be prioritized and realistically evaluated does not seem to reflect in her list of primary goals. There seems to be little acknowledgement of what efforts will come at the expense of others, and what goals may prove to be contradictory. For example, the idea that America will have a foreign policy consistent with its democratic values and principles while promoting human rights everywhere possible without being ideological seems a bit dubious as a 'non-ideological' policy. To many in the rest of the world, our commitment to democracy and human rights appears very ideological, and thus pursuing these goals may not be compatible with say, winning the war on Afghanistan which will require the aid of Central Asian countries with some autocratic tendencies. Can we simultaneously engage and strengthen our alliances India and Pakistan in a productive manner? Strengthen NATO and pursue a pragmatic Russian policy? Our foreign policy seems to be not only that we can have our cake and eat it too, but also have NATO, the UN, the G8 bake us cakes that we can continue to both have and eat.

Don't worry, though. We'll sort it out with smart power.

Finance, Industrial Policy and The Limits of Power

I've been reading a lot of Andrew Bacevich lately, and while I may not be enamored with all of his diagnosis or prescriptions for the ailing American hegemon, they are impossible to ignore. At the very least lend a very useful framework for analyzing our present predicament. One of Bacevich's most important observations on domestic politics is that an ideology of "National Security" has, for the past 60 years, justified a relentless expansion of executive power.

TARP has given this expansion new relevance. Because bailout plans are guaranteed to fail if their credibility is undermined by major changes, the short-term well being of the economy is hostage to the will and whimsy of the executive branch. In Bacevich's latest book, America's economic ills consist of its entitlement to a culture of consumption and its underpinnings - cheap credit, cheap oil, and cheap imported goods. As far as economic policy goes, the conservative Bacevich savages Reagan's rhetoric of indulgent individualism. Because economic debate in the United States remains a left vs. right, government vs. market affair (even as the President once decried as "laissez-faire" does more to move America towards "socialism" than any has in years), it is tempting to analyze Bacevich in the same way. Such rhetoric compels the disgruntled to come away from The Limits of Power with a worldview that finds free market ideology complicit with this culture of consumption, and thus the obvious solution with a stronger government that can rein in finance, promote alternative energy and rebuild American industry to wean it off of imports. Reject "market fundamentalism," and the culture of consumption might wither away.

But such an interpretation is naive, if not delusional. If anything, Bacevich's thesis that our economic addictions are rooted beneath the veneer of partisan politics requires us to recognize it as naive and delusional. We have already seen a massive expansion in government power and reining in of the free market, and it has only served to further promote the underpinnings of this "culture of consumption." We have spent over a trillion already and potentially guarantee trillions more to ensure access to credit. The business cycle has taken care of cheap oil for us. As for cheap imported goods, perhaps the government might take a step in the "right" direction. But if you asked me, the widening trade deficit is more a symptom of our refusal to save than of a dangerous reliance on foreign products.

The evolving manifestations of America's insatiable entitlement have substituted government for the market to facilitate its addiction to consumption-fueled growth. The ideology of "National Security" may now find a new place in the bailout debates and industrial policy. Wesley Clark insists that the maintenance of American military power relies on the protection of our auto industry, and justifies his claims with a variety of arguments similar to those The Limits of Power targets. Take one paragraph:

In a little more than a year, the Army has procured and fielded in Iraq more than a thousand so-called mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles. The lives of hundreds of soldiers and marines have been saved, and their tasks made more achievable, by the efforts of the American automotive industry. And unlike in World War II, America didn’t have to divert much civilian capacity to meet these military needs. Without a vigorous automotive sector, those needs could not have been quickly met.

The ideology of "National Security" in The Limits of Power functions as an elastic clause to justify whatever the United States would prefer to do in the interest of power. In this case, Clark identifies the interests of American national security not just with equipping its massive military, but in paving the way for its transformation into fighting counterinsurgency and the war on terror. But he also implies that such debt is necessary so that these wars can be fought without influencing civilian life, hoping to insulate Americans from even indirect civic liability in their conflicts.

We should not be surprised if economic nationalist rhetoric strengthens its rhetoric of national security. The steel industry is never far behind in making similar arguments. While it may seem outlandish to read all such articles through the lens of Bacevich's thesis, it is important to fully absorb the book's argument. The culture of consumption and faith in militarism that brought us to this point was not the making of any one person or party. Neither will the effort that overcomes it be. If we accept his criticism of the past, we must recognize its relevance to our present and future, regardless of who is leading us.

I do not consider Bacevich one of the best critics of the Bush administration because I agree with him entirely (I do not think we can so easily and confidently revert to the purely defensive, conventional military posture he advocates, among other things). I consider Bacevich one of the best critics of the Bush administration because he understands the Bush administration's worst flaws in their proper context - not as the sole responsibility of some cabal that has hijacked America, but as the manifestation of long-term trends at all levels of government and society that both parties and most Americans have comfortably allowed to run rampant, if not encouraged. The root problems will not disappear simply because the party has changed even if the symptoms manifest themselves differently. The most sobering part of The Limits of Power is that we can see the trends it identifies continuing to manifest themselves today. Obsession with immediate economic gratification at the expense of managing debt, messianic ambitions of America's role in world affairs, a national security strategy focused on the "imperial periphery" and the appropriation of the concept to justify the interests of selfish interests in a broken system - these have not disappeared. The current iterations of these actions - the financial bailout, the move away from reducing budget deficits, our desire to regain moral world leadership and fix Afghanistan, to help American industries - are arguably more justified and clear-sighted than those of the Bush administration. But as the country waits in anticipation of the inauguration and an era of change, it is important to remember not only the limits the Bush administration came up against in exercising power abroad, but the limits we will face in truly changing how it is exercised.

You Break America, You Buy American?

