Georgia on my mind

It's hard to know where to begin after such an absence, but anyone at all concerned with foreign affairs should be paying close attention...

EDIT: Damn. Matt Yglesias got the idea for the title first on his new blog, about 18 hours ago. Not that I think my title was particularly clever.

Let's begin at the beginning. The very first thing to remember is that this did not begin with a Russian invasion of Georgia, it began with a Georgian invasion of South Ossetia. Saakashvili made an enormous miscalculation in thinking he could retake these areas - held by Russian "peacekeepers" and populated by Russian "citizens" - with the explicit backing of the West. His increasingly desperate pleas to the West to stand up for its values indicate he thought otherwise. Saakashvili's diplomatic and military mistake notwithstanding, Russia cannot escape a large part of the blame. Firstly, its diplomatic casus belli is shaky at best. The idea that Russian troops are acting as peacekeepers, when tension and violence has been escalating for years, is a propagandic fantasy. They are not UN blue helmets. UNOMIG has only a few hundred personnel, while Russia was allowed thousands of troops. Furthermore, as both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have actively expressed interest in joining Russia (look for shots of the "Vladimir Putin - our President" billboards in these regions), Russian troops are completely inappropriate for a neutral peacekeeping role. Would you have Croats peacekeeping in Bosnia in 1995? Syrians peacekeeping in Lebanon in 2006? The idea that Russia should have troops to protect its citizens in Georgia is similarly questionable. Russia granted citizenship to some members of an armed rebellion in a foreign country. Once they become citizens, they become armed Russians attempting to detach territory to Russia. If the US granted citizenship to Balochi and Khuzestani rebels in Iran, and then decided it needed troops to protect its new citizens from the reprisals by the Iranian government, what would one call it but raw bellicosity?

However, this is war. At war, what anyone ought to do is inseparable from what can be done.

This is something Georgia must keep in mind as it wages against a power that is unquestionably its military superior. Russia, which of course occupied the entirety of South Ossetia, deployed the 58th Army to the region, engaging in the battle for Tskhinvali, until sometime on August 10th, when Georgia reported it withdrew all troops from South Ossetia. Now, there's more to this sketchy overview. First of all, who was winning the battle of Tskhinvali? Of the conflicting accounts mentioned, I'm inclined to believe the government official giving the worst news for his own side. There is little incentive to lie in that direction for the South Ossetians. After all, the Georgians did have some advantages - the quality of their military has increased significantly since Operation Enduring Freedom, and they were fighting the kind of battle NATO always hoped to fight against Soviet troops - with the superior manpower of the Soviets stacked up behind them. Indeed, Russia's reinforcements to South Ossetia consisted not of regular troops, but airborne units flown in - indicative of either a lack of troops on hand, inability to move through South Ossetia quickly, or major risk to transit from the border, which must pass through the Roki tunnel (Incidentally, the Georgians claimed to destroy this tunnel earlier, though the Russians denied this).

But, Georgia has said it wants to observe a ceasefire and has pulled out of Ossetia. Given Saakashvili has been calling for a ceasefire since the Russians rolled in, this isn't unexpected. Most likely, given the physical and political geography favored a confrontation at Tskhinvali, Georgia hoped pulling to antebellum positions would increase the chances of such a ceasfire. No such luck. Russia appears to be pushing on Gori, and the Russian government didn't deny reports of clashes outside the city. Gori is key to Georgian military operations - they've relocated their primary combat hospital there, and it was expected to be the center of an Ossetian war. A loss there would spell the end of Georgia's defense short of reverting to a guerilla war a la Chechnya (Not a pleasant prospect, as Chechnya lost something like 50% of its usable land to combat).

But there are broader implications to Russia's intention to take the war to Gori. Gori is indisputably Georgian territory - Russia's already disproportionate response is rapidly losing legitimacy. So it does not appear Russia will be constrained much by international public opinion - perhaps fitting as they assault the hometown of Josef Stalin. However, it also lends credence to rumors that Russia hopes not just to detach Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but truly ruin Georgia and depose Saakashvili. The author suspected such earlier, when Russia initially refused to even acknowledge that Georgia had requested a ceasefire. Any chance of Georgians ceasing combat is unlikely as long as Russia remains operating outside Ossetia but hasn't finished the fight by taking Gori.

So... Why should we care? Allowing Russia to respond so disproportionately - taking the fight beyond the disputed regions - is not a step the West should allow Russia to take lightly. It is a severe blow to American interests in Eastern Europe - not only does the West stand to lose an ally if Russia gets its way, but it stands to lose even more in the post-Soviet sphere. We have shown that when its allies stand up to Russia by embracing the West, the West will not stand up for its allies - unless, of course, they're in NATO, as Ukrainians and Georgians mulling over their failed membership bids might conclude. A successful action on Russia's part, without backup from the West, may dissuade non-members from taking pro-Western actions. Pro-Western actions being anything and everything Put-... Er... Medvedev does not approve of. On the other hand, as a threat to other Eastern European countries, we might expect renewed strength in the NATO bids of Ukraine or other countries. After all, what, in the mind of a Ukrainian, would stop Russia from doing the same thing over time in Donetsk and Crimea within the next few decades? Indeed, Russia is not very happy about Ukraine's lack of interest in renewing the Black Sea Fleet's lease on Sevastopol. This is especially critical as Ukraine has threatened to deny this base to the fleet even as it operates against Georgia.

So, what should the NATO/EU/US response be? Well, trying to broker a peace without the Russians overthrowing Saakashvili hasn't worked so far. Indeed, in the UNSC Russia has gone so far as to try to get the UN to support its actions in Georgia, and shows no signs of letting its veto power allow anything less to pass. Ideally, this situation would end with neutral (perhaps EU, if not UN) peacekeepers taking over duties in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and holding a proper referendum. Practically, this is unlikely to be an option. So, what diplomatic pressure can the West put on Russia? It can demand that Russia comply with their demands on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for giving some concessions on Georgia. This, however, would make it appear the West allowed Georgia as a sacrifice to Russia, so is somewhat undesirable. Other options to pressure Russia could include stepping up US presence in Eastern Europe, refusing to cooperate with Russian demands in other regions, allowing the Ukraine into NATO, supporting its threat to refuse Sevastopol to the Black Sea Fleet, or promising to increase aid to Georgia after the war, or a variety of other options. Obviously, starting WWIII is a bad idea, but so is letting Russia roll over Georgia and oust Saakashvili.

Incidentally, some Russians claim we did something very, very disturbing: According to this newspaper (translated), Russian troops in Tskhinvali caught Georgian saboteurs after the claimed withdrawal, including a black (and thus likely non-Georgian) NATO advisor. This story has not been corroborated, and I wouldn't be surprised if it was entirely fabricated, but if it is going on... Yikes.

This will get updated in lieu of constant new posts, unless something major develops that deserves its own.

UPDATE: 9K Russian troops and 300+ AFVs in Abkhazia... and they're moving on to Senaki, which is another zone of Georgia proper. Gori fell, and Georgia is mounting a last ditch defense of the capital at Mtskheta.

May We Live in Interesting Times...

"Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating."
- Carl von Clausewitz

The Georgians are moving in on South Ossetia and they don't look to be pulling any punches. This wouldn't be very worrying if it weren't for the way Russia's reacted. According to the Georgians, the Russians flew three Su-24s into Georgia and started bