The Last Shots of 2008

A month ago I referred to relying on resolving the Kashmir dispute to accomplish our foreign policy goals in South Asia is akin to relying on resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute to accomplish our foreign policy goals in the Middle East. So, true to form, the ceasefire in Gaza has erupted into violence that may lead up to a major ground offensive.

Just as in Kashmir, we would have to put pressure on a nominally allied country to gain the favor of Muslims. It is unlikely we will see any sort of grand settlement without moving Israel closer to its pre-1967 borders or stopping settlement in the West Bank. Meanwhile, that we supply Israel with billions in military arms does little to endear us to the Palestinians or the broader Islamic community.

That being said, Israel is acting entirely within its rights and responsibilities as a sovereign country. When Hamas launches rockets at Israeli homes, Israel is obligated to retaliate against Hamas. Putting pressure on Israel to make concessions as it responds to these attacks may seem like the sensible step for peace negotiations, but in all likelihood it would only strengthen hawks and reduce our leverage as a broker of negotiations, even if it enhanced our credibility among Palestinians.

So far Operation "Cast Lead" seems to be proceeding well for the Israelis. According to most reports, the IDF has caught Hamas unprepared and landed heavy blows against infrastructure and logistics. Thanks to this surprise advantage (and some new ordnance from Uncle Sam), Israel's tactics of using airstrikes seem to be working reasonably effectively so far, with "50 percent" of capability for rocket attack eliminated. (The IDF actually started its own Youtube channel to highlight its "precision bombing" in Gaza, while Arab networks have already brought Gaza to the center of their attention.)

But with 20,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza and the party's non-military wing firmly embedded in the Strip's social services, it's going to take more than a bombing campaign to destroy their operational capability. So far, the Israeli government has alluded to new phases of operations, possibly involving ground troops in an operation "to totally change the rules of the game." Even if this was enough to destroy Hamas, would Israel really want to? Because destroying Hamas would require destroying the government of Gaza, does Israel really have a Phase IV planned to pick up the pieces?

On top of all of this, the man who has the most riding on Operation Cast Lead, Ehud Barak, is also the man most to bring progress in negotiations - and with the election coming up soon, he cannot afford to bring Israel another July War.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan's offensive against the insurgents in Pashtunistan has closed off the Peshawar corridor. Since the majority of our supplies come through Pakistan, this is just one more reason why they will have to remain an ally in the war on terror. But since this route is becoming less and less reliable, we will need a new solution. This requires us to deal with two possible alternatives:

1. Strengthening the route through Russia into Central Asia. This means dropping human rights claims against the 'stans and increasing our reliance on Russia through rail transport. While Russia is generally glad NATO is doing its job in Afghanistan and fighting Islamic terror there, this course isn't particularly palatable to people concerned about human rights or worried about Russia's future course.
2. Trying to open the "East-West Corridor" from the Caucasus across the Caspian into Central Asia. Once again, we have to concede human rights issues to countries like Uzbekistan. This time, though, we would likely end up increasing our military presence in the Caucasus in a way Russia would be very unhappy with, possibly stressing the Western European NATO members who fear they will suffer the most from Russia's response to American penetration of the post-Soviet sphere.
   

An Afghan Awakening?

The US is hoping to launch a second "Awakening" of tribal militias - this time in Afghanistan. While this idea might seem commendable, the more one examines Afghanistan, the less viable it seems without some significant changes from how it was accomplished in Iraq. While it will be important that we bring Afghans in the South and East who might otherwise ally themselves with the fundamentalist militias on board, accomplishing this by empowering the militias themselves will likely be a major mistake. Iraq's government had far more credibility at the national and local level, and provided both a pathway for integrating the militias in such a way that the government could eventually monopolize force in those areas, and in the transition could theoretically check potential excesses on the part of the Sons of Iraq, and thus helped balance power between combatant factions.

In Afghanistan, however, actual local governance is incredibly weak, since many officials aren't elected but appointed. If we pursue these tactics, we will be delegating more power to the tribes and people of Afghanistan in some ways, yes, but we will not be doing so in a sustainable manner. The Awakening in Iraq is working because it built on ties between Sunni communities and the militias; through the plan to integrate the militia members with the government, it in turn helped bind the militias to the government and thus would help reinforce the credibility of the Shia dominated government to Sunnis. The militia program in Afghanistan, however, seems to bypass the idea of building government credibility or ties between the militias and the government entirely:

During a weekend visit, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the U.S. focus on establishing a strong central government in Afghanistan may have been "overstated." He said the U.S. would now focus more on "enabling the communities, the tribes and their leaders."