Chrysler is set to get a $4 billion loan from the US Treasury to aid its restructuring, the latest in a line of concessions to the American auto industry. I remain skeptical of the utility of these measures. At best, they will likely continue to struggle against foreign automakers with plants in other US States. At worst, there are now concerns we will set off a new wave of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, where "ghosts of Smoot and Hawley... will not announce themselves in their full protectionist garb."

Advocates of industry bailouts declaim criticism of these rescue packages as hypocrites and union-bashers, who would shovel trillions to Wall Street fraudsters whose con games with imaginary money created this mess, while scorning the real, Main Street Americans in Detroit who "make things" and are merely the victims of corporate greed and corruption. However, until financial liquidity is based on the provision of automobiles and not dollars, the same standards simply do not apply. Indeed, our government is theoretically ensuring trillions of dollars to prop up the financial sector. But that does not mean that other industries automatically deserve similar treatment.

No, the real problem with bailout hypocrisy will come when other American industries start demanding their own bailouts, handouts, and government directed favoritism. After all, Americans make more than just cars, and they have stopped buying more than just cars since this recession has hit. The process has already begun with Obama's proposed economic stimulus. The steel industry, for instance, has asked that a "buy American" clause be inserted into any stimulus legislation. Given that the most likely stimulus packages will focus heavily on infrastructure, this would amount to billions in guaranteed purchases of American steel. Theoretically the Keynesian multiplier effect would justify these costs, since the steel workers could in turn spend money and stimulate the economy further. But with the stimulus multiplier of 1.1 or lower likely and other potential pitfalls and inefficiencies to fiscal policy, it would make more sense to provide as many public goods as possible at the lowest cost. That means buying cheaper raw materials even if they come from abroad.

This is more important than just saving money by buying cheaper foreign products, though. Countries like China are desperate to provide some form of stimulus through exports, as their own citizens and governments are unlikely to provide an increase in consumption or spending significant enough to prevent serious slowdowns. In steel, for example, China may already be promoting its companies to export. Should we mix economic recovery with economic nationalism, these countries will have to respond with programs of economic nationalism of their own to compensate for being shut out abroad. Between Treasury involving itself in industry and not just finance and the potential of a "buy American" stimulus, perhaps these claims that fiscal policy might lead to global trade wars may not be so alarmist after all.

The Last Shots of 2008

A month ago I referred to relying on resolving the Kashmir dispute to accomplish our foreign policy goals in South Asia is akin to relying on resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute to accomplish our foreign policy goals in the Middle East. So, true to form, the ceasefire in Gaza has erupted into violence that may lead up to a major ground offensive.

Just as in Kashmir, we would have to put pressure on a nominally allied country to gain the favor of Muslims. It is unlikely we will see any sort of grand settlement without moving Israel closer to its pre-1967 borders or stopping settlement in the West Bank. Meanwhile, that we supply Israel with billions in military arms does little to endear us to the Palestinians or the broader Islamic community.

That being said, Israel is acting entirely within its rights and responsibilities as a sovereign country. When Hamas launches rockets at Israeli homes, Israel is obligated to retaliate against Hamas. Putting pressure on Israel to make concessions as it responds to these attacks may seem like the sensible step for peace negotiations, but in all likelihood it would only strengthen hawks and reduce our leverage as a broker of negotiations, even if it enhanced our credibility among Palestinians.

So far Operation "Cast Lead" seems to be proceeding well for the Israelis. According to most reports, the IDF has caught Hamas unprepared and landed heavy blows against infrastructure and logistics. Thanks to this surprise advantage (and some new ordnance from Uncle Sam), Israel's tactics of using airstrikes seem to be working reasonably effectively so far, with "50 percent" of capability for rocket attack eliminated. (The IDF actually started its own Youtube channel to highlight its "precision bombing" in Gaza, while Arab networks have already brought Gaza to the center of their attention.)

But with 20,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza and the party's non-military wing firmly embedded in the Strip's social services, it's going to take more than a bombing campaign to destroy their operational capability. So far, the Israeli government has alluded to new phases of operations, possibly involving ground troops in an operation "to totally change the rules of the game." Even if this was enough to destroy Hamas, would Israel really want to? Because destroying Hamas would require destroying the government of Gaza, does Israel really have a Phase IV planned to pick up the pieces?

On top of all of this, the man who has the most riding on Operation Cast Lead, Ehud Barak, is also the man most to bring progress in negotiations - and with the election coming up soon, he cannot afford to bring Israel another July War.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan's offensive against the insurgents in Pashtunistan has closed off the Peshawar corridor. Since the majority of our supplies come through Pakistan, this is just one more reason why they will have to remain an ally in the war on terror. But since this route is becoming less and less reliable, we will need a new solution. This requires us to deal with two possible alternatives:

1. Strengthening the route through Russia into Central Asia. This means dropping human rights claims against the 'stans and increasing our reliance on Russia through rail transport. While Russia is generally glad NATO is doing its job in Afghanistan and fighting Islamic terror there, this course isn't particularly palatable to people concerned about human rights or worried about Russia's future course.
2. Trying to open the "East-West Corridor" from the Caucasus across the Caspian into Central Asia. Once again, we have to concede human rights issues to countries like Uzbekistan. This time, though, we would likely end up increasing our military presence in the Caucasus in a way Russia would be very unhappy with, possibly stressing the Western European NATO members who fear they will suffer the most from Russia's response to American penetration of the post-Soviet sphere.
   

An Afghan Awakening?

The US is hoping to launch a second "Awakening" of tribal militias - this time in Afghanistan. While this idea might seem commendable, the more one examines Afghanistan, the less viable it seems without some significant changes from how it was accomplished in Iraq. While it will be important that we bring Afghans in the South and East who might otherwise ally themselves with the fundamentalist militias on board, accomplishing this by empowering the militias themselves will likely be a major mistake. Iraq's government had far more credibility at the national and local level, and provided both a pathway for integrating the militias in such a way that the government could eventually monopolize force in those areas, and in the transition could theoretically check potential excesses on the part of the Sons of Iraq, and thus helped balance power between combatant factions.

