Citizens of tomorrow, be forewarned

Regardless of the merits and problems of the Paulson bailout plan, it emphasizes a lot of key trends and disturbing points about the direction in which the global economy is moving. Firstly, the US, for better or for worse, is still a major standard-bearer for Western and Westernizing economic norms. What we do will echo in the rest of the world, and we should not undertake any action that we would not want turned against us later on. As Drezner points out, the US, so far, is doing fairly well; other countries experiencing such financial turmoil have not been so lucky. The US, like its banks, is too big to fail - with around a fifth of world GDP, a financial collapse here would reverberate with massive consequences around the globe. The EU faces a huge test of its fiscal prowess even now, while China cannot afford a world economic downturn that would halt its rapid growth. The world economy for the past 60 years has increasingly been a positive-sum game. While this is not inherently enough to pretent catastrophe, there is no doubt turning it into a zero sum game only encourages it.

To cast a further cynical light on things, the bailout, from a separation-of-powers perspective, should be terrifying. The executive branch, in tandem with the Federal Reserve, can issue hundreds of billions of dollars without judicial review or much legislative oversight. What makes this all the worse is that the Federal Reserve is the only institution that has performed reasonably well throughout the crisis. Congress refused to back down from a program of aggressive homeownership expansion even in the midst of a housing bubble, while opportunities for both parties to reform the GSEs went unexploited. Confronted with the crisis, Congress passed an utterly useless fiscal stimulus bill. I have little confidence constructive responses will emerge in an expedient timeframe barring some massive shift in attitudes and norms in the legislature (Dodd's proposal is decent, but given some of its provisions, it is unlikely to fly through Congress and into law fast enough for Wall Street's liking). Ultimately, the economic crisis may give the executive - the one sitting, and likely whoever wins in November - powers the Iraq War could not grant them. These powers may remain theoretical, though. The burden of financing these bailouts will severely impede whatever discretionary programs they now promise - whether they be tax cuts or spending on social programs. If there is "Caesarism" in 21st century America, it will be centered around national power, rather than "bread and circuses."

On the other hand, we may have that Congressional oversight and those bread and circuses. The current proposal could easily be stacked with Democratic "riders" to bail out whoever that party thinks needs additional relief. Doing so, of course, would only further implicate Congress with a possible (some would say likely) failure of the bailout plan. With an election coming up, too many incentives are on politicians to wash their hands of current problems rather than take on the much more difficult task of fixing them. We may well be stuck between gridlock and the unchecked executive.

Meanwhile, much of the rest of the world so rudely refuses to act according to our preferences. Despite suffering a major terrorist attack which could have decapitated the government, Pakistan continues to stand against American intrusion. This seems illogical until one considers how al Qaeda started out - attacking "apostate" governments which turned to the US for security. Should Pakistan allow American intervention, it is reasonable to expect more bombs, not fewer, targeted at the Zadari government.

The Myth of Omnipotence

A big commonality between any two American Presidential candidates these days is an overwhelming belief in American power. While candidates may argue that their opponent or predecessor has squandered this power and influence, rarely will they ever argue that they have permanently diminished it. Even if they privately feel their country is in irreversible decline, it's politically infeasible to admit as such - American exceptionalism is not dead, and will not be for some time. With the "good" people in charge, the problems that prevented the previous administration's grandiose schemes from working will disappear.

Neither candidate is immune from this fallacy. John McCain, despite his criticism of the Bush administration's implementation of neoconservative strategy, still thinks that those same botched wars could have worked if only someone who put "country first" and devoted the country fully to the task was in charge. So too does he believe that "big government" would work a lot better if the government shaped up to his values. Obama, for his part, holds some similar beliefs. America can undertake unilateralist actions - like attacks against Pakistan - so long as somebody sufficiently "understanding" of our allies is there to soothe their concerns. Similarly, many Democrats (likely Obama included) argue that if only "someone else" had been in charge, regulation could have been put in place to stop the current economic crisis - despite a lack of any clear steps the government could have taken to prevent it. So too has the government's heavy-handed response been underwhelming. But Bush is "laissez-faire," so if we had people who believed in government, it would have worked, right?

Returning to foreign policy and, (once again), Pakistan, there's one further danger to bring up. Obama, to his credit, has staked a huge amount of his foreign policy experience on nuclear nonproliferation. A successful nuclear attack could derail globalization, a constructive post-Bush fight against terrorism, and intensify animosity among great powers. However, it is impossible to develop an effective nonproliferation regime without the cooperation of Pakistan - a nuclear power and serial proliferator of technology. Between its offers to help other Muslim countries to develop nuclear technology or AQ Khan's black market, viewed in light of the cozy relationship between most organs of the Pakistani security establishment and Islamist militants, securing Pakistani arms and technology is absolutely essential to effective nonproliferation. However, it is difficult to imagine Pakistan cooperating on an issue it views as essential to its own security while the US violates its borders. Worse, the Pakistani nuclear program could easily be detached from civilian control, and a humiliated military would likely cling to its nuclear arms to compensate for its inability or unwillingness to retaliate to American attacks.

There are other dangerous precedents. Just as the next American President will want to rebuild America's relationships with its allies, America is demonstrating (and the candidates often affirming) that some allies (and the American national interest) are more important than others. This would be sensible and acceptable were not so much of Obama's campaign staked on rebuilding America as a moral leader in the world. Many Americans speak of rebuilding America's relationship with Europe - but Europe itself does not have a unified foreign policy. It will be difficult to please both pro-Russian natural gas customers like Germany and paranoid post-Soviet states like Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltics.

Meanwhile, the American abandonment of Georgia will likely lead other minor states near regional powers to question our commitment. When America will not even protect their territorial integrity, it may seem like a better idea to accommodate rising regional powers (Russia, China, Iran) rather than rely on the US Cavalry that may never come. There are fears this is already happening in the Persian Gulf. Allowing relationships between the US and states on the peripheries of rising powers to erode will be especially dangerous. If a strategy of negotiations and engagement fail, the US will have to turn to a strategy of containment. Without those peripheral states, such strategies can become much more difficult.

Ultimately, successful diplomacy cannot occur without clear objectives, and we cannot have clear objectives without acknowledging what concessions we will make and what goals we will not pursue. Is the United States willing to make concessions on free trade, environmental regulation, military aid, and tolerance of human rights abuses to keep other countries working with us? Sure, there are unilateral decisions the US can make - closing Camp X-Ray, ending torture, taking the lead on climate change legislation - but eventually the US will have to sacrifice degrees of either its idealistic aspirations or material ambitions to make multilateralism work. Rejecting the Bush Doctrine is not a concession; declining to invade other countries without the sanction of the international community is the bare minimum of accepted behavior for most states. Undoubtedly, the candidates do privately know what specific goals and concessions they are willing to work towards. The problem of course, is getting the American people to accept them when the illusion of Washington's omnipotence can no longer be upheld.

If it is Worth Doing...

Usually one does not cite William Tecumseh Sherman in a rumination on military restraint, but...

Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and defeat.

... seems to be an appropriate turn of phrase lately. The war in Iraq was fought by exactly such a metric. It was a plan to fight the war from the air, move in with less troops than we used to liberate Kuwait, and spend a few dozen billion to have them sit around in a country where only a few hardened Baathists would resist our lovely presence. Five years later, here we are.

So, forgive me when I recommend an outspoken war critic and Presidential candidate not be so cavalier about attacking Pakistan, especially when he has no real plan for how to prevent such a conflict from escalating, or what the boundaries of such a mission would be. I will not go so far as to argue there are no circumstances under which we can attack Pakistan and buy into a foreign policy based on multilateral cooperation and support for Pakistani democracy. Faced against an increasingly uncooperative Pakistani government, attacks into the frontier may not be the worst option as far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned. Nevertheless, to be "realistic" about this aspect of the strategy means to stop clinging to any notion that we intend to pursue a policy of cooperation or support for democracy in Pakistan.

We are making a lot of enemies, ones with uniforms and nuclear bombs. I can't tell you how it will end, but I can say how it won't - there is not going to be a friendly Pakistani government. There is not going to be a cooperative Pakistani army willing to absorb thousands of casualties fighting tribesmen backed by the ISI while a foreign power humiliatingly violates their sovereignty. Do you want a prime example of the US shelling a society into support for extremism? Start watching Pakistan. Even if there is no escalation into a shooting war with Islamabad, we will poison democracy in Pakistan. The most basic function of a government is not education, or healthcare or welfare. It is protecting its citizens from coercion. Either the leader who allows his citizens to die will be replaced, or the system that put him into power will. Whether a stronger nationalist is voted into power or a coup occurs, Pakistanis are highly unlikely to tolerate such transgressions.

However destabilizing Iraq was, fomenting a crisis with Pakistan will be just as troubling with the international community in general. Sure, India might be happy, but who else will be? Europe operates in Afghanistan, too, and given the unease that many Europeans already feel about their Afghan troop presence, attacking Pakistan, if anything, would expedite their withdrawal. China will be very angry about an attack on its strategic partner, while the world public in general will see the unsavory aspects of the "Bush Doctrine" as permanent fixtures in America's 21st century policy, rather than a 7 year phase. In short: if you believe in soft power, you should be pleading with Obama-Biden to tone down their rhetoric on Pakistan. If you think attacking Pakistan is a good idea, maybe liberal internationalism shouldn't the keystone for your foreign policy this term. Perhaps the best Vietnam analogy isn't Iraq. Cambodia, after all, came from the guy who was going to "end the war," too...

Lest one assume I'm being too hard on Obama, let me point out that Palin's Charlie Gibson interview is more than proof enough that she is unfit to be Vice President come 2009. The idea that Mr. "Country First" would put her on the spot is extremely disturbing. Yes, she was a smart choice to unify the base. However, we've had 8 years of an folksy, outsider, common-man conservative ex-governor with no foreign policy experience. Excuse me if I am not willing to risk a few more.

Elsewhere in the world, OPEC has decided $100 is too low for a barrel of oil Any politician who tells you they've got a plan to enrich Americans by "lowering gas prices" or taxing "windfall profits" from oil companies is full of it - especially when the Gods seem to be on the side of higher oil prices, too. Also in unsurprising news today, Hugo Chavez has "had enough of so much shit" from the US.

A Few Words on Pakistan

While it's great that Pakistan transitioned to a civilian Presidency peacefully, Zadari is likely to have a rough ride from here on out. Let's face it - if you think an American Presidential candidate has experience problems, wait until you hear about Zadari. As Robert Kaplan points out, his primary qualification is being the widower of Benazir Bhutto. Character aside, there is no indication he will be able to rein in the army or Inter-Services Intelligence, let alone the "Islamic Emirate" on the Afghan frontier. The Pakistani government is by no means in the clear, nor is it clear it has overcome the specters of the past. Zadari may be no friend of the courts, given the "Mr. 10%" moniker, which will ensure friction with the populace. While General Kayani is hardly another Musharraf, the military will become the de facto government where instability looms. The ISI, on the other hand, still sees Islamic extremists as viable proxies for the Pakistani national interest. Given recent tensions over Kashmir, it is important to remember that no matter what happens in Afghanistan, Islamabad will always have an interest in waging asymmetric warfare against its economically and militarily superior rival.