"How strong the central government will be in the future, I think, is yet to be determined," he told reporters.

This is focusing on a legitimate problem but responding in a very risky way. I certainly have been critical of a Kabul-centric Afghan policy. That said, I don't think the solution is to create a parallel security force that does what the government is supposed to. Now, the creation of these militias is indeed only a first phase, but until we can integrate them with the de jure local governments they will require constant US handling to prevent them from further destabilizing Afghanistan in the long run. However, that integration cannot be effective until the people of Afghansitan see their local governments as legitimate, which means without fixing the problem of governance in Afghanistan this entire effort may be wasted.

To be fair, similar criticisms were voiced at the beginning of the Anbar Awakening, and fortunately many of these fears have not (yet) been realized. But again: different country, different problems. As we've already seen, Afghanistan there are the issues of governance to sort out. But there are also underlying problems in our military strategy, too. Where the United States had a significant ground presence in Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq, the ground presence in the turbulent regions of Afghanistan has proven inadequate. America cannot effectively combat today's hostile militias because when Americans (or whatever other ISAF force there is) go back to their bases, the Taliban can control the countryside. Replace "Taliban" with "warlords" and one can see why revitalizing non-governmental militias could be so dangerous. If warlords do come to control these militias, checking them will not be easy, since they, not the US, not ISAF, and not the Afghan government, will have the last words. Counterinsurgency needs to be population-centric to succeed, and without our soldiers being deployed accordingly, the militia strategy will indeed be counterproductive. If we do not want to send another hundred thousand or more troops into Afghanistan for a long, long time, we will need to begin deploying our men into the midst of the villages we hope to defend. Such a strategy may carry a higher cost in both blood and treasure, but there is no easy way to win this war.

Also in the news...

As the global economy flounders, Russia is organizing the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, in hopes of... "not creating a cartel." Keep in mind that Putin came up with the idea of a "Gas OPEC" in 2002 and that Gazprom board member and nominal Russian "executive" Medvedev hoped this organization would achieve OPEC's level of influence. How such an organization could achieve OPEC's influence without the power to manipulate the flow of gas is beyond me. And while yes, there are Russian ships cruising in the Carribbean again, those interested in geopolitics should be more concerned about Russia's energy deals than its military deployments. Russia's fleet is still not a viable challenge to the US on the open seas, and even if the era of "cheap gas" and today's falling energy prices ends, it still won't be enough - even when the gap between the US and USSR was narrowest, the US still had a clear naval advantage outside of the USSR's regional waters. However, because Gazprom intends to invest more in energy resources outside the post-Soviet sphere, Latin America is more important to the Kremlin for economic reasons than military ones. While countries like Bolivia and Venezuela are ideologically opposed to American influence and globalization, this does serve as a good reminder of why the US needs to stay politically active and economically open around the world - there are countries waiting to pick up where we left off, and they may not use such an advantage to our best interests.

Piling it On

This is not looking like a good week for optimists.

The NBER threw in the towel and decided that despite the discrepancy between quarterly GDP forecasts and the official definition, the US downturn started in December 2007. Before people start grumbling about the worthless academics taking too long to get in touch with reality, remember when the stimulus package to "real Americans" was supposed to save the economy? Those were the days...

Mankiw and Cowen have good NYT editorials on the economy, in particular on what lessons we should really be taking from the '30s.

But, you shouldn't become too wrapped up in worrying about the economy. According to a bipartisan Congressional task force, you should also be worried about an attack on the US using weapons of mass destruction, the odds of which "are now better than even" between now and 2013. The report points out that a biological attack is more likely than a nuclear one, though nuclear proliferation and the destabilization of Pakistan will make loose nuclear weapons likely threats. It says the next attack on the US will also most likely originate from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

But, before we decide to stick to that promised policy of preemptive intervention to kill terrorists on Pakistani soil, it might be worth considering the precedent we're setting. Because there's a country that already has and it believes it has been once again attacked by terrorists based in Pakistan. Already, India has taken Obama's stance to indicate that it too has the right to kick down doors in the pursuit of justice. As Robert Kaplan, India faces a far graver threat from Islamic terrorism than the United States does.

