In the midst of this President's emphasis on Russian relations, the Afghan war, and now perhaps Arab-Israeli talks as his foreign policy keystones, it is perhaps too easy to forget the one country that might present a "peer competitor" to the US, China. Though China is far from replacing the US as hegemon, China's combination of rising wealth and military modernization are not cause for alarm, but certainly demand consideration. The US has been doing a relatively poor job of maintaining its status as hegemon. It has mired itself in debt, two wars and on top of that, its military procurement system has encouraged budgetary bloat and all too many weapons systems that neither meet the needs of present wars nor seem to have much use for the future.
It is important to note that the term "asymmetry" has more application in warfare than the counterinsurgency and guerrilla wars that occupy our current thinking on defense. The goal of any belligerent is to create an asymmetry over the enemy, whether it is the Taliban creating asymmetry through the use of IEDs in Helmand or the US creating asymmetry through overwhelming air dominance in its own combat operations. This understanding of asymmetry informs the People's Liberation Army as it seeks to develop "assassin's mace" capabilities, technologies and tactics that would allow it to defeat a qualitatively superior force. These technologies range from electronic countermeasures that addle our air strikes to ballistic missiles appropriated for conventional strikes against US airbases and carrier groups.
Keep in mind that while the US is experiencing "relative decline," it still maintains overwhelming air and naval dominance across the globe. China's "assassin's mace" technologies, while we ignore them at our own peril, are not cure-alls. Chinese electronic jamming, for example, may not be able to defeat current generations of American missile guidance systems. Chinese weapons systems, when measured against their US equivalents, are still a generation or more behind. Nevertheless, this dominance, particularly in the naval and air capabilities the US would first bring to bear against China in any conceivable war scenario, has spurred development in ballistic missile technologies. These could be a potential "game changer" in a US-China war.
Why? No other country currently employs ballistic missiles against mobile naval target, nor do many other countries have the ballistic missile capabilities to challenge the United States. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) are much faster than cruise missiles, making them harder to intercept. They can be launched from land, unlike many anti-ship missiles, so US air-sea dominance will have less capability to counteract them. Other conventionally-armed ballistic missiles could be targeted against US airbases at Kadena, Okinawa, South Korea and Guam to achieve theatre-wide air dominance in an operation against Taiwan.
Notably, the PLA artillery command and the PLA Navy do not agree on the utility of these missiles. So let's not single out US procurement for having inter-service politics (the PLAN opposes ASBMs in part to preserve the importance of the navy) guide procurement. Another thing to keep in mind is the importance of things like US tanker capabilities, basing rights, and electronics (among many other factors) to the complexity of warfare at land and sea. It's not hypocritical to be worried about Chinese capabilities but think our resources are not best spent on the F-22 and other defense industry pet projects.
Showing posts with label Asia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asia. Show all posts
Sunday, September 13, 2009
Monday, December 1, 2008
Piling it On
This is not looking like a good week for optimists.
The NBER threw in the towel and decided that despite the discrepancy between quarterly GDP forecasts and the official definition, the US downturn started in December 2007. Before people start grumbling about the worthless academics taking too long to get in touch with reality, remember when the stimulus package to "real Americans" was supposed to save the economy? Those were the days...
Mankiw and Cowen have good NYT editorials on the economy, in particular on what lessons we should really be taking from the '30s.
But, you shouldn't become too wrapped up in worrying about the economy. According to a bipartisan Congressional task force, you should also be worried about an attack on the US using weapons of mass destruction, the odds of which "are now better than even" between now and 2013. The report points out that a biological attack is more likely than a nuclear one, though nuclear proliferation and the destabilization of Pakistan will make loose nuclear weapons likely threats. It says the next attack on the US will also most likely originate from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
But, before we decide to stick to that promised policy of preemptive intervention to kill terrorists on Pakistani soil, it might be worth considering the precedent we're setting. Because there's a country that already has and it believes it has been once again attacked by terrorists based in Pakistan. Already, India has taken Obama's stance to indicate that it too has the right to kick down doors in the pursuit of justice. As Robert Kaplan, India faces a far graver threat from Islamic terrorism than the United States does.
Yet a policy that allows such attack on India's part could easily end up with a nuclear exchange - note that Pakistan does not have a "no first-use" policy on nuclear arms. While launching nuclear weapons at the United States would be futile, Pakistan does have a credible deterrent against India. This will likely be the second time that the United States must navigate its way through an Indo-Pakistani crisis while fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan.
Calls for Obama to take the "regional approach" and use Kashmir to convince Pakistan to contribute more troops to dealing with Islamic fundamentalists in its own borders and cease support for them outside of them seem more unrealistic than ever. India was hostile to the idea before the attacks, it will not be amenable to them now. The ideal outcome would be greater cooperation between the two powers on counterterrorism, but this is incredibly unlikely. As tensions increase, the US will find that Kashmir negotiations will not be able to proceed without taking sides, and treating Kashmir as a way to deal with American concerns about Afghanistan will inevitably draw the US to a pro-Pakistani line.
India has endured decades of Islamist violence on its own soil. If this sort of thing happened to the United States, we'd have taken up Armitage's cry and bombed them into the stone age. But we cannot expect that they will continue to tolerate such tragedies in a manner conducive to our goals. One way or another, Indians will feel compelled to respond. Relying on the Kashmir approach to win the war on terror is not viable. India, for its part, however, must improve its counterterrorist efforts. Watching Indian footage, city police fired at Kalashnikov-wielding terrorists with ancient bolt-action rifles while the response of more professional units has not impressed American analysts either. While there's obviously a lot more than small arms deficiencies that contributed to the problem, they are symptomatic of a deeper problem. India has invested well in its regular military but left the provincial-level counterterrorist and police forces underfunded. Terrorist attacks are thus more effective against India, and India cannot respond with its regular military without triggering a nuclear crisis. (We, too, struggle with managing the traditional gap between domestic law enforcement and the use of our military abroad. Fortunately we've managed to get by without a nuclear war scare... So far.)
The important thing to remember during all of this is that al Qaeda is hoping we'll overreact. Based on the latest tapes, they're having trouble coming up with an effective message against Obama without any policies of his they can criticize. Al Qaeda needs to provoke Obama into making a big mistake that involves perceived aggression and injustice against Muslims to maintain its base of support. This is something his cabinet should keep in mind as January 20th approaches. While I still take issue with sending Hillary Clinton to Foggy Bottom, I'm far more pleased with Obama's other national security picks. That being said, no matter what happens to the economy, sidelining foreign policy will come with consequences. Obama had really better trust his staff, because he is going to be a busy, busy man.
The NBER threw in the towel and decided that despite the discrepancy between quarterly GDP forecasts and the official definition, the US downturn started in December 2007. Before people start grumbling about the worthless academics taking too long to get in touch with reality, remember when the stimulus package to "real Americans" was supposed to save the economy? Those were the days...
Mankiw and Cowen have good NYT editorials on the economy, in particular on what lessons we should really be taking from the '30s.
But, you shouldn't become too wrapped up in worrying about the economy. According to a bipartisan Congressional task force, you should also be worried about an attack on the US using weapons of mass destruction, the odds of which "are now better than even" between now and 2013. The report points out that a biological attack is more likely than a nuclear one, though nuclear proliferation and the destabilization of Pakistan will make loose nuclear weapons likely threats. It says the next attack on the US will also most likely originate from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
But, before we decide to stick to that promised policy of preemptive intervention to kill terrorists on Pakistani soil, it might be worth considering the precedent we're setting. Because there's a country that already has and it believes it has been once again attacked by terrorists based in Pakistan. Already, India has taken Obama's stance to indicate that it too has the right to kick down doors in the pursuit of justice. As Robert Kaplan, India faces a far graver threat from Islamic terrorism than the United States does.
Yet a policy that allows such attack on India's part could easily end up with a nuclear exchange - note that Pakistan does not have a "no first-use" policy on nuclear arms. While launching nuclear weapons at the United States would be futile, Pakistan does have a credible deterrent against India. This will likely be the second time that the United States must navigate its way through an Indo-Pakistani crisis while fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan.
