A Good Fight?

If there's one thing Americans appear to agree on, it's Afghanistan - the war is winnable, but it needs more troops. Untainted by the stigma of preemption or unilateralism, Afghanistan is the "good war" that everybody can get behind. However, we should not confuse righteousness with feasibility.

There is no mistake that Afghanistan has been shortchanged since the beginning of the conflict. The effort to rectify this, however, is much larger than many imagine. Afghanistan, were it to have a level of military presence proportional to successful counterinsurgency campaigns, would likely require 400,000 troops for stability. Counting current NATO deployments and the Afghan security forces, that is twice the number of troops we have in Afghanistan today. Neither candidate has proposed sending anywhere near 200,000 troops to Afghanistan, nor could they feasibly be expected to do so. Nor is it likely that the United Kingdom, France, Canada or Germany will be willing to commit thousands more of their soldiers. Indeed, the British ambassador to Afghanistan has allegedly written off the Afghan campaign as futile, with a dictatorship that holds the country together as the optimal outcome - a new Iron Amir.

Of course, one might retort that a "surge" in Afghanistan could work as well as the one in Iraq did. However, this is far less likely to work out in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has dozens of millions of people, just like Iraq, and far more difficult terrain - a brigade in Afghanistan simply isn't as helpful as a brigade in Iraq. The surge in Iraq was also accompanied and preceded by significant changes in tactics that are far less likely to occur in Afghanistan. The Pashtun tribes that harbor al Qaeda and the Taliban are far less likely to switch sides, and in many cases al Qaeda is too deeply integrated with tribes to make such a strategy effective. Nor would the assassination campaign that JSOC conducted in Iraq work effectively in Afghanistan - enemy leaders are less accessible, and crossing the border into Pakistan is only making us more enemies on the other side of the border.

A strategy to stabilize Afghanistan would likely require rebuilding the tribal structure, perhaps even at the expense of the "national" level strategy, and placing more troops in harm's way. While Americans might have the stomach for such a war, European reactions to attacks indicate they may not, while the effects of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq should remind us that empowering tribes may create friction with the central government. We would also need to establish a long-term political, military, and economic commitment to Afghanistan. But with billions of dollars in bailouts down the pipe and an American public that will be clamoring for relief in the months to come (perhaps in Europe, too), NATO members will have a tough time convincing their people that Afghanistan is worth it. Success in Afghanistan is not likely to occur within the next four years. Perhaps not even within the next eight. Should we add a war in Pakistan into the mix, it may not be won at all. There is nothing wrong with believing Afghanistan is a just war. But if it is just, and we wish to win it, we're going to have to commit enormous resources to it. Something Americans should keep in mind as they throw all besides the economy to the wind.

Elsewhere, the Somali pirate drama has spotlighted a more disturbing trend - the looming escalation of the conflict between the Sudanese government and southern (ie, not Darfuri) separatists. Simultaneously, skepticism about AFRICOM does not bode well for American response capability or a "revolutionized" military policy in Africa.