Yet a policy that allows such attack on India's part could easily end up with a nuclear exchange - note that Pakistan does not have a "no first-use" policy on nuclear arms. While launching nuclear weapons at the United States would be futile, Pakistan does have a credible deterrent against India. This will likely be the second time that the United States must navigate its way through an Indo-Pakistani crisis while fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan.

Calls for Obama to take the "regional approach" and use Kashmir to convince Pakistan to contribute more troops to dealing with Islamic fundamentalists in its own borders and cease support for them outside of them seem more unrealistic than ever. India was hostile to the idea before the attacks, it will not be amenable to them now. The ideal outcome would be greater cooperation between the two powers on counterterrorism, but this is incredibly unlikely. As tensions increase, the US will find that Kashmir negotiations will not be able to proceed without taking sides, and treating Kashmir as a way to deal with American concerns about Afghanistan will inevitably draw the US to a pro-Pakistani line.

India has endured decades of Islamist violence on its own soil. If this sort of thing happened to the United States, we'd have taken up Armitage's cry and bombed them into the stone age. But we cannot expect that they will continue to tolerate such tragedies in a manner conducive to our goals. One way or another, Indians will feel compelled to respond. Relying on the Kashmir approach to win the war on terror is not viable. India, for its part, however, must improve its counterterrorist efforts. Watching Indian footage, city police fired at Kalashnikov-wielding terrorists with ancient bolt-action rifles while the response of more professional units has not impressed American analysts either. While there's obviously a lot more than small arms deficiencies that contributed to the problem, they are symptomatic of a deeper problem. India has invested well in its regular military but left the provincial-level counterterrorist and police forces underfunded. Terrorist attacks are thus more effective against India, and India cannot respond with its regular military without triggering a nuclear crisis. (We, too, struggle with managing the traditional gap between domestic law enforcement and the use of our military abroad. Fortunately we've managed to get by without a nuclear war scare... So far.)

The important thing to remember during all of this is that al Qaeda is hoping we'll overreact. Based on the latest tapes, they're having trouble coming up with an effective message against Obama without any policies of his they can criticize. Al Qaeda needs to provoke Obama into making a big mistake that involves perceived aggression and injustice against Muslims to maintain its base of support. This is something his cabinet should keep in mind as January 20th approaches. While I still take issue with sending Hillary Clinton to Foggy Bottom, I'm far more pleased with Obama's other national security picks. That being said, no matter what happens to the economy, sidelining foreign policy will come with consequences. Obama had really better trust his staff, because he is going to be a busy, busy man.

Pirates & More on Pakistan

With Somali piracy back in the international spotlight, I'd figure now would be a good time to relate the issues of Somalia to the wider world - because what's happening does reflect on larger trends, and the immediate problem is not to be discounted either.

The largest tanker organization in the world called for a UN-lead naval blockade of Somalia. Citing the immense area of pirate operations, they have deduced that short of arming or escorting every tanker, intercepting pirate vessels before they reach shipping routes is the only effective prevention. Now, while this seems logical in theory, it will be much more difficult to implement in practice. Relying on the United Nations to stabilize Somalia has a pretty poor track record. However, it may be difficult for the United States to draw in non-NATO powers without one. Reluctance to intervene without a mandate aside, the Somali piracy episode is illuminating the effects of America's decline in relative power.

Proponents of stabilizing hegemons might note that American dominance cannot perform a function that seemed to be a given a decade ago - protecting the sea lanes and providing the basic security necessary for free trade. Unless the UN can effectively step in to create a genuine partnership to secure the seas, the natural result will be great power intervention. Though domestic concerns will make it difficult for Americans to concern themselves with a region that's frustrated us for the past 15 years, we should not be surprised when other powers pick up where we left off. Since rising and resurgent powers lack true blue water navies, the United States must recognize that a contribution by other great powers to stability in the Gulf of Aden must come with an expansion of rival powers' naval bases. The expansion of naval bases will further the decline in relative American power and de facto balance against US interests and capabilities.

On the other hand, the other great powers would be just fine with the US and NATO dealing with the problem. Russia's Ambassador to NATO suggested that they launch an invasion of the Somali coast. Of course, Russia may have ulterior motives for wishing such a maneuver. After all, with an American war in Iraq, a NATO war in Afghanistan and many other commitments, every new NATO deployment outside of Eurasia is one that may force western troops to leave Russia's desired "sphere of influence."