Calls for Obama to take the "regional approach" and use Kashmir to convince Pakistan to contribute more troops to dealing with Islamic fundamentalists in its own borders and cease support for them outside of them seem more unrealistic than ever. India was hostile to the idea before the attacks, it will not be amenable to them now. The ideal outcome would be greater cooperation between the two powers on counterterrorism, but this is incredibly unlikely. As tensions increase, the US will find that Kashmir negotiations will not be able to proceed without taking sides, and treating Kashmir as a way to deal with American concerns about Afghanistan will inevitably draw the US to a pro-Pakistani line.
India has endured decades of Islamist violence on its own soil. If this sort of thing happened to the United States, we'd have taken up Armitage's cry and bombed them into the stone age. But we cannot expect that they will continue to tolerate such tragedies in a manner conducive to our goals. One way or another, Indians will feel compelled to respond. Relying on the Kashmir approach to win the war on terror is not viable. India, for its part, however, must improve its counterterrorist efforts. Watching Indian footage, city police fired at Kalashnikov-wielding terrorists with ancient bolt-action rifles while the response of more professional units has not impressed American analysts either. While there's obviously a lot more than small arms deficiencies that contributed to the problem, they are symptomatic of a deeper problem. India has invested well in its regular military but left the provincial-level counterterrorist and police forces underfunded. Terrorist attacks are thus more effective against India, and India cannot respond with its regular military without triggering a nuclear crisis. (We, too, struggle with managing the traditional gap between domestic law enforcement and the use of our military abroad. Fortunately we've managed to get by without a nuclear war scare... So far.)
The important thing to remember during all of this is that al Qaeda is hoping we'll overreact. Based on the latest tapes, they're having trouble coming up with an effective message against Obama without any policies of his they can criticize. Al Qaeda needs to provoke Obama into making a big mistake that involves perceived aggression and injustice against Muslims to maintain its base of support. This is something his cabinet should keep in mind as January 20th approaches. While I still take issue with sending Hillary Clinton to Foggy Bottom, I'm far more pleased with Obama's other national security picks. That being said, no matter what happens to the economy, sidelining foreign policy will come with consequences. Obama had really better trust his staff, because he is going to be a busy, busy man.
Sunday, November 16, 2008
Eurasian Rumor Mill
Interesting day for news in Afghanistan...
First up is Karzai's offer to protect Mullah Omar (whose head is worth $10 million as far as the US is concerned) so long as he agrees to hold talks with Kabul. If ISAF or anyone else has a problem, Karzai said they could remove him or leave Afghanistan - unappealing options for a coalition that is committed to an Afghanistan that is both stable and democratic. I doubt Omar trusts the Afghans to protect him that well, but if they could (and kept their word), it might put the US and its new President in an unenviable situation.
Another interesting development: Apparently, Gordon Brown floated the idea of placing Chinese troops in Afghanistan. Though there hasn't been much to substantiate this report, if true, could signal an interesting development in Chinese policy. One possibility is that the Chinese want to prove they're a responsible member of the international community, prepared to work with the west on common issues (after all, China has its own issues with Islamic militants in Xinjiang). Fighting in Afghanistan would give Chinese troops valuable counterinsurgency experience and allow them to observe the COIN tactics of other coalition members. The other possibility is that China might finally want to make the inroads into Central Asia commensurate with its status as a world power. Many analysts have speculated that China is preparing to get into Central Asia to secure its borders (by developing Xinjiang and Tibet through trade) and economic resources (energy, energy, energy).
From a realpolitik angle, building up a presence in Central Asia could provide China with access to resources the US cannot easily exclude. Despite a generally warm attitude and a vital trade relationship, China remains paranoid about its reliance on sea transport across the Indian Ocean for many of its raw material imports, since the US Navy patrols the Straits of Malacca. It's just one reason why the US cannot afford to shun free trade or economic integration with China if it wishes to avoid the pitfalls of multipolarity.
Medvedev changes his tune on Obama... Sort of. Given the combination of the missile movements and now this supposed overture, Medvedev may be putting on a bit of political theater to put the onus on Obama to make concessions even as he tries to embarrass or frustrate American goals. Such maneuvering would sour the strategic or domestic political climate to making those concessions, allowing Medvedev to sour Russian opinion about Obama by making it appear as if he is less reasonable or cooperative than otherwise believed. Given what occurred in Iran after the congratulatory letter incident, we may want to expect this sort of thing as more anti-Bush leaders attempt to shore up domestic credibility in the wake of Obama's victory.
First up is Karzai's offer to protect Mullah Omar (whose head is worth $10 million as far as the US is concerned) so long as he agrees to hold talks with Kabul. If ISAF or anyone else has a problem, Karzai said they could remove him or leave Afghanistan - unappealing options for a coalition that is committed to an Afghanistan that is both stable and democratic. I doubt Omar trusts the Afghans to protect him that well, but if they could (and kept their word), it might put the US and its new President in an unenviable situation.
Another interesting development: Apparently, Gordon Brown floated the idea of placing Chinese troops in Afghanistan. Though there hasn't been much to substantiate this report, if true, could signal an interesting development in Chinese policy. One possibility is that the Chinese want to prove they're a responsible member of the international community, prepared to work with the west on common issues (after all, China has its own issues with Islamic militants in Xinjiang). Fighting in Afghanistan would give Chinese troops valuable counterinsurgency experience and allow them to observe the COIN tactics of other coalition members. The other possibility is that China might finally want to make the inroads into Central Asia commensurate with its status as a world power. Many analysts have speculated that China is preparing to get into Central Asia to secure its borders (by developing Xinjiang and Tibet through trade) and economic resources (energy, energy, energy).
From a realpolitik angle, building up a presence in Central Asia could provide China with access to resources the US cannot easily exclude. Despite a generally warm attitude and a vital trade relationship, China remains paranoid about its reliance on sea transport across the Indian Ocean for many of its raw material imports, since the US Navy patrols the Straits of Malacca. It's just one reason why the US cannot afford to shun free trade or economic integration with China if it wishes to avoid the pitfalls of multipolarity.
Medvedev changes his tune on Obama... Sort of. Given the combination of the missile movements and now this supposed overture, Medvedev may be putting on a bit of political theater to put the onus on Obama to make concessions even as he tries to embarrass or frustrate American goals. Such maneuvering would sour the strategic or domestic political climate to making those concessions, allowing Medvedev to sour Russian opinion about Obama by making it appear as if he is less reasonable or cooperative than otherwise believed. Given what occurred in Iran after the congratulatory letter incident, we may want to expect this sort of thing as more anti-Bush leaders attempt to shore up domestic credibility in the wake of Obama's victory.
Friday, September 12, 2008
If it is Worth Doing...
Usually one does not cite William Tecumseh Sherman in a rumination on military restraint, but...
So, forgive me when I recommend an outspoken war critic and Presidential candidate not be so cavalier about attacking Pakistan, especially when he has no real plan for how to prevent such a conflict from escalating, or what the boundaries of such a mission would be. I will not go so far as to argue there are no circumstances under which we can attack Pakistan and buy into a foreign policy based on multilateral cooperation and support for Pakistani democracy. Faced against an increasingly uncooperative Pakistani government, attacks into the frontier may not be the worst option as far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned. Nevertheless, to be "realistic" about this aspect of the strategy means to stop clinging to any notion that we intend to pursue a policy of cooperation or support for democracy in Pakistan.
We are making a lot of enemies, ones with uniforms and nuclear bombs. I can't tell you how it will end, but I can say how it won't - there is not going to be a friendly Pakistani government. There is not going to be a cooperative Pakistani army willing to absorb thousands of casualties fighting tribesmen backed by the ISI while a foreign power humiliatingly violates their sovereignty. Do you want a prime example of the US shelling a society into support for extremism? Start watching Pakistan. Even if there is no escalation into a shooting war with Islamabad, we will poison democracy in Pakistan. The most basic function of a government is not education, or healthcare or welfare. It is protecting its citizens from coercion. Either the leader who allows his citizens to die will be replaced, or the system that put him into power will. Whether a stronger nationalist is voted into power or a coup occurs, Pakistanis are highly unlikely to tolerate such transgressions.