In Afghanistan, however, actual local governance is incredibly weak, since many officials aren't elected but appointed. If we pursue these tactics, we will be delegating more power to the tribes and people of Afghanistan in some ways, yes, but we will not be doing so in a sustainable manner. The Awakening in Iraq is working because it built on ties between Sunni communities and the militias; through the plan to integrate the militia members with the government, it in turn helped bind the militias to the government and thus would help reinforce the credibility of the Shia dominated government to Sunnis. The militia program in Afghanistan, however, seems to bypass the idea of building government credibility or ties between the militias and the government entirely:

During a weekend visit, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the U.S. focus on establishing a strong central government in Afghanistan may have been "overstated." He said the U.S. would now focus more on "enabling the communities, the tribes and their leaders."

"How strong the central government will be in the future, I think, is yet to be determined," he told reporters.

This is focusing on a legitimate problem but responding in a very risky way. I certainly have been critical of a Kabul-centric Afghan policy. That said, I don't think the solution is to create a parallel security force that does what the government is supposed to. Now, the creation of these militias is indeed only a first phase, but until we can integrate them with the de jure local governments they will require constant US handling to prevent them from further destabilizing Afghanistan in the long run. However, that integration cannot be effective until the people of Afghansitan see their local governments as legitimate, which means without fixing the problem of governance in Afghanistan this entire effort may be wasted.

To be fair, similar criticisms were voiced at the beginning of the Anbar Awakening, and fortunately many of these fears have not (yet) been realized. But again: different country, different problems. As we've already seen, Afghanistan there are the issues of governance to sort out. But there are also underlying problems in our military strategy, too. Where the United States had a significant ground presence in Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq, the ground presence in the turbulent regions of Afghanistan has proven inadequate. America cannot effectively combat today's hostile militias because when Americans (or whatever other ISAF force there is) go back to their bases, the Taliban can control the countryside. Replace "Taliban" with "warlords" and one can see why revitalizing non-governmental militias could be so dangerous. If warlords do come to control these militias, checking them will not be easy, since they, not the US, not ISAF, and not the Afghan government, will have the last words. Counterinsurgency needs to be population-centric to succeed, and without our soldiers being deployed accordingly, the militia strategy will indeed be counterproductive. If we do not want to send another hundred thousand or more troops into Afghanistan for a long, long time, we will need to begin deploying our men into the midst of the villages we hope to defend. Such a strategy may carry a higher cost in both blood and treasure, but there is no easy way to win this war.

Also in the news...

As the global economy flounders, Russia is organizing the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, in hopes of... "not creating a cartel." Keep in mind that Putin came up with the idea of a "Gas OPEC" in 2002 and that Gazprom board member and nominal Russian "executive" Medvedev hoped this organization would achieve OPEC's level of influence. How such an organization could achieve OPEC's influence without the power to manipulate the flow of gas is beyond me. And while yes, there are Russian ships cruising in the Carribbean again, those interested in geopolitics should be more concerned about Russia's energy deals than its military deployments. Russia's fleet is still not a viable challenge to the US on the open seas, and even if the era of "cheap gas" and today's falling energy prices ends, it still won't be enough - even when the gap between the US and USSR was narrowest, the US still had a clear naval advantage outside of the USSR's regional waters. However, because Gazprom intends to invest more in energy resources outside the post-Soviet sphere, Latin America is more important to the Kremlin for economic reasons than military ones. While countries like Bolivia and Venezuela are ideologically opposed to American influence and globalization, this does serve as a good reminder of why the US needs to stay politically active and economically open around the world - there are countries waiting to pick up where we left off, and they may not use such an advantage to our best interests.

Piling it On

This is not looking like a good week for optimists.

The NBER threw in the towel and decided that despite the discrepancy between quarterly GDP forecasts and the official definition, the US downturn started in December 2007. Before people start grumbling about the worthless academics taking too long to get in touch with reality, remember when the stimulus package to "real Americans" was supposed to save the economy? Those were the days...

Mankiw and Cowen have good NYT editorials on the economy, in particular on what lessons we should really be taking from the '30s.

But, you shouldn't become too wrapped up in worrying about the economy. According to a bipartisan Congressional task force, you should also be worried about an attack on the US using weapons of mass destruction, the odds of which "are now better than even" between now and 2013. The report points out that a biological attack is more likely than a nuclear one, though nuclear proliferation and the destabilization of Pakistan will make loose nuclear weapons likely threats. It says the next attack on the US will also most likely originate from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

But, before we decide to stick to that promised policy of preemptive intervention to kill terrorists on Pakistani soil, it might be worth considering the precedent we're setting. Because there's a country that already has and it believes it has been once again attacked by terrorists based in Pakistan. Already, India has taken Obama's stance to indicate that it too has the right to kick down doors in the pursuit of justice. As Robert Kaplan, India faces a far graver threat from Islamic terrorism than the United States does.

Yet a policy that allows such attack on India's part could easily end up with a nuclear exchange - note that Pakistan does not have a "no first-use" policy on nuclear arms. While launching nuclear weapons at the United States would be futile, Pakistan does have a credible deterrent against India. This will likely be the second time that the United States must navigate its way through an Indo-Pakistani crisis while fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan.