Speaking of which, go check out the Global Trends 2025 report.

Keep watching Pakistan. As support for Kashmir negotiations continues to grow in the west, it's important to remember just how risky pinning our hopes in Afghanistan on Kashmir will be.

Firstly, alienating India (as would be necessary to placate the Pakistani Army) will risk Afghanistan's long term stability, as India has been a major investor in Afghanistan and will likely play a large role in the region when NATO leaves. Secondly, negotiating on Kashmir does not automatically make fighting Afghanistan easier. Pakistan would have to decide India was no longer a threat, even though the rising wealth disparity due to India's economic success will likely contribute to a widening gap in relative military power. Ongoing religious/nationalist enmity will continue, and will likely be amplified in India as the US is forced to placate Pakistan. Even if Pakistan still didn't feel that India was its primary threat, it would have to remake its military for counterinsurgency warfare. Just as the surge required tactical and operational changes to work, so too will units trained and equipped to fight conventional warfare against India have to adapt to the nature of the NWFP and FATA conflict. Considering we arguably have yet to make this move, it may be unreasonable to expect the Pakistanis to do the same.

Furthermore, we must remember Islamic fundamentalists will have grievances with the Pakistani government for supporting the US and for its failure to live up to cultural, political, and economic expectations, regardless of how Kashmir goes. The fighting on the frontier will not disappear because not all terrorists and insurgents have the same motivations. If Pakistan feels it must play off tribal groups and political factions against each other to succeed (a tactic we should not complain about, given our trumpeting of the success of the surge), they will. Indeed, Pakistan supports anti-American and fundamentalist groups not only to fight against India in Kashmir, but so they can fight against anti-government groups on the frontier. Will support for these groups end, too? Dealing with Kashmir certainly won't end the radicalizing effect of American occupation in Afghanistan and intervention in Pakistan.

Relying on Kashmir to fix Afghanistan is similar to relying on Palestine to fix America's Middle Eastern problems. It is a nice idea on paper and could yield benefits if resolved in a manner pleasing both sides, but it has proven incredibly difficult to accomplish effectively. At least we have a well-established team of public servants with Arab-Israeli expertise. Do the same resources exist for Kashmir? What's worse, unlike in the Palestinian debate, America has a significant national interest in maintaining good relations with both sides. While America can afford to disagree with Israel and has already dealt with alienating the Palestinians, America needs the support of Pakistan in Afghanistan and India in broader, strategic terms. And, like Israel and Palestine, even when we manage to get the negotiations right, there are still plenty of other grievances against the US. We've had to have a Plan B for a Middle Eastern policy without the resolution of Israel and Palestine. What's our Plan B for dealing with South Asia without resolving Kashmir?

Eurasian Rumor Mill

Interesting day for news in Afghanistan...

First up is Karzai's offer to protect Mullah Omar (whose head is worth $10 million as far as the US is concerned) so long as he agrees to hold talks with Kabul. If ISAF or anyone else has a problem, Karzai said they could remove him or leave Afghanistan - unappealing options for a coalition that is committed to an Afghanistan that is both stable and democratic. I doubt Omar trusts the Afghans to protect him that well, but if they could (and kept their word), it might put the US and its new President in an unenviable situation.

Another interesting development: Apparently, Gordon Brown floated the idea of placing Chinese troops in Afghanistan. Though there hasn't been much to substantiate this report, if true, could signal an interesting development in Chinese policy. One possibility is that the Chinese want to prove they're a responsible member of the international community, prepared to work with the west on common issues (after all, China has its own issues with Islamic militants in Xinjiang). Fighting in Afghanistan would give Chinese troops valuable counterinsurgency experience and allow them to observe the COIN tactics of other coalition members. The other possibility is that China might finally want to make the inroads into Central Asia commensurate with its status as a world power. Many analysts have speculated that China is preparing to get into Central Asia to secure its borders (by developing Xinjiang and Tibet through trade) and economic resources (energy, energy, energy).

From a realpolitik angle, building up a presence in Central Asia could provide China with access to resources the US cannot easily exclude. Despite a generally warm attitude and a vital trade relationship, China remains paranoid about its reliance on sea transport across the Indian Ocean for many of its raw material imports, since the US Navy patrols the Straits of Malacca. It's just one reason why the US cannot afford to shun free trade or economic integration with China if it wishes to avoid the pitfalls of multipolarity.