However destabilizing Iraq was, fomenting a crisis with Pakistan will be just as troubling with the international community in general. Sure, India might be happy, but who else will be? Europe operates in Afghanistan, too, and given the unease that many Europeans already feel about their Afghan troop presence, attacking Pakistan, if anything, would expedite their withdrawal. China will be very angry about an attack on its strategic partner, while the world public in general will see the unsavory aspects of the "Bush Doctrine" as permanent fixtures in America's 21st century policy, rather than a 7 year phase. In short: if you believe in soft power, you should be pleading with Obama-Biden to tone down their rhetoric on Pakistan. If you think attacking Pakistan is a good idea, maybe liberal internationalism shouldn't the keystone for your foreign policy this term. Perhaps the best Vietnam analogy isn't Iraq. Cambodia, after all, came from the guy who was going to "end the war," too...
Lest one assume I'm being too hard on Obama, let me point out that Palin's Charlie Gibson interview is more than proof enough that she is unfit to be Vice President come 2009. The idea that Mr. "Country First" would put her on the spot is extremely disturbing. Yes, she was a smart choice to unify the base. However, we've had 8 years of an folksy, outsider, common-man conservative ex-governor with no foreign policy experience. Excuse me if I am not willing to risk a few more.
Elsewhere in the world, OPEC has decided $100 is too low for a barrel of oil Any politician who tells you they've got a plan to enrich Americans by "lowering gas prices" or taxing "windfall profits" from oil companies is full of it - especially when the Gods seem to be on the side of higher oil prices, too. Also in unsurprising news today, Hugo Chavez has "had enough of so much shit" from the US.
Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and defeat.... seems to be an appropriate turn of phrase lately. The war in Iraq was fought by exactly such a metric. It was a plan to fight the war from the air, move in with less troops than we used to liberate Kuwait, and spend a few dozen billion to have them sit around in a country where only a few hardened Baathists would resist our lovely presence. Five years later, here we are.
So, forgive me when I recommend an outspoken war critic and Presidential candidate not be so cavalier about attacking Pakistan, especially when he has no real plan for how to prevent such a conflict from escalating, or what the boundaries of such a mission would be. I will not go so far as to argue there are no circumstances under which we can attack Pakistan and buy into a foreign policy based on multilateral cooperation and support for Pakistani democracy. Faced against an increasingly uncooperative Pakistani government, attacks into the frontier may not be the worst option as far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned. Nevertheless, to be "realistic" about this aspect of the strategy means to stop clinging to any notion that we intend to pursue a policy of cooperation or support for democracy in Pakistan.
We are making a lot of enemies, ones with uniforms and nuclear bombs. I can't tell you how it will end, but I can say how it won't - there is not going to be a friendly Pakistani government. There is not going to be a cooperative Pakistani army willing to absorb thousands of casualties fighting tribesmen backed by the ISI while a foreign power humiliatingly violates their sovereignty. Do you want a prime example of the US shelling a society into support for extremism? Start watching Pakistan. Even if there is no escalation into a shooting war with Islamabad, we will poison democracy in Pakistan. The most basic function of a government is not education, or healthcare or welfare. It is protecting its citizens from coercion. Either the leader who allows his citizens to die will be replaced, or the system that put him into power will. Whether a stronger nationalist is voted into power or a coup occurs, Pakistanis are highly unlikely to tolerate such transgressions.
However destabilizing Iraq was, fomenting a crisis with Pakistan will be just as troubling with the international community in general. Sure, India might be happy, but who else will be? Europe operates in Afghanistan, too, and given the unease that many Europeans already feel about their Afghan troop presence, attacking Pakistan, if anything, would expedite their withdrawal. China will be very angry about an attack on its strategic partner, while the world public in general will see the unsavory aspects of the "Bush Doctrine" as permanent fixtures in America's 21st century policy, rather than a 7 year phase. In short: if you believe in soft power, you should be pleading with Obama-Biden to tone down their rhetoric on Pakistan. If you think attacking Pakistan is a good idea, maybe liberal internationalism shouldn't the keystone for your foreign policy this term. Perhaps the best Vietnam analogy isn't Iraq. Cambodia, after all, came from the guy who was going to "end the war," too...
Lest one assume I'm being too hard on Obama, let me point out that Palin's Charlie Gibson interview is more than proof enough that she is unfit to be Vice President come 2009. The idea that Mr. "Country First" would put her on the spot is extremely disturbing. Yes, she was a smart choice to unify the base. However, we've had 8 years of an folksy, outsider, common-man conservative ex-governor with no foreign policy experience. Excuse me if I am not willing to risk a few more.
Elsewhere in the world, OPEC has decided $100 is too low for a barrel of oil Any politician who tells you they've got a plan to enrich Americans by "lowering gas prices" or taxing "windfall profits" from oil companies is full of it - especially when the Gods seem to be on the side of higher oil prices, too. Also in unsurprising news today, Hugo Chavez has "had enough of so much shit" from the US.
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
A Few Words on Pakistan
While it's great that Pakistan transitioned to a civilian Presidency peacefully, Zadari is likely to have a rough ride from here on out. Let's face it - if you think an American Presidential candidate has experience problems, wait until you hear about Zadari. As Robert Kaplan points out, his primary qualification is being the widower of Benazir Bhutto. Character aside, there is no indication he will be able to rein in the army or Inter-Services Intelligence, let alone the "Islamic Emirate" on the Afghan frontier. The Pakistani government is by no means in the clear, nor is it clear it has overcome the specters of the past. Zadari may be no friend of the courts, given the "Mr. 10%" moniker, which will ensure friction with the populace. While General Kayani is hardly another Musharraf, the military will become the de facto government where instability looms. The ISI, on the other hand, still sees Islamic extremists as viable proxies for the Pakistani national interest. Given recent tensions over Kashmir, it is important to remember that no matter what happens in Afghanistan, Islamabad will always have an interest in waging asymmetric warfare against its economically and militarily superior rival.
The US, for its part, is certainly not showing much faith in the Pakistani government. American troops attacked Pakistani soil without authorization, and have kept up bombing for good measure. While the President of the US and the one to follow will undoubtedly pay lip service to Pakistani democracy, Americans are going to have to accept that that democracy doesn't care for the direction the Afghan war is headed in. On top of it all, we have a ticket with two vocal Pakistan hawks. No, they're not Republicans (McCain has followed Bush's old line on Pakistan, while I doubt Palin's campaign manager has finished briefing her on what her opinion is supposed to be). While Obama gets praise for tracking Osama down to the "cave where he lives," Biden was way ahead of him. They absolutely have a point in criticizing Pakistan's response to the war on terror threat, but Pakistanis (who have lost over 1000 soldiers and 3000 civilians in the North-West War) were tired of the US line beforehand, and certainly not warming up to it. Countries that have sacrificed thousands of their own people for their partners only to get invaded by them tend to have grievances over such treatment. The Bush-Obama policy of military intervention in Pakistan would force Obama to do some major backpedaling if he hoped to gain any cooperation from the government in Islamabad, especially as the US-India nuclear deal moves forward.
Of course, given Pakistan's struggling economy, wouldn't it make sense to use non-military aid as leverage to elicit Pakistani cooperation? Yes, but that doesn't mean we can rely on it. After all, Pakistan is already quite cozy with a government less picky about their behavior in Afghanistan. In the long run, Pakistan might not need the US so much after all...
The US, for its part, is certainly not showing much faith in the Pakistani government. American troops attacked Pakistani soil without authorization, and have kept up bombing for good measure. While the President of the US and the one to follow will undoubtedly pay lip service to Pakistani democracy, Americans are going to have to accept that that democracy doesn't care for the direction the Afghan war is headed in. On top of it all, we have a ticket with two vocal Pakistan hawks. No, they're not Republicans (McCain has followed Bush's old line on Pakistan, while I doubt Palin's campaign manager has finished briefing her on what her opinion is supposed to be). While Obama gets praise for tracking Osama down to the "cave where he lives," Biden was way ahead of him. They absolutely have a point in criticizing Pakistan's response to the war on terror threat, but Pakistanis (who have lost over 1000 soldiers and 3000 civilians in the North-West War) were tired of the US line beforehand, and certainly not warming up to it. Countries that have sacrificed thousands of their own people for their partners only to get invaded by them tend to have grievances over such treatment. The Bush-Obama policy of military intervention in Pakistan would force Obama to do some major backpedaling if he hoped to gain any cooperation from the government in Islamabad, especially as the US-India nuclear deal moves forward.