Calls for Obama to take the "regional approach" and use Kashmir to convince Pakistan to contribute more troops to dealing with Islamic fundamentalists in its own borders and cease support for them outside of them seem more unrealistic than ever. India was hostile to the idea before the attacks, it will not be amenable to them now. The ideal outcome would be greater cooperation between the two powers on counterterrorism, but this is incredibly unlikely. As tensions increase, the US will find that Kashmir negotiations will not be able to proceed without taking sides, and treating Kashmir as a way to deal with American concerns about Afghanistan will inevitably draw the US to a pro-Pakistani line.

India has endured decades of Islamist violence on its own soil. If this sort of thing happened to the United States, we'd have taken up Armitage's cry and bombed them into the stone age. But we cannot expect that they will continue to tolerate such tragedies in a manner conducive to our goals. One way or another, Indians will feel compelled to respond. Relying on the Kashmir approach to win the war on terror is not viable. India, for its part, however, must improve its counterterrorist efforts. Watching Indian footage, city police fired at Kalashnikov-wielding terrorists with ancient bolt-action rifles while the response of more professional units has not impressed American analysts either. While there's obviously a lot more than small arms deficiencies that contributed to the problem, they are symptomatic of a deeper problem. India has invested well in its regular military but left the provincial-level counterterrorist and police forces underfunded. Terrorist attacks are thus more effective against India, and India cannot respond with its regular military without triggering a nuclear crisis. (We, too, struggle with managing the traditional gap between domestic law enforcement and the use of our military abroad. Fortunately we've managed to get by without a nuclear war scare... So far.)

The important thing to remember during all of this is that al Qaeda is hoping we'll overreact. Based on the latest tapes, they're having trouble coming up with an effective message against Obama without any policies of his they can criticize. Al Qaeda needs to provoke Obama into making a big mistake that involves perceived aggression and injustice against Muslims to maintain its base of support. This is something his cabinet should keep in mind as January 20th approaches. While I still take issue with sending Hillary Clinton to Foggy Bottom, I'm far more pleased with Obama's other national security picks. That being said, no matter what happens to the economy, sidelining foreign policy will come with consequences. Obama had really better trust his staff, because he is going to be a busy, busy man.

Pirates & More on Pakistan

With Somali piracy back in the international spotlight, I'd figure now would be a good time to relate the issues of Somalia to the wider world - because what's happening does reflect on larger trends, and the immediate problem is not to be discounted either.

The largest tanker organization in the world called for a UN-lead naval blockade of Somalia. Citing the immense area of pirate operations, they have deduced that short of arming or escorting every tanker, intercepting pirate vessels before they reach shipping routes is the only effective prevention. Now, while this seems logical in theory, it will be much more difficult to implement in practice. Relying on the United Nations to stabilize Somalia has a pretty poor track record. However, it may be difficult for the United States to draw in non-NATO powers without one. Reluctance to intervene without a mandate aside, the Somali piracy episode is illuminating the effects of America's decline in relative power.

Proponents of stabilizing hegemons might note that American dominance cannot perform a function that seemed to be a given a decade ago - protecting the sea lanes and providing the basic security necessary for free trade. Unless the UN can effectively step in to create a genuine partnership to secure the seas, the natural result will be great power intervention. Though domestic concerns will make it difficult for Americans to concern themselves with a region that's frustrated us for the past 15 years, we should not be surprised when other powers pick up where we left off. Since rising and resurgent powers lack true blue water navies, the United States must recognize that a contribution by other great powers to stability in the Gulf of Aden must come with an expansion of rival powers' naval bases. The expansion of naval bases will further the decline in relative American power and de facto balance against US interests and capabilities.

On the other hand, the other great powers would be just fine with the US and NATO dealing with the problem. Russia's Ambassador to NATO suggested that they launch an invasion of the Somali coast. Of course, Russia may have ulterior motives for wishing such a maneuver. After all, with an American war in Iraq, a NATO war in Afghanistan and many other commitments, every new NATO deployment outside of Eurasia is one that may force western troops to leave Russia's desired "sphere of influence."

Speaking of which, go check out the Global Trends 2025 report.

Keep watching Pakistan. As support for Kashmir negotiations continues to grow in the west, it's important to remember just how risky pinning our hopes in Afghanistan on Kashmir will be.

Firstly, alienating India (as would be necessary to placate the Pakistani Army) will risk Afghanistan's long term stability, as India has been a major investor in Afghanistan and will likely play a large role in the region when NATO leaves. Secondly, negotiating on Kashmir does not automatically make fighting Afghanistan easier. Pakistan would have to decide India was no longer a threat, even though the rising wealth disparity due to India's economic success will likely contribute to a widening gap in relative military power. Ongoing religious/nationalist enmity will continue, and will likely be amplified in India as the US is forced to placate Pakistan. Even if Pakistan still didn't feel that India was its primary threat, it would have to remake its military for counterinsurgency warfare. Just as the surge required tactical and operational changes to work, so too will units trained and equipped to fight conventional warfare against India have to adapt to the nature of the NWFP and FATA conflict. Considering we arguably have yet to make this move, it may be unreasonable to expect the Pakistanis to do the same.

Furthermore, we must remember Islamic fundamentalists will have grievances with the Pakistani government for supporting the US and for its failure to live up to cultural, political, and economic expectations, regardless of how Kashmir goes. The fighting on the frontier will not disappear because not all terrorists and insurgents have the same motivations. If Pakistan feels it must play off tribal groups and political factions against each other to succeed (a tactic we should not complain about, given our trumpeting of the success of the surge), they will. Indeed, Pakistan supports anti-American and fundamentalist groups not only to fight against India in Kashmir, but so they can fight against anti-government groups on the frontier. Will support for these groups end, too? Dealing with Kashmir certainly won't end the radicalizing effect of American occupation in Afghanistan and intervention in Pakistan.