Medvedev changes his tune on Obama... Sort of. Given the combination of the missile movements and now this supposed overture, Medvedev may be putting on a bit of political theater to put the onus on Obama to make concessions even as he tries to embarrass or frustrate American goals. Such maneuvering would sour the strategic or domestic political climate to making those concessions, allowing Medvedev to sour Russian opinion about Obama by making it appear as if he is less reasonable or cooperative than otherwise believed. Given what occurred in Iran after the congratulatory letter incident, we may want to expect this sort of thing as more anti-Bush leaders attempt to shore up domestic credibility in the wake of Obama's victory.

Transitional Rumors, International Omens

The big buzz about Obama's foreign policy is that Hillary Clinton is going to be Obama's secretary of state. It seems like a brilliant political move - something you'd expect from a guy who's read Team of Rivals. However, I question the wisdom of such a decision.

Obama needs to be heading into the real world, 2009, not cleaning up old grudges from 2008. Of course Obama, as a politician, is going to want to consolidate his support and prevent an internal struggle that one would expect from a big-tent political party like the Democrats. However, American foreign policy is already losing attention to the economy and it cannot afford to lose any more attention to domestic political maneuvering. To be frank, Obama's foreign policy is not going to work itself out. Once the soft power buzz of his own election wears off (and it will not be long), the President will need to attempt to help keep old allies on board, warm relations with former friends, and carefully engage rivals and enemies. Thanks to American unipolarity, the last two administrations have relied on force and the absence of balancing rivals to assert American diplomatic objectives. America's economic stability contributed to these ambitious foreign policies. With a general decline in relative American power (due more to the rise of others ) and the potential for economic disaster at home, the US will have its work cut out for it abroad.

Managing the complex negotiations to come - and all their attendant trade-offs, treaties, and concessions - will require an exceptional secretary of state. While many foreign leaders respect and admire Obama, once they begin interacting with him at the negotiating table questions of national interest will take precedence. Hillary Clinton is not entirely unqualified to be secretary of state. But she is by far not the most qualified, and claims that her experience as first lady will offer some unique advantage are mostly irrelevant. Firstly, the US already has the soft power namedropping advantage - his name is Barack Obama. Secondly, the first lady functions in a PR role, not as a major negotiator and her friendliness with the leaders of the '90s is not pertinent to today's leadership. Whatever personal connections she formed then, many are with leaders out of office now, or who never had to have Mrs. Clinton tell them anything they didn't want to hear. Memories of the good times will quickly fade when those countries national security and economic concerns go on the line. These personal connections also fail to address the secretary of state's biggest challenge - working with states like Iran, Syria, and North Korea that the US has previously shunned diplomatically.

As for secretary of defense, word is that Robert Gates will be held on for the transition. It's a good call and I hope that those rumors are true. Gates has done a lot to turn around American defense strategy, and given that Obama will be more than busy enough during the transition, it would be good to keep a competent, relatively strategically compatible cabinet member managing things to minimize disruption to American defense policy and distraction from the economic agenda.

Elsewhere, I suspect the Obama administration is keeping a close eye on what's happening in the DRC and Rwanda. The situation is already ugly and may be spiralling further out of control, as neighboring countries volunteer deploying their own "peacekeeping" forces in a scene reminiscent of foreign interventions of previous decades. Obama (not to mention his staff) has said a lot about humanitarian intervention. Given that a humanitarian operation in the Congo is more plausible from an international perspective (no great power like China looming over, and stronger, broadly supported UN presence), it may be the site of this administration's first big humanitarian intervention rather than Darfur.

Other places to watch out for - North Korea. China is taking Kim's disappearing act very seriously, and regime change could drastically alter US plans for the region. From Pakistan, we have the usual bad news and then the (seemingly) unusual bad news. It's worth remembering that the Iranians dislike the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban about as much as we do, and cooperating in stabilizing the region could be one of the fruits of a truly grand (though by no means assured) bargain with Tehran.

Also, this bit of Hayden's assessment of al Qaeda is interesting. Osama is cut off from regular AQ operations and focused more on his own survival - good. But what this should tell us is that we should not prioritize killing or capturing him over the broader effort against al Qaeda. One of the reasons why terrorism cannot be treated purely as a law enforcement issue is that AQ's organizational structure is complex and flexible enough to endure disruptions to its leadership. If we have to go into Pakistan guns blazing to take out someone already out of the organizational loop, we are probably going to create a lot more anti-American Pakistanis without necessarily severely disrupting AQ's ability to conduct a retaliatory attack. This isn't to say getting OBL isn't important, it's just an example of how we need to balance political objectives in the wider strategic context. An attitude that sees killing OBL as the "game over" in the fight against AQ will be disappointing at best and counterproductive at worst.