The US, for its part, is certainly not showing much faith in the Pakistani government. American troops attacked Pakistani soil without authorization, and have kept up bombing for good measure. While the President of the US and the one to follow will undoubtedly pay lip service to Pakistani democracy, Americans are going to have to accept that that democracy doesn't care for the direction the Afghan war is headed in. On top of it all, we have a ticket with two vocal Pakistan hawks. No, they're not Republicans (McCain has followed Bush's old line on Pakistan, while I doubt Palin's campaign manager has finished briefing her on what her opinion is supposed to be). While Obama gets praise for tracking Osama down to the "cave where he lives," Biden was way ahead of him. They absolutely have a point in criticizing Pakistan's response to the war on terror threat, but Pakistanis (who have lost over 1000 soldiers and 3000 civilians in the North-West War) were tired of the US line beforehand, and certainly not warming up to it. Countries that have sacrificed thousands of their own people for their partners only to get invaded by them tend to have grievances over such treatment. The Bush-Obama policy of military intervention in Pakistan would force Obama to do some major backpedaling if he hoped to gain any cooperation from the government in Islamabad, especially as the US-India nuclear deal moves forward.

Of course, given Pakistan's struggling economy, wouldn't it make sense to use non-military aid as leverage to elicit Pakistani cooperation? Yes, but that doesn't mean we can rely on it. After all, Pakistan is already quite cozy with a government less picky about their behavior in Afghanistan. In the long run, Pakistan might not need the US so much after all...

More of the Same

For anyone wondering in what direction Russia is traveling, look to the headlines.

Medvedev's five principles of the new Russian foreign policy bode ill for America's next foreign policy. This will not be a new Cold War - hence the difficulty. America knows how to fight and win a Cold War, because we already did for half a century. The position Russia is turning to now - one with spheres of influence, halfhearted deferences to "laws of nations" and refusal to submit to a unipolar world - seems far more 19th century than 20th. These sorts of politics, based on the balance of power rather than the confrontation of superpowers, are exactly the sort Americans like to think they have historically avoided. During the 19th (and much of the first half of the 20th) century, we secluded ourselves from European realpolitik and played hegemon in our own hemisphere. Then, in the second half of the 20th century, we were the "good" in bipolar world. Both Democrats and Republicans aspire to this sort of situation. While the neoconservative movement is oft criticized for its desire to turn any foreign policy problem into a "good versus evil" struggle, so too do many modern liberals. "Talking with our enemies" does not exclude liberals from this trend. Ultimately, restoring America's moral leadership is a meaningless idea without some immoral force to oppose. While some countries will have a smoother ride than they might get with another neoconservative President, some will have rougher ones (think of trade and human rights disagreements). The communities formed in liberal internationalist systems have boundaries. On those boundaries, even morally upstanding Presidents are forced to practice realism rather than liberalism.

What kept those sorts of politics less prevalent within the liberal community in the 20th century were common interests. While globalization and interdependence undoubtedly produce huge common interests, they are not all equal. If Europe's economic interests in Russian petroleum outweigh its political interests in standing with the US, can we be sure they will stand with us? Recent history suggests they will not. The 19th century was one of constantly shifting alliances, where ethnic ties increasingly took precedence over moral ones, though back then those moral ties were often conservative rather than liberal in nature. Nevertheless, America's next President needs to understand more than how to restore moral or protect morals. We don't need another Truman, because this isn't the Cold War. We don't need another Reagan, because this isn't the Cold War. If anything, we need a Teddy Roosevelt (and I'm waiting for McCain to prove he is) - a pragmatist that does more than simply "stand up" for American ideals.

Other items of interest...

• Fukuda resigns as PM, most likely successor, Taro Aso, is a China hawk and has all the ethnic sensitivity of Pat Buchanan. If you thought going back to the 19th century in Russia was bad, hope it doesn't happen in Asia.
• Anbar goes to the Iraqis. Now if only they can integrate the Sons of Iraq, that 2011 timeline might look pretty nice.
• Iranian nuclear deal with Nigeria. I'm not going to panic, but it makes you think...