Of course, given Pakistan's struggling economy, wouldn't it make sense to use non-military aid as leverage to elicit Pakistani cooperation? Yes, but that doesn't mean we can rely on it. After all, Pakistan is already quite cozy with a government less picky about their behavior in Afghanistan. In the long run, Pakistan might not need the US so much after all...
Friday, August 8, 2008
May We Live in Interesting Times...
"Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating."
- Carl von Clausewitz
The Georgians are moving in on South Ossetia and they don't look to be pulling any punches. This wouldn't be very worrying if it weren't for the way Russia's reacted. According to the Georgians, the Russians flew three Su-24s into Georgia and started bombing police stations. Now, the Russians haven't said anything yet and I doubt they'll say they did it - using Russian jets to harass Georgia is nothing new. The last time the Georgians claimed the Russians bombed them, the Russians said it was likely an incident fabricated by the Georgian government. To be fair, Georgia does operate a half-dozen or so Su-24s. Russia operates 458. Choose your verison of the truth, I suppose. However, even if Russia isn't "officially" fighting Georgia, that isn't going to stop them from helping out the Ossetians (or the Abkhaz). They can always supply weapons to the resistance movements themselves - even when it wasn't Kremlin policy, many Russian officers voluntarily did it (or were bribed) during the initial '91-'93 conflict. Russia's going to come down hard on Georgia for a number of reasons. One is letting American soldiers into Georgia from 2002-2004. Another is Georgia's continuing efforts to expand this relationship into NATO membership. Don't forget Georgia's offer to take part in the US missile shield - something that's gotten Poland in trouble too. Consider also Russia's promise to step up support for Georgian breakaway regions in light of Kosovar independence. If Russia really throws their weight into this, it's not just because Russia cares so much about regions that have the population equivalents of Providence, Rhode Island and Gary, Indiana - it's because Russia wants to reassert its traditional role in the Caucasus - hegemon.
UPDATE: Russia is throwing their weight into this. The 58th army has entered Georgia.
So, it being an Olympic year, we can look forward at least to some spirited matches between Russia and Georgia in the Olympics. The IOC's efforts to the contrary, the Olympics are a political event. China's using it as a nationalist popularity boost. The Uighurs are using it as an opportunity to lash out at the Chinese government (perhaps to gain some visibility with the Free Tibet crowd). The US has put a Sudanese refugee as its flag-carrier. But remember guys, the Olympics are not political. At all. Ever. So this one's won't be either. Believe it, and it will be true.
Pakistan's Parliament seems on track to impeach Musharraf. This, if it works well, is good news - Pakistan's civilian government hasn't been perfect, but it's better to forge a new relationship with a legitimate government than lose Pakistan moderates by clinging to an unpopular strongman. Of course, Musharraf (and the military), if they choose to fight it out, can shut down parliament, declare emergency law again, and throw the whole process for a loop. On the other hand, if this succeeds against the army's wishes, who knows how tight a leash the Pakistani government can keep on the army and ISI? Nevertheless, the US should do everything to ensure that Pakistan has a strong, legitimate government - we aren't ready for Kagan's nightmare.
Nuclear talks with Iran aren't progressing swimmingly, either. The risk-reward ratio is still skewed too far to justify a military attack, but this logic might not convince Israel. To go on a bit of a tangent, I consider an Israeli attack on Iran the worst of all possible options. Firstly, the political blowback in Iran and the wider Middle East would be just as catastrophic for the US - especially because geography necessitates we green-light any Israeli strike. However, there are so many nuclear sites in Iran (and Iran's air-defense network is well enough along) that a decisive blow against Iran's nuclear infrastructure would require the might of the USAF, not just the relative handful Israeli aircraft capable of reaching Iran's inland sites. I do not think such strikes are inevitable, though. I would, however, rate the Iranian chance of acquiring a bomb as higher than the chances there will be a conflict.
- Carl von Clausewitz
The Georgians are moving in on South Ossetia and they don't look to be pulling any punches. This wouldn't be very worrying if it weren't for the way Russia's reacted. According to the Georgians, the Russians flew three Su-24s into Georgia and started bombing police stations. Now, the Russians haven't said anything yet and I doubt they'll say they did it - using Russian jets to harass Georgia is nothing new. The last time the Georgians claimed the Russians bombed them, the Russians said it was likely an incident fabricated by the Georgian government. To be fair, Georgia does operate a half-dozen or so Su-24s. Russia operates 458. Choose your verison of the truth, I suppose. However, even if Russia isn't "officially" fighting Georgia, that isn't going to stop them from helping out the Ossetians (or the Abkhaz). They can always supply weapons to the resistance movements themselves - even when it wasn't Kremlin policy, many Russian officers voluntarily did it (or were bribed) during the initial '91-'93 conflict. Russia's going to come down hard on Georgia for a number of reasons. One is letting American soldiers into Georgia from 2002-2004. Another is Georgia's continuing efforts to expand this relationship into NATO membership. Don't forget Georgia's offer to take part in the US missile shield - something that's gotten Poland in trouble too. Consider also Russia's promise to step up support for Georgian breakaway regions in light of Kosovar independence. If Russia really throws their weight into this, it's not just because Russia cares so much about regions that have the population equivalents of Providence, Rhode Island and Gary, Indiana - it's because Russia wants to reassert its traditional role in the Caucasus - hegemon.
UPDATE: Russia is throwing their weight into this. The 58th army has entered Georgia.
So, it being an Olympic year, we can look forward at least to some spirited matches between Russia and Georgia in the Olympics. The IOC's efforts to the contrary, the Olympics are a political event. China's using it as a nationalist popularity boost. The Uighurs are using it as an opportunity to lash out at the Chinese government (perhaps to gain some visibility with the Free Tibet crowd). The US has put a Sudanese refugee as its flag-carrier. But remember guys, the Olympics are not political. At all. Ever. So this one's won't be either. Believe it, and it will be true.
Pakistan's Parliament seems on track to impeach Musharraf. This, if it works well, is good news - Pakistan's civilian government hasn't been perfect, but it's better to forge a new relationship with a legitimate government than lose Pakistan moderates by clinging to an unpopular strongman. Of course, Musharraf (and the military), if they choose to fight it out, can shut down parliament, declare emergency law again, and throw the whole process for a loop. On the other hand, if this succeeds against the army's wishes, who knows how tight a leash the Pakistani government can keep on the army and ISI? Nevertheless, the US should do everything to ensure that Pakistan has a strong, legitimate government - we aren't ready for Kagan's nightmare.
Nuclear talks with Iran aren't progressing swimmingly, either. The risk-reward ratio is still skewed too far to justify a military attack, but this logic might not convince Israel. To go on a bit of a tangent, I consider an Israeli attack on Iran the worst of all possible options. Firstly, the political blowback in Iran and the wider Middle East would be just as catastrophic for the US - especially because geography necessitates we green-light any Israeli strike. However, there are so many nuclear sites in Iran (and Iran's air-defense network is well enough along) that a decisive blow against Iran's nuclear infrastructure would require the might of the USAF, not just the relative handful Israeli aircraft capable of reaching Iran's inland sites. I do not think such strikes are inevitable, though. I would, however, rate the Iranian chance of acquiring a bomb as higher than the chances there will be a conflict.
Saturday, August 2, 2008
With a Friend Like This...
Pakistan is one of the most frustrating countries for the US to deal with in the war on terror. It's a massive state sponsor of Islamic fundamentalism - something we found out the hard way when we had to subcontract their ISI to get into Afghanistan in the '80s. It has nuclear weapons, and thus has intentionally and unintentionally become a potential source of nuclear proliferation. And even if it becomes completely intolerable to American interests, it is far too massive for the US to invade.
Why has our Pakistan policy gone so badly?
First of all, America is not the hub of all international interests. Especially Pakistan's. Pakistan has plenty of built-in faults, like its hodgepodge of ethnic groups and a virtually permanent state of inferiority to its rival. Consequently, Pakistan's overriding motives are maintaining internal stability and checking India.
Which means that unless we can convince Pakistan we're going to destroy them, or give them real advantages against India, it's going to be really hard to get Pakistan's government to act the way we want. Let alone its people, which the government often has had a hard time getting to act the way it wants.
Until now, we've gotten Pakistan to ignore it's natural interest of exploiting Islamic sentiments to shore up support in the lawless Northwestern Frontier and check India by bribing them with military aid to India. Given the returns, however, this doesn't make much sense in the long run - India is a far more valuable ally than Pakistan, to be frank. Nevertheless, we need Pakistan's cooperation to deal with Afghanistan and terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Obama has suggested a policy of intervening in Pakistan without the government's permission. This makes sense when it is absolutely vital to, say, killing key al Qaeda members or existential threats to Afghanistan, but it is not a cure-all replacement for Pakistani cooperation. Indeed, even using this method when it is vital could have dire consequences - either it will induce a government extremely hostile to US interests, or US intervention could induce internal unrest and destabilization in Pakistan, especially given the fragile nature of Pakistan's parliamentary governments. Either way, worse for the US at this point.
It's important to note that nobody really wants Pakistan to collapse - its neighbors don't want to deal with the refugees, al Qaeda doesn't want to lose the shield of protection (if Pakistan were already in anarchy, there'd be no reason not to cross the border and mess around), China doesn't want to lose a client, Iran doesn't want to fight off the Baluchis, Saudi Arabia doesn't want to lose the ISI as a partner, and India doesn't want to lose a common enemy. Finally, the vast majority of the world doesn't want loose nukes. Even if they become more hostile, until they start handing out nuclear weapons, they're probably an enemy we want intact.
Also, if you believe Jared Diamond, this collapse is inevitable since Pakistan is committing ecological suicide.
Why has our Pakistan policy gone so badly?
First of all, America is not the hub of all international interests. Especially Pakistan's. Pakistan has plenty of built-in faults, like its hodgepodge of ethnic groups and a virtually permanent state of inferiority to its rival. Consequently, Pakistan's overriding motives are maintaining internal stability and checking India.
Which means that unless we can convince Pakistan we're going to destroy them, or give them real advantages against India, it's going to be really hard to get Pakistan's government to act the way we want. Let alone its people, which the government often has had a hard time getting to act the way it wants.
Until now, we've gotten Pakistan to ignore it's natural interest of exploiting Islamic sentiments to shore up support in the lawless Northwestern Frontier and check India by bribing them with military aid to India. Given the returns, however, this doesn't make much sense in the long run - India is a far more valuable ally than Pakistan, to be frank. Nevertheless, we need Pakistan's cooperation to deal with Afghanistan and terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Obama has suggested a policy of intervening in Pakistan without the government's permission. This makes sense when it is absolutely vital to, say, killing key al Qaeda members or existential threats to Afghanistan, but it is not a cure-all replacement for Pakistani cooperation. Indeed, even using this method when it is vital could have dire consequences - either it will induce a government extremely hostile to US interests, or US intervention could induce internal unrest and destabilization in Pakistan, especially given the fragile nature of Pakistan's parliamentary governments. Either way, worse for the US at this point.
It's important to note that nobody really wants Pakistan to collapse - its neighbors don't want to deal with the refugees, al Qaeda doesn't want to lose the shield of protection (if Pakistan were already in anarchy, there'd be no reason not to cross the border and mess around), China doesn't want to lose a client, Iran doesn't want to fight off the Baluchis, Saudi Arabia doesn't want to lose the ISI as a partner, and India doesn't want to lose a common enemy. Finally, the vast majority of the world doesn't want loose nukes. Even if they become more hostile, until they start handing out nuclear weapons, they're probably an enemy we want intact.
Also, if you believe Jared Diamond, this collapse is inevitable since Pakistan is committing ecological suicide.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
Really, How'd it Get This Way?
Why can't America mind its own business? I posed the question earlier and touched on it briefly. But it's a question intruiguing enough to answer, and it comes from an opinion common enough to rile me. Since World War II, every American policy has been built around an interventionist approach to foreign affairs - even the most Wilsonian and internationalist of policies lead us into conflicts - from Korea to Kosovo, good intentions lead to the use of American power abroad. Why can't we be like every other nation?
There are several flaws to this argument, and even then it takes valances - the purely isolationist and the multilateralist being most prominent. These posts often reek of the strawman fallacy, but I assure you I have heard these arguments made.
The first is that, quite simply, America is not like every other nation. We are still one fifth of the world's economy. This is not to say that economic might paves the way for diplomatic right, but it is a figure you should keep in mind. America is still a bull in a china shop. Even when it lies down to sleep, it is still going to knock something over. Other countries expect things of the most powerful countries, especially when they are the only one that can deploy power anywhere in the world. Even with the rise of China, you are not going to see comparable military power. American aircraft will still patrol the Taiwan Strait and American carriers will still linger in the East China Sea. But I will bet money that you will not live to see Chinese CVNs at a permanent base in Hispanola or 30,000 PLA troops in Guatemala. India is even less prepared for a role as a military superpower. Russia virtually ended naval construction and its strategic air capabilities are unlikely to return to Cold War capabilities (Even Russia's traditional strong point, missile technology is on the wane - reporting botched Topol tests is a taboo subject in Putin's Russia). The EU might be least prepared of all potential superpowers - Europe includes powers, but it is not a power itself. The EU, internally, is a remarkable institution. But it is less than the sum of its parts beyond its own borders. (One could, of course, argue that we don't need any superpower lording over anyone, but this would be to assume there are no genuinely international problems or concerns that require a forceful resolution. History shows rather well that there are, and such an attitude generally results in the triumph of the nastiest superpowers.)
Even if we do have a role to play, then who will help us do it? This is the multilateralist form of the argument. Who wants to do what we do? If Europe is on the rise and will some day act as a unified power beyond its own borders, then it is the most logical ideological heir to America's role. So too, people would argue, it could also be America's successor in practical terms - after all, KFOR was representative of NATO, ISAF's non-American component is largely European, etc. But do they want to?
The answer, overwhelmingly, is no. Britain is a telling example. Iraq? Britain's been there, and it bought the T-shirt. Afghanistan? Also not a positive experience. But it's not just Britain: Europe is tired of anything that smells of empire. Want to see multilateral, institution-based, trans-Atlantic cooperation? French socialists are trying to avoid entering the NATO unified command structure precisely so they don't have to contribute or defer their national interest to others. When the choice comes down to spending more on the military so half of it doesn't walk away so they can fight wars of choice or maintaining a massive amount of morally unquestionable entitlement programs, which way do you think a democratic European country will swing? There are willing Eastern European countries, to be sure - the ones who remember American favors and Soviet boots, but Western Europe is sensibly enough more concerned about angering its petroleum supplier than getting more Ukranians in ISAF.
But the truth is, Europeans know issues like a potential Iraqi collapse, a crisis in the Taiwan Straits, and war in the Korean peninsula are real issues - they'd just rather have someone else dump half their discretionary spending into the military and hundreds of thousands of soldiers into permanent overseas bases. International security is a public good, and public goods are free rider problems. The UN will not likely be the "government" that resolves such problems when they appear on a national scale. Giving the US, UK, France, Russia and China vetoes alone is problematic enough, proposals to make the council more representative by giving the same to Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, and an Islamic Player to be Named Later is not going to help. So the superpower among great powers often does the work of others. To go back to Afghanistan's long history of interventions...
Yet the system was broken before Bush came into power. Bin Laden escalated the war on terror, and when we escalated we found out we didn't know how to fight. Yes, George W. Bush was not the optimal in his conduct, to put it lightly. (Neither is he necessarily the worst - remember that we have yet to invade Syria, Iran and Pakistan as the doomsayers predicted. John McCain could have been President in 2001, too.) But the blowback we are reaping now is not all from Bush. Ossetia and Abkhazia are once again on the brink of war. Russia wraps up its support for these Georgian breakaway regions in a tu quoques argument based around NATO support for Kosovo. It would also be foolish to discuss Putin's hawkish tendencies without noting the US-lead effort to incorporate former Soviet puppets in 1999, or to discuss European skepticism (and Russian paranoia) about American hawkishness without remembering in 1999 when fellow NATO commanders refused to follow Wesley Clark's orders to start World War III.