Relying on Kashmir to fix Afghanistan is similar to relying on Palestine to fix America's Middle Eastern problems. It is a nice idea on paper and could yield benefits if resolved in a manner pleasing both sides, but it has proven incredibly difficult to accomplish effectively. At least we have a well-established team of public servants with Arab-Israeli expertise. Do the same resources exist for Kashmir? What's worse, unlike in the Palestinian debate, America has a significant national interest in maintaining good relations with both sides. While America can afford to disagree with Israel and has already dealt with alienating the Palestinians, America needs the support of Pakistan in Afghanistan and India in broader, strategic terms. And, like Israel and Palestine, even when we manage to get the negotiations right, there are still plenty of other grievances against the US. We've had to have a Plan B for a Middle Eastern policy without the resolution of Israel and Palestine. What's our Plan B for dealing with South Asia without resolving Kashmir?

Eurasian Rumor Mill

Interesting day for news in Afghanistan...

First up is Karzai's offer to protect Mullah Omar (whose head is worth $10 million as far as the US is concerned) so long as he agrees to hold talks with Kabul. If ISAF or anyone else has a problem, Karzai said they could remove him or leave Afghanistan - unappealing options for a coalition that is committed to an Afghanistan that is both stable and democratic. I doubt Omar trusts the Afghans to protect him that well, but if they could (and kept their word), it might put the US and its new President in an unenviable situation.

Another interesting development: Apparently, Gordon Brown floated the idea of placing Chinese troops in Afghanistan. Though there hasn't been much to substantiate this report, if true, could signal an interesting development in Chinese policy. One possibility is that the Chinese want to prove they're a responsible member of the international community, prepared to work with the west on common issues (after all, China has its own issues with Islamic militants in Xinjiang). Fighting in Afghanistan would give Chinese troops valuable counterinsurgency experience and allow them to observe the COIN tactics of other coalition members. The other possibility is that China might finally want to make the inroads into Central Asia commensurate with its status as a world power. Many analysts have speculated that China is preparing to get into Central Asia to secure its borders (by developing Xinjiang and Tibet through trade) and economic resources (energy, energy, energy).

From a realpolitik angle, building up a presence in Central Asia could provide China with access to resources the US cannot easily exclude. Despite a generally warm attitude and a vital trade relationship, China remains paranoid about its reliance on sea transport across the Indian Ocean for many of its raw material imports, since the US Navy patrols the Straits of Malacca. It's just one reason why the US cannot afford to shun free trade or economic integration with China if it wishes to avoid the pitfalls of multipolarity.

Medvedev changes his tune on Obama... Sort of. Given the combination of the missile movements and now this supposed overture, Medvedev may be putting on a bit of political theater to put the onus on Obama to make concessions even as he tries to embarrass or frustrate American goals. Such maneuvering would sour the strategic or domestic political climate to making those concessions, allowing Medvedev to sour Russian opinion about Obama by making it appear as if he is less reasonable or cooperative than otherwise believed. Given what occurred in Iran after the congratulatory letter incident, we may want to expect this sort of thing as more anti-Bush leaders attempt to shore up domestic credibility in the wake of Obama's victory.

Transitional Rumors, International Omens

The big buzz about Obama's foreign policy is that Hillary Clinton is going to be Obama's secretary of state. It seems like a brilliant political move - something you'd expect from a guy who's read Team of Rivals. However, I question the wisdom of such a decision.

Obama needs to be heading into the real world, 2009, not cleaning up old grudges from 2008. Of course Obama, as a politician, is going to want to consolidate his support and prevent an internal struggle that one would expect from a big-tent political party like the Democrats. However, American foreign policy is already losing attention to the economy and it cannot afford to lose any more attention to domestic political maneuvering. To be frank, Obama's foreign policy is not going to work itself out. Once the soft power buzz of his own election wears off (and it will not be long), the President will need to attempt to help keep old allies on board, warm relations with former friends, and carefully engage rivals and enemies. Thanks to American unipolarity, the last two administrations have relied on force and the absence of balancing rivals to assert American diplomatic objectives. America's economic stability contributed to these ambitious foreign policies. With a general decline in relative American power (due more to the rise of others ) and the potential for economic disaster at home, the US will have its work cut out for it abroad.

Managing the complex negotiations to come - and all their attendant trade-offs, treaties, and concessions - will require an exceptional secretary of state. While many foreign leaders respect and admire Obama, once they begin interacting with him at the negotiating table questions of national interest will take precedence. Hillary Clinton is not entirely unqualified to be secretary of state. But she is by far not the most qualified, and claims that her experience as first lady will offer some unique advantage are mostly irrelevant. Firstly, the US already has the soft power namedropping advantage - his name is Barack Obama. Secondly, the first lady functions in a PR role, not as a major negotiator and her friendliness with the leaders of the '90s is not pertinent to today's leadership. Whatever personal connections she formed then, many are with leaders out of office now, or who never had to have Mrs. Clinton tell them anything they didn't want to hear. Memories of the good times will quickly fade when those countries national security and economic concerns go on the line. These personal connections also fail to address the secretary of state's biggest challenge - working with states like Iran, Syria, and North Korea that the US has previously shunned diplomatically.

As for secretary of defense, word is that Robert Gates will be held on for the transition. It's a good call and I hope that those rumors are true. Gates has done a lot to turn around American defense strategy, and given that Obama will be more than busy enough during the transition, it would be good to keep a competent, relatively strategically compatible cabinet member managing things to minimize disruption to American defense policy and distraction from the economic agenda.

Elsewhere, I suspect the Obama administration is keeping a close eye on what's happening in the DRC and Rwanda. The situation is already ugly and may be spiralling further out of control, as neighboring countries volunteer deploying their own "peacekeeping" forces in a scene reminiscent of foreign interventions of previous decades. Obama (not to mention his staff) has said a lot about humanitarian intervention. Given that a humanitarian operation in the Congo is more plausible from an international perspective (no great power like China looming over, and stronger, broadly supported UN presence), it may be the site of this administration's first big humanitarian intervention rather than Darfur.