On another note, congratulations to General Ann Dunwoody, America's first female four-star general.

The world isn't waiting

While Americans (and to some extent, everyone else) have a lot to be excited about, it sure hasn't taken long for the post-election euphoria to wear away. Obama's judgment and temperament helped him win the election, they will be among his best attributes going forward. However, Americans must remember that they are neither infallible nor may they necessarily lead to the policies we've come to expect.

On fiscal matters, the money for Obama's healthcare and other spending plans is gone - spent in the Paulson bailout plan. At least Paulson is moving towards the Dodd plan equity stake strategy rather than directly purchasing toxic assets, but the plan is (as we must expect) far from perfect. However, the fact remains that our financial sector is too vital to collapse - it is the engine of growth for our economy, especially in the long term. Eliminating or rolling back the bailout plan would be disastrous - not just for the immediate impact on the market, but for creating a climate of uncertainty hostile to investment. Nor will Obama's tax plans help very much. During a recession, increasing taxes on the very wealthiest and capital gains will have diminishing marginal returns - recessions, especially centered in the financial sector, will disproportionately reduce the incomes of wealthy investors (even if they suffer far less than ordinary Americans in absolute terms).

Though we should not foolishly cling to the impossibility of balancing the budget, we must spend wisely. So when the Big Three begin requesting billions in their own bailouts, we should not be so eager to appease them. While the auto industry and media will naturally claim that these companies, like the banks, are "too big to fail," the reality is that finance and manufacturing play vastly different roles in the American economy. Without solvent banks, simple but incredibly vital economic functions - saving and loaning money, for example, come into peril. Allowing for massive amounts of bank failures deprives the market of liquidity, crippling economic growth and innovation (starting a new company requires investment, after all). Car companies simply cannot claim to be this vital to the American economy, however important they are. Though undoubtedly the Big Three will get some form of bailout (Obama wouldn't want someone like Mitt Romney taking the industrial Midwest in 2012), it is likely this money could be better spent elsewhere. The jobs lost by these major companies will be highly visible - but not the jobs that will be lost in other companies due to the difference in allocation of resources. Even if someone were to point out this unemployment, the natural response would be, "good thing we bailed out those automakers, or they'd have gone under too!"

America cannot afford to constantly prop up every industry whose management and labor organizations legislate themselves into stagnation. We have bailed out the Big Three in better times - why do we think doing it now will help them finally achieve the magical recovery they've wanted? Even if we did stipulate the management be sacked and some new visionary team be put in place, can we really expect them to fix when even successful automakers are facing a hard year? Eventually, Washington will have to realize that doing the best thing for the workers will mean spending more money on new industries and trade adjustment assistance. This is the economic equivalent of "Weekend at Bernie's," and at some point we may have to stop waiting for the miracle that makes Detroit great again.

How far Obama deviates from his original platform is still unknown, but we should not be too shocked when - not if - he does. We can only hope that the deviations he does make will be positive - like promoting global cooperation on recovery by affirming free trade.

As for foreign policy, goodwill has failed to erase many of the expected dilemmas. On election day, Russia forced Obama to take Eastern Europe's side of the missile defense dispute by deploying missiles to Kaliningrad. This, combined with his preference for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership, will make Russian cooperation on Iran more difficult. Speaking of Iran, don't hold your breath for a great breakthrough there, either. Within days of the election, the mood of the BBC went from this to this. As for Pakistan, the economic crisis has only made intervening in the country more dangerous, while the recent calls for mediating the Kashmir dispute have the potential to harm our interests in the region even more. Germany, not just Britain, seems to be growing more skeptical about committing to Afghanistan - if this is indicative of a greater trend among ISAF members, we have a problem:

A new strategy would only work if Western countries openly discussed their
objectives in Afghanistan. They would have to admit that they cannot establish a
democracy, equal rights for women, or a welfare state in Afghanistan. Shifting
the focus from nation building to simply combating al-Qaida terrorists would
presumably be the only basis for Europeans and Obama to formulate a joint
policy.

And it isn't even January, yet.