The wounds of Afghanistan, Iraq, and America's looming confrontation with the reality of its own unpreparedness for a "global war on terrorism" were open, we've just spent the last 8 years worsening them. Modern advocates of multilateralism argue that while the US was a unipolar power in the 1990s, it was not unlimited in its capabilities or grossly irresponsible in its actions; and thus aggressive, unilateral policy cannot be used as the baseline for its 21st century actions. I agree, and I add: while multilateral systems in the 1990s were certainly more effective, they were limited in their capabilities and appeared increasingly irresponsible to those whose interests they did not serve. The problems inherent in these multilateral systems that lead, in part, to our rejection of them, still exist, because they are entrenched in these organizations themselves.
America cannot and will not act like just another country, or a nicely fitting cog in a multilateral regime because the system it inhabits will not permit such a policy. The abdication of international responsibility, to borrow a phrase from Therese Delpech, applies not only to America's conduct in the beginning of the 21st century but also to the reluctance of its presumptive allies in sacrificing their own limited self-interest and the actions of its rivals. The multilateral system will not live up to the expectations American internationalists are today setting for it as long as all the major players refuse to cooperate, whether that means the US, Europe, NATO as a whole, or Russia or China. But it is also worth noting that these international systems are more effective when they have a clear leader to guide them, as is the case when NATO acts. To the extent that the world becomes more multipolar, this too will be more difficult.
The "orderly" systems that are able to govern great powers are often, historically, self-defeating in the long run and thus require the work of a great diplomat to create and sustain them. When that diplomat is gone, the system breaks down. Metternich's system collapsed when there was no Metternich to defend it from Bismarck. Bismarck's realpolitik and "great wheel" failed when he was no longer around to keep it from imploding on itself. Wilson's system of internationalism was perhaps more disconnected with the reality in Europe than the previously mentioned ones, but it is unquestionable that the lack of his direct presence in the League of Nations and the lack of a suitable successor contributed to its failure. For our century, we have no adequate international order or system guarantee its stability, and we will likely need a great diplomat to build one. Unfortunately, "not being George W. Bush" is not a sufficient qualification. This system is too compromised, I fear, for anything less than brilliance and luck to fix it.
---
That was a lot longer than I intended.
There are several flaws to this argument, and even then it takes valances - the purely isolationist and the multilateralist being most prominent. These posts often reek of the strawman fallacy, but I assure you I have heard these arguments made.
The first is that, quite simply, America is not like every other nation. We are still one fifth of the world's economy. This is not to say that economic might paves the way for diplomatic right, but it is a figure you should keep in mind. America is still a bull in a china shop. Even when it lies down to sleep, it is still going to knock something over. Other countries expect things of the most powerful countries, especially when they are the only one that can deploy power anywhere in the world. Even with the rise of China, you are not going to see comparable military power. American aircraft will still patrol the Taiwan Strait and American carriers will still linger in the East China Sea. But I will bet money that you will not live to see Chinese CVNs at a permanent base in Hispanola or 30,000 PLA troops in Guatemala. India is even less prepared for a role as a military superpower. Russia virtually ended naval construction and its strategic air capabilities are unlikely to return to Cold War capabilities (Even Russia's traditional strong point, missile technology is on the wane - reporting botched Topol tests is a taboo subject in Putin's Russia). The EU might be least prepared of all potential superpowers - Europe includes powers, but it is not a power itself. The EU, internally, is a remarkable institution. But it is less than the sum of its parts beyond its own borders. (One could, of course, argue that we don't need any superpower lording over anyone, but this would be to assume there are no genuinely international problems or concerns that require a forceful resolution. History shows rather well that there are, and such an attitude generally results in the triumph of the nastiest superpowers.)
Even if we do have a role to play, then who will help us do it? This is the multilateralist form of the argument. Who wants to do what we do? If Europe is on the rise and will some day act as a unified power beyond its own borders, then it is the most logical ideological heir to America's role. So too, people would argue, it could also be America's successor in practical terms - after all, KFOR was representative of NATO, ISAF's non-American component is largely European, etc. But do they want to?
The answer, overwhelmingly, is no. Britain is a telling example. Iraq? Britain's been there, and it bought the T-shirt. Afghanistan? Also not a positive experience. But it's not just Britain: Europe is tired of anything that smells of empire. Want to see multilateral, institution-based, trans-Atlantic cooperation? French socialists are trying to avoid entering the NATO unified command structure precisely so they don't have to contribute or defer their national interest to others. When the choice comes down to spending more on the military so half of it doesn't walk away so they can fight wars of choice or maintaining a massive amount of morally unquestionable entitlement programs, which way do you think a democratic European country will swing? There are willing Eastern European countries, to be sure - the ones who remember American favors and Soviet boots, but Western Europe is sensibly enough more concerned about angering its petroleum supplier than getting more Ukranians in ISAF.
But the truth is, Europeans know issues like a potential Iraqi collapse, a crisis in the Taiwan Straits, and war in the Korean peninsula are real issues - they'd just rather have someone else dump half their discretionary spending into the military and hundreds of thousands of soldiers into permanent overseas bases. International security is a public good, and public goods are free rider problems. The UN will not likely be the "government" that resolves such problems when they appear on a national scale. Giving the US, UK, France, Russia and China vetoes alone is problematic enough, proposals to make the council more representative by giving the same to Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, and an Islamic Player to be Named Later is not going to help. So the superpower among great powers often does the work of others. To go back to Afghanistan's long history of interventions...
"On another hand, it's absolutely clear that Nato countries, and Great Britain among them, they are doing our job," he adds.
"Now western countries are doing our job and support tremendously Russian security."
There's the Catch-22 of American foreign policy. When our actions serve the interests of all international players, we will bear the brunt of the costs. When they do not, there will be fewer to help with whatever ones we do not.
But what about the 1990s? Or, to put it in a partisan manner, what about the Clinton administration? Our unipolarity then was also unquestioned, but we now nostalgically look back upon it as an era of hope for multilateral policy and the international rule of law. Well, part of that is justified. And much of it is a kneejerk reaction to the misguided policies of George W. Bush. But it is important to remember that while Bush's interest in nation-building came after 9/11, the neoconservatism of his advisors was already there. PNAC's letter petitioning Clinton to depose Saddam went out in 1998. Its famed "Rebuilding America's Defenses" came out in 1997.
Let's review:
- The Battle of Mogadishu, 1993 - You've seen the movie, maybe even read the book, but the American withdrawal here was emblamatic of much of what neoconservatives thought was wrong about American foreign policy.
- The Rwandan genocide, 1994 - The US decides to "do what everyone else is doing," which, in a collective action problem, is absolutely nothing. Using force to protect human rights starts looking like a good idea again.
- Operation Deliberate Force, Bosnia, 1995 - NATO bombs the Balkans to the peace table. Russia prevents the UN from doing anything constructive.
- 3rd Taiwan Straits Crisis, 1995-1996 - China launches missiles over Taiwan, Chinese generals imply they would use nuclear arms against American cities if the US intervened. These war fears persist well into the beginning of Bush's first term... And then 9/11 happens. This is why PNAC is writing letters about rebuilding America's defenses.
- Operation Desert Fox, Iraq, 1998 - Iraq refuses to comply with inspectors. America bombs Iraq, and Clinton signs the Iraq Liberation Act that supports anti-Saddam militias. The aforementioned PNAC letter to go further comes here.
- Operation Infinite Reach, Afghanistan, Sudan, 1998 - In response to the African embassy bombings, the US bombs a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan and other targets in Afghanistan. Russia and the Muslims are angry, but the US is still riding enough goodwill from the attacks on its embassies that Europe gives it the general OK.
- Operation Allied Force, Kosovo, 1999 - Similar story, slightly different location. The phrase "humanitarian bombing" is used intentionally by NATO spokespersons. KFOR - Western troops - are on the ground. Criticisms include the questionable use of UN resolutions as a justification, undermining of the international system, the unnecessary escalation of conflict due to a misreading of the target nation's actions, and committing the US to nation-building. Only this time, it's conservatives saying the latter rather than liberals.