Other places to watch out for - North Korea. China is taking Kim's disappearing act very seriously, and regime change could drastically alter US plans for the region. From Pakistan, we have the usual bad news and then the (seemingly) unusual bad news. It's worth remembering that the Iranians dislike the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban about as much as we do, and cooperating in stabilizing the region could be one of the fruits of a truly grand (though by no means assured) bargain with Tehran.

Also, this bit of Hayden's assessment of al Qaeda is interesting. Osama is cut off from regular AQ operations and focused more on his own survival - good. But what this should tell us is that we should not prioritize killing or capturing him over the broader effort against al Qaeda. One of the reasons why terrorism cannot be treated purely as a law enforcement issue is that AQ's organizational structure is complex and flexible enough to endure disruptions to its leadership. If we have to go into Pakistan guns blazing to take out someone already out of the organizational loop, we are probably going to create a lot more anti-American Pakistanis without necessarily severely disrupting AQ's ability to conduct a retaliatory attack. This isn't to say getting OBL isn't important, it's just an example of how we need to balance political objectives in the wider strategic context. An attitude that sees killing OBL as the "game over" in the fight against AQ will be disappointing at best and counterproductive at worst.

On another note, congratulations to General Ann Dunwoody, America's first female four-star general.

The world isn't waiting

While Americans (and to some extent, everyone else) have a lot to be excited about, it sure hasn't taken long for the post-election euphoria to wear away. Obama's judgment and temperament helped him win the election, they will be among his best attributes going forward. However, Americans must remember that they are neither infallible nor may they necessarily lead to the policies we've come to expect.

On fiscal matters, the money for Obama's healthcare and other spending plans is gone - spent in the Paulson bailout plan. At least Paulson is moving towards the Dodd plan equity stake strategy rather than directly purchasing toxic assets, but the plan is (as we must expect) far from perfect. However, the fact remains that our financial sector is too vital to collapse - it is the engine of growth for our economy, especially in the long term. Eliminating or rolling back the bailout plan would be disastrous - not just for the immediate impact on the market, but for creating a climate of uncertainty hostile to investment. Nor will Obama's tax plans help very much. During a recession, increasing taxes on the very wealthiest and capital gains will have diminishing marginal returns - recessions, especially centered in the financial sector, will disproportionately reduce the incomes of wealthy investors (even if they suffer far less than ordinary Americans in absolute terms).

Though we should not foolishly cling to the impossibility of balancing the budget, we must spend wisely. So when the Big Three begin requesting billions in their own bailouts, we should not be so eager to appease them. While the auto industry and media will naturally claim that these companies, like the banks, are "too big to fail," the reality is that finance and manufacturing play vastly different roles in the American economy. Without solvent banks, simple but incredibly vital economic functions - saving and loaning money, for example, come into peril. Allowing for massive amounts of bank failures deprives the market of liquidity, crippling economic growth and innovation (starting a new company requires investment, after all). Car companies simply cannot claim to be this vital to the American economy, however important they are. Though undoubtedly the Big Three will get some form of bailout (Obama wouldn't want someone like Mitt Romney taking the industrial Midwest in 2012), it is likely this money could be better spent elsewhere. The jobs lost by these major companies will be highly visible - but not the jobs that will be lost in other companies due to the difference in allocation of resources. Even if someone were to point out this unemployment, the natural response would be, "good thing we bailed out those automakers, or they'd have gone under too!"

America cannot afford to constantly prop up every industry whose management and labor organizations legislate themselves into stagnation. We have bailed out the Big Three in better times - why do we think doing it now will help them finally achieve the magical recovery they've wanted? Even if we did stipulate the management be sacked and some new visionary team be put in place, can we really expect them to fix when even successful automakers are facing a hard year? Eventually, Washington will have to realize that doing the best thing for the workers will mean spending more money on new industries and trade adjustment assistance. This is the economic equivalent of "Weekend at Bernie's," and at some point we may have to stop waiting for the miracle that makes Detroit great again.

How far Obama deviates from his original platform is still unknown, but we should not be too shocked when - not if - he does. We can only hope that the deviations he does make will be positive - like promoting global cooperation on recovery by affirming free trade.

As for foreign policy, goodwill has failed to erase many of the expected dilemmas. On election day, Russia forced Obama to take Eastern Europe's side of the missile defense dispute by deploying missiles to Kaliningrad. This, combined with his preference for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership, will make Russian cooperation on Iran more difficult. Speaking of Iran, don't hold your breath for a great breakthrough there, either. Within days of the election, the mood of the BBC went from this to this. As for Pakistan, the economic crisis has only made intervening in the country more dangerous, while the recent calls for mediating the Kashmir dispute have the potential to harm our interests in the region even more. Germany, not just Britain, seems to be growing more skeptical about committing to Afghanistan - if this is indicative of a greater trend among ISAF members, we have a problem:

A new strategy would only work if Western countries openly discussed their
objectives in Afghanistan. They would have to admit that they cannot establish a
democracy, equal rights for women, or a welfare state in Afghanistan. Shifting
the focus from nation building to simply combating al-Qaida terrorists would
presumably be the only basis for Europeans and Obama to formulate a joint
policy.

And it isn't even January, yet.

Denial is a River in the Hindu Kush

Obama continues to ignore the ramifications of his Pakistan policy. Osama bin Laden is killing Americans now. Pakistan is unable and unwilling to clear out the FATA and NWFP now. We likely have intelligence to put the heat on a lot of AQ and Taliban members now. By his standards, we should be lighting up the Pakistani frontier. This isn't a hypothetical, this is a reality. Either he is willing to resume raids in Pakistan or he isn't, and if he is he needs to acknowledge that attacking Pakistan is going to be just as damaging to support for the war on terror as supporting Musharraf in Pakistan. They were shooting at us. This isn't an academic question for point-scoring - this is a real policy decision, and Obama needs to tone down the rhetoric or prepare for a conflict that will be nowhere near as clear-cut as he would have us believe. Pakistan made a truce with the Taliban because they were tired of killing their soldiers and their citizens and because in counterinsurgency, sometimes you have to deal with the devil. Letting us smack around Pakistanis and tribal kinsmen is only going to create more attacks on the Pakistani government. We too will have to make deals with those tribes if we want to stabilize Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, McCain's Afghan policy continues to buy into the fantasy that another "surge" will save Afghanistan. It won't, unless you want a larger surge (let's talk 3-4x larger), and a replication of one of the pre-surge reductions in violence - an Anbar awakening. That means allying with some of the fundamentalist tribes that used to harbor or support al Qaeda, not hunting down and destroying every formerly anti-American tribe in Afghanistan (or, Senator Obama, the NWFP or FATA). We essentially have two options to stabilize Afghanistan without a massive long-term presence that will last generations - installing a less-than-democratic central government that has made peace with some of the belligerents and delegated to the tribes, or a new Iron Amir with dictatorial powers. America wants stability, democracy, and withdrawal within a few years - it will get two if it is lucky.

McCain had a stronger performance than his last debate, and seemed to tackle the real long-run issue for the "American empire" - domestic expenditures - more directly than Obama did. Both, however, were mum on Medicare, the biggest and faster growing of the American entitlement programs. Both made legitimate points on their own healthcare proposals, but ultimately as far as the "elephants in the room" are concerned, nobody really knows what to do about the immediate problems of global financial meltdown (especially since this will increasingly require linking foreign and domestic policies), and nobody really wants to talk about how many planks of their platforms will have to be torn out in January.

I haven't needed to wait long for the geopolitical hysteria over the financial crisis to start. Iceland, unable to bail out its financial institutions without compromising its fiscal solvency, hoped the EU would be able to bail it out. No such luck. Now Russia may offer the capital injection, and already some observers think it may be part of a Russian attempt to subvert NATO (and perhaps even establish a security presence in the North Atlantic!).

As usual, everything in the Middle East is going swimmingly.

A Good Fight?

If there's one thing Americans appear to agree on, it's Afghanistan - the war is winnable, but it needs more troops. Untainted by the stigma of preemption or unilateralism, Afghanistan is the "good war" that everybody can get behind. However, we should not confuse righteousness with feasibility.

There is no mistake that Afghanistan has been shortchanged since the beginning of the conflict. The effort to rectify this, however, is much larger than many imagine. Afghanistan, were it to have a level of military presence proportional to successful counterinsurgency campaigns, would likely require 400,000 troops for stability. Counting current NATO deployments and the Afghan security forces, that is twice the number of troops we have in Afghanistan today. Neither candidate has proposed sending anywhere near 200,000 troops to Afghanistan, nor could they feasibly be expected to do so. Nor is it likely that the United Kingdom, France, Canada or Germany will be willing to commit thousands more of their soldiers. Indeed, the British ambassador to Afghanistan has allegedly written off the Afghan campaign as futile, with a dictatorship that holds the country together as the optimal outcome - a new Iron Amir.

Of course, one might retort that a "surge" in Afghanistan could work as well as the one in Iraq did. However, this is far less likely to work out in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has dozens of millions of people, just like Iraq, and far more difficult terrain - a brigade in Afghanistan simply isn't as helpful as a brigade in Iraq. The surge in Iraq was also accompanied and preceded by significant changes in tactics that are far less likely to occur in Afghanistan. The Pashtun tribes that harbor al Qaeda and the Taliban are far less likely to switch sides, and in many cases al Qaeda is too deeply integrated with tribes to make such a strategy effective. Nor would the assassination campaign that JSOC conducted in Iraq work effectively in Afghanistan - enemy leaders are less accessible, and crossing the border into Pakistan is only making us more enemies on the other side of the border.

A strategy to stabilize Afghanistan would likely require rebuilding the tribal structure, perhaps even at the expense of the "national" level strategy, and placing more troops in harm's way. While Americans might have the stomach for such a war, European reactions to attacks indicate they may not, while the effects of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq should remind us that empowering tribes may create friction with the central government. We would also need to establish a long-term political, military, and economic commitment to Afghanistan. But with billions of dollars in bailouts down the pipe and an American public that will be clamoring for relief in the months to come (perhaps in Europe, too), NATO members will have a tough time convincing their people that Afghanistan is worth it. Success in Afghanistan is not likely to occur within the next four years. Perhaps not even within the next eight. Should we add a war in Pakistan into the mix, it may not be won at all. There is nothing wrong with believing Afghanistan is a just war. But if it is just, and we wish to win it, we're going to have to commit enormous resources to it. Something Americans should keep in mind as they throw all besides the economy to the wind.

Elsewhere, the Somali pirate drama has spotlighted a more disturbing trend - the looming escalation of the conflict between the Sudanese government and southern (ie, not Darfuri) separatists. Simultaneously, skepticism about AFRICOM does not bode well for American response capability or a "revolutionized" military policy in Africa.

Citizens of tomorrow, be forewarned

Regardless of the merits and problems of the Paulson bailout plan, it emphasizes a lot of key trends and disturbing points about the direction in which the global economy is moving. Firstly, the US, for better or for worse, is still a major standard-bearer for Western and Westernizing economic norms. What we do will echo in the rest of the world, and we should not undertake any action that we would not want turned against us later on. As Drezner points out, the US, so far, is doing fairly well; other countries experiencing such financial turmoil have not been so lucky. The US, like its banks, is too big to fail - with around a fifth of world GDP, a financial collapse here would reverberate with massive consequences around the globe. The EU faces a huge test of its fiscal prowess even now, while China cannot afford a world economic downturn that would halt its rapid growth. The world economy for the past 60 years has increasingly been a positive-sum game. While this is not inherently enough to pretent catastrophe, there is no doubt turning it into a zero sum game only encourages it.

To cast a further cynical light on things, the bailout, from a separation-of-powers perspective, should be terrifying. The executive branch, in tandem with the Federal Reserve, can issue hundreds of billions of dollars without judicial review or much legislative oversight. What makes this all the worse is that the Federal Reserve is the only institution that has performed reasonably well throughout the crisis. Congress refused to back down from a program of aggressive homeownership expansion even in the midst of a housing bubble, while opportunities for both parties to reform the GSEs went unexploited. Confronted with the crisis, Congress passed an utterly useless fiscal stimulus bill. I have little confidence constructive responses will emerge in an expedient timeframe barring some massive shift in attitudes and norms in the legislature (Dodd's proposal is decent, but given some of its provisions, it is unlikely to fly through Congress and into law fast enough for Wall Street's liking). Ultimately, the economic crisis may give the executive - the one sitting, and likely whoever wins in November - powers the Iraq War could not grant them. These powers may remain theoretical, though. The burden of financing these bailouts will severely impede whatever discretionary programs they now promise - whether they be tax cuts or spending on social programs. If there is "Caesarism" in 21st century America, it will be centered around national power, rather than "bread and circuses."

On the other hand, we may have that Congressional oversight and those bread and circuses. The current proposal could easily be stacked with Democratic "riders" to bail out whoever that party thinks needs additional relief. Doing so, of course, would only further implicate Congress with a possible (some would say likely) failure of the bailout plan. With an election coming up, too many incentives are on politicians to wash their hands of current problems rather than take on the much more difficult task of fixing them. We may well be stuck between gridlock and the unchecked executive.

Meanwhile, much of the rest of the world so rudely refuses to act according to our preferences. Despite suffering a major terrorist attack which could have decapitated the government, Pakistan continues to stand against American intrusion. This seems illogical until one considers how al Qaeda started out - attacking "apostate" governments which turned to the US for security. Should Pakistan allow American intervention, it is reasonable to expect more bombs, not fewer, targeted at the Zadari government.

If it is Worth Doing...

Usually one does not cite William Tecumseh Sherman in a rumination on military restraint, but...

Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and defeat.

... seems to be an appropriate turn of phrase lately. The war in Iraq was fought by exactly such a metric. It was a plan to fight the war from the air, move in with less troops than we used to liberate Kuwait, and spend a few dozen billion to have them sit around in a country where only a few hardened Baathists would resist our lovely presence. Five years later, here we are.

So, forgive me when I recommend an outspoken war critic and Presidential candidate not be so cavalier about attacking Pakistan, especially when he has no real plan for how to prevent such a conflict from escalating, or what the boundaries of such a mission would be. I will not go so far as to argue there are no circumstances under which we can attack Pakistan and buy into a foreign policy based on multilateral cooperation and support for Pakistani democracy. Faced against an increasingly uncooperative Pakistani government, attacks into the frontier may not be the worst option as far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned. Nevertheless, to be "realistic" about this aspect of the strategy means to stop clinging to any notion that we intend to pursue a policy of cooperation or support for democracy in Pakistan.

We are making a lot of enemies, ones with uniforms and nuclear bombs. I can't tell you how it will end, but I can say how it won't - there is not going to be a friendly Pakistani government. There is not going to be a cooperative Pakistani army willing to absorb thousands of casualties fighting tribesmen backed by the ISI while a foreign power humiliatingly violates their sovereignty. Do you want a prime example of the US shelling a society into support for extremism? Start watching Pakistan. Even if there is no escalation into a shooting war with Islamabad, we will poison democracy in Pakistan. The most basic function of a government is not education, or healthcare or welfare. It is protecting its citizens from coercion. Either the leader who allows his citizens to die will be replaced, or the system that put him into power will. Whether a stronger nationalist is voted into power or a coup occurs, Pakistanis are highly unlikely to tolerate such transgressions.

However destabilizing Iraq was, fomenting a crisis with Pakistan will be just as troubling with the international community in general. Sure, India might be happy, but who else will be? Europe operates in Afghanistan, too, and given the unease that many Europeans already feel about their Afghan troop presence, attacking Pakistan, if anything, would expedite their withdrawal. China will be very angry about an attack on its strategic partner, while the world public in general will see the unsavory aspects of the "Bush Doctrine" as permanent fixtures in America's 21st century policy, rather than a 7 year phase. In short: if you believe in soft power, you should be pleading with Obama-Biden to tone down their rhetoric on Pakistan. If you think attacking Pakistan is a good idea, maybe liberal internationalism shouldn't the keystone for your foreign policy this term. Perhaps the best Vietnam analogy isn't Iraq. Cambodia, after all, came from the guy who was going to "end the war," too...

Lest one assume I'm being too hard on Obama, let me point out that Palin's Charlie Gibson interview is more than proof enough that she is unfit to be Vice President come 2009. The idea that Mr. "Country First" would put her on the spot is extremely disturbing. Yes, she was a smart choice to unify the base. However, we've had 8 years of an folksy, outsider, common-man conservative ex-governor with no foreign policy experience. Excuse me if I am not willing to risk a few more.

Elsewhere in the world, OPEC has decided $100 is too low for a barrel of oil Any politician who tells you they've got a plan to enrich Americans by "lowering gas prices" or taxing "windfall profits" from oil companies is full of it - especially when the Gods seem to be on the side of higher oil prices, too. Also in unsurprising news today, Hugo Chavez has "had enough of so much shit" from the US.