Yet the system was broken before Bush came into power. Bin Laden escalated the war on terror, and when we escalated we found out we didn't know how to fight. Yes, George W. Bush was not the optimal in his conduct, to put it lightly. (Neither is he necessarily the worst - remember that we have yet to invade Syria, Iran and Pakistan as the doomsayers predicted. John McCain could have been President in 2001, too.) But the blowback we are reaping now is not all from Bush. Ossetia and Abkhazia are once again on the brink of war. Russia wraps up its support for these Georgian breakaway regions in a tu quoques argument based around NATO support for Kosovo. It would also be foolish to discuss Putin's hawkish tendencies without noting the US-lead effort to incorporate former Soviet puppets in 1999, or to discuss European skepticism (and Russian paranoia) about American hawkishness without remembering in 1999 when fellow NATO commanders refused to follow Wesley Clark's orders to start World War III.
The wounds of Afghanistan, Iraq, and America's looming confrontation with the reality of its own unpreparedness for a "global war on terrorism" were open, we've just spent the last 8 years worsening them. Modern advocates of multilateralism argue that while the US was a unipolar power in the 1990s, it was not unlimited in its capabilities or grossly irresponsible in its actions; and thus aggressive, unilateral policy cannot be used as the baseline for its 21st century actions. I agree, and I add: while multilateral systems in the 1990s were certainly more effective, they were limited in their capabilities and appeared increasingly irresponsible to those whose interests they did not serve. The problems inherent in these multilateral systems that lead, in part, to our rejection of them, still exist, because they are entrenched in these organizations themselves.
America cannot and will not act like just another country, or a nicely fitting cog in a multilateral regime because the system it inhabits will not permit such a policy. The abdication of international responsibility, to borrow a phrase from Therese Delpech, applies not only to America's conduct in the beginning of the 21st century but also to the reluctance of its presumptive allies in sacrificing their own limited self-interest and the actions of its rivals. The multilateral system will not live up to the expectations American internationalists are today setting for it as long as all the major players refuse to cooperate, whether that means the US, Europe, NATO as a whole, or Russia or China. But it is also worth noting that these international systems are more effective when they have a clear leader to guide them, as is the case when NATO acts. To the extent that the world becomes more multipolar, this too will be more difficult.
The "orderly" systems that are able to govern great powers are often, historically, self-defeating in the long run and thus require the work of a great diplomat to create and sustain them. When that diplomat is gone, the system breaks down. Metternich's system collapsed when there was no Metternich to defend it from Bismarck. Bismarck's realpolitik and "great wheel" failed when he was no longer around to keep it from imploding on itself. Wilson's system of internationalism was perhaps more disconnected with the reality in Europe than the previously mentioned ones, but it is unquestionable that the lack of his direct presence in the League of Nations and the lack of a suitable successor contributed to its failure. For our century, we have no adequate international order or system guarantee its stability, and we will likely need a great diplomat to build one. Unfortunately, "not being George W. Bush" is not a sufficient qualification. This system is too compromised, I fear, for anything less than brilliance and luck to fix it.
---
That was a lot longer than I intended.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Neoliberalism and hawkishness
Does it make any sense to be optimistic and supportive of free trade and still support maintaining the world's most powerful air force and navy, things not particularly useful for our current conflicts? In other words, why do I want to trade with China (and other countries) but check its power? My response is somewhat rambling since I've never been asked this, and would probably be more coherent had someone else taken up the onerous burden of interrogating me.
Free trade is good for both "us" and "them" economically. Consequently, free trade does have some positive diplomatic effects - in addition to economic benefits, free trade is a diplomatic signal. Working through organizations like the WTO strengthens international institutions and multilateralism, thus reducing harsh feelings and anti-American sentiment - that whole "image" issue. With that apparent, why then would I still support the maintenance of instruments of traditional state warfare?
I don't believe the marginal effect of free trade is enough to push countries from "brink of war" to "peace" except in the very long run (very rich, liberal, democratic countries are less likely to fight each other, yes, and free trade can generally encourage the attitudes and institutions that promote the aforementioned things). WWI, after all, occurred despite very high levels of global economic integration.
It's important to note that not all wars are fought over economic issues. However, backsliding on economic agreements like free trade can still exacerbate things because of its value as a political signal and its inducement of political and economic volatility. Take the interwar period - the backsliding on free trade probably contributed to WWII to some degree, but economic autarky both encouraged and fed on radical political movements.
Also, there's the deterrence value - maintaining a globally active military and forging strategic partnerships discourages minor powers from fighting each other. Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East, India, China and any of their regional rivals (including Taiwan), Russia and its neighbors spring to mind as well. Even if one country might not want to fight the US because of economic linkages or political incentives, it might still have an incentive to fight someone else.
Then of course there is the fear of shocks to the present international order. It is too soon to say whether the dystopian visions of conflict over natural resources will come true, but one never knows. I am not advocating invading other countries for their oil, but the US has a useful role as a balancer and peacekeeper as I have just mentioned.
While this post addresses the international stage in general, it addresses China in particular. One of the lines of argument specific to China is of China skeptics to lump all its faults together - political crimes, environmental damage, and poor working conditions, and consequently want to tie free trade to standards China is unlikely to accept. Such soft protectionism is unlikely to be useful in improving the lives of Chinese. In fact, by impoverishing China it would lessen the incentive to raise wages, improve labor standards, or clean up the environment. As for the argument that it is wrong to trade with a dictatorship, economic sanctions are useful for stopping specific policies, not for transforming societies. Economic sanctions did not make Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Burma, Iraq and others into liberal democracies. If anything, integrating autocratic countries into the global economy makes major social change more likely.
Maintaining policies that limit, say, arms trade with China are far more sensible than blanket policies that serve mainly to appease protectionist interests.
Free trade is good for both "us" and "them" economically. Consequently, free trade does have some positive diplomatic effects - in addition to economic benefits, free trade is a diplomatic signal. Working through organizations like the WTO strengthens international institutions and multilateralism, thus reducing harsh feelings and anti-American sentiment - that whole "image" issue. With that apparent, why then would I still support the maintenance of instruments of traditional state warfare?
I don't believe the marginal effect of free trade is enough to push countries from "brink of war" to "peace" except in the very long run (very rich, liberal, democratic countries are less likely to fight each other, yes, and free trade can generally encourage the attitudes and institutions that promote the aforementioned things). WWI, after all, occurred despite very high levels of global economic integration.
It's important to note that not all wars are fought over economic issues. However, backsliding on economic agreements like free trade can still exacerbate things because of its value as a political signal and its inducement of political and economic volatility. Take the interwar period - the backsliding on free trade probably contributed to WWII to some degree, but economic autarky both encouraged and fed on radical political movements.
Also, there's the deterrence value - maintaining a globally active military and forging strategic partnerships discourages minor powers from fighting each other. Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East, India, China and any of their regional rivals (including Taiwan), Russia and its neighbors spring to mind as well. Even if one country might not want to fight the US because of economic linkages or political incentives, it might still have an incentive to fight someone else.
Then of course there is the fear of shocks to the present international order. It is too soon to say whether the dystopian visions of conflict over natural resources will come true, but one never knows. I am not advocating invading other countries for their oil, but the US has a useful role as a balancer and peacekeeper as I have just mentioned.
While this post addresses the international stage in general, it addresses China in particular. One of the lines of argument specific to China is of China skeptics to lump all its faults together - political crimes, environmental damage, and poor working conditions, and consequently want to tie free trade to standards China is unlikely to accept. Such soft protectionism is unlikely to be useful in improving the lives of Chinese. In fact, by impoverishing China it would lessen the incentive to raise wages, improve labor standards, or clean up the environment. As for the argument that it is wrong to trade with a dictatorship, economic sanctions are useful for stopping specific policies, not for transforming societies. Economic sanctions did not make Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Burma, Iraq and others into liberal democracies. If anything, integrating autocratic countries into the global economy makes major social change more likely.
Maintaining policies that limit, say, arms trade with China are far more sensible than blanket policies that serve mainly to appease protectionist interests.
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
Proliferation for whom?
So, returning to the great question: who should have nuclear arms?
Theoretically this question is impossible to answer in any manner involving ethics. So I would suppose we'd have to deal with this one in the real world.
The "Official" Five Nuclear Weapons States: Good luck convincing them to give them up. Now, there is certainly a case to be made for reducing the size of their arsenals (with the potential exception of China, which has a very limited nuclear deterrent with regards to its peer competitors of America and Russia), but the balance of power, however repugnant the concept seems to many Americans, does have to be maintained when dealing with something like nuclear arms. As former, present and likely future superpowers (respectively), Russia, the USA and China all have the strongest cases for maintaining their nuclear arsenals. So what of the two European countries? Britain probably has the weakest case for maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent, given the general affinity between its own security interests and that of the United States. France would have a similar interest to disarm if not for the chance that it will lead the EU in any sort of combined-defense scheme, since it is more centrally involved in the European project than the UK and has a more powerful air force and navy than Germany. Were the EU ever to truly form a military alliance, France would be the natural candidate to provide its nuclear deterrent.
India and Pakistan: Again, good luck getting them to disarm. Even if India and Pakistan were to disarm bilaterally, this would not settle the region's nuclear question. Many in the West are not entirely cognizant that China is, and has been, more of an issue for India than America. They have border disputes, and fought a war over them in the 1960s. This is mostly settled now, but China's rise and support for Indian rival Pakistan could prove a sticking point. Then there's the darker possibilities of resource competition for not just fossil fuels, but possibly water control (a good number of major river systems in South and East Asia originate from China). Pakistan needs a nuclear deterrent against an otherwise militarily superior India, and India needs a nuclear deterrent against China. The system is in place, and it will take a long time and a lot of effort and goodwill to undo it.
Israel: The first important thing to note about Israeli nuclear weapons is that they've not done well as a deterrent against conventional attacks. They likely had nuclear arms during 1967, and this did not convince Arab states their conventional efforts would be useless (they built up troops that the Israelis then destroyed in the Six Day War). In 1973, the Arabs attacked directly and it took an American bailout to relieve conventional Israeli forces to win the war. Nuclear weapons did not deter the Arabs, they still had to be defeated on the battlefield. Though one might argue Israeli nuclear arms have prevented a similar clash since the Yom Kippur War, this probably has more to do with Israeli conventional superiority and knowledge that the US would bail Israel out as much as the nuclear threat. They work as a precautionary deterrent against WMDs such as Syria's chemical weapons stockpile and the potential Iranian (or Egyptian, or Syrian, or in the 1980s, Iraqi) nuclear device.
Speaking of '73, it's important to note that part of the reason the US bailed out Israel during Nickel Grass wasn't out of some great love for the state of Israel (we're talking about Nixon and Kissinger here, the former was pretty much an anti-Semite and the latter opposed the state's creation in '48!) , but out of Cold War politics. If the US didn't give Israel the means to defeat the Arabs conventionally, Israel would have had to use nuclear arms, and given the Soviet involvement in the conflict... That could have meant WWIII. Just another case of how 3rd parties make effective nuclear deterrence difficult.
Theoretically this question is impossible to answer in any manner involving ethics. So I would suppose we'd have to deal with this one in the real world.
The "Official" Five Nuclear Weapons States: Good luck convincing them to give them up. Now, there is certainly a case to be made for reducing the size of their arsenals (with the potential exception of China, which has a very limited nuclear deterrent with regards to its peer competitors of America and Russia), but the balance of power, however repugnant the concept seems to many Americans, does have to be maintained when dealing with something like nuclear arms. As former, present and likely future superpowers (respectively), Russia, the USA and China all have the strongest cases for maintaining their nuclear arsenals. So what of the two European countries? Britain probably has the weakest case for maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent, given the general affinity between its own security interests and that of the United States. France would have a similar interest to disarm if not for the chance that it will lead the EU in any sort of combined-defense scheme, since it is more centrally involved in the European project than the UK and has a more powerful air force and navy than Germany. Were the EU ever to truly form a military alliance, France would be the natural candidate to provide its nuclear deterrent.
India and Pakistan: Again, good luck getting them to disarm. Even if India and Pakistan were to disarm bilaterally, this would not settle the region's nuclear question. Many in the West are not entirely cognizant that China is, and has been, more of an issue for India than America. They have border disputes, and fought a war over them in the 1960s. This is mostly settled now, but China's rise and support for Indian rival Pakistan could prove a sticking point. Then there's the darker possibilities of resource competition for not just fossil fuels, but possibly water control (a good number of major river systems in South and East Asia originate from China). Pakistan needs a nuclear deterrent against an otherwise militarily superior India, and India needs a nuclear deterrent against China. The system is in place, and it will take a long time and a lot of effort and goodwill to undo it.
Israel: The first important thing to note about Israeli nuclear weapons is that they've not done well as a deterrent against conventional attacks. They likely had nuclear arms during 1967, and this did not convince Arab states their conventional efforts would be useless (they built up troops that the Israelis then destroyed in the Six Day War). In 1973, the Arabs attacked directly and it took an American bailout to relieve conventional Israeli forces to win the war. Nuclear weapons did not deter the Arabs, they still had to be defeated on the battlefield. Though one might argue Israeli nuclear arms have prevented a similar clash since the Yom Kippur War, this probably has more to do with Israeli conventional superiority and knowledge that the US would bail Israel out as much as the nuclear threat. They work as a precautionary deterrent against WMDs such as Syria's chemical weapons stockpile and the potential Iranian (or Egyptian, or Syrian, or in the 1980s, Iraqi) nuclear device.
Speaking of '73, it's important to note that part of the reason the US bailed out Israel during Nickel Grass wasn't out of some great love for the state of Israel (we're talking about Nixon and Kissinger here, the former was pretty much an anti-Semite and the latter opposed the state's creation in '48!) , but out of Cold War politics. If the US didn't give Israel the means to defeat the Arabs conventionally, Israel would have had to use nuclear arms, and given the Soviet involvement in the conflict... That could have meant WWIII. Just another case of how 3rd parties make effective nuclear deterrence difficult.
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
Unusual Signs II
Via Foreign Policy:
(For the record, I'd be pretty damn confounded if Chinese students wrote to "Grandpa Bush" during Katrina, too.)
UPDATE: I have since been informed by native Chinese speakers that the "grandpa" thing is just a result of literal translation of normal Chinese language. They agree on the "Uncle PLA" being weird, however.
"Thank you, Uncle PLA!" said Elizabeth in the newly acquired Chinese vocabulary "Jiefungjun Shushu" meaning uncle soldier of the People's Liberation Army, "You saved many lives from ruins. You bring hope to each and every corner of China. We will never forget your love to the young, the old and to the people! I will never forget this new Chinese word that I learned today!"Is Oregon that bad? Really? Or does everything translated by Xinhua from Chinese to English sound like Maoist propaganda? Grandpa Hu? Grandpa Wen? Uncle PLA? Seriously? It's mostly hilarious, but a little odd that somewhere little American girls are writing to CCP officials in prose straight out of the party handbook.
(For the record, I'd be pretty damn confounded if Chinese students wrote to "Grandpa Bush" during Katrina, too.)
UPDATE: I have since been informed by native Chinese speakers that the "grandpa" thing is just a result of literal translation of normal Chinese language. They agree on the "Uncle PLA" being weird, however.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Unusual Signs
From the BBC:
Now, I would not make too much of this, but the parallels, or perhaps lack thereof, with another incident are curious. Knowing the problems of historical memory in Asia remains quite prescient, especially given their grounding in the general population rather than the ruling elite. It has been remarked that Chinese nationalism is a threat to this elite, yet simultaneously that development will empower the masses politically, not just economically. Will nationalism dissipate with the empowerment of the people, or is the continued political stratification of China in the interest of regional stability? One wonders how a "China Lobby" of the 21st century might look.Japan has decided not to a send a military aircraft to China to deliver relief supplies for victims of the Sichuan earthquake.
It will instead use a chartered plane to send the materials to the disaster zone, top government spokesman Nobutaka Machimura said.
The move came after some Chinese officials were concerned about allowing a military plane in, Mr Machimura said.
There is lingering anger in China over Japan's actions in World War II.
Ties between the two sides have improved in recent months, but only three years ago there were violent anti-Japanese protests across several Chinese cities.
Chinese officials were concerned about a backlash among people who remember Japan's war-time militarism, media reports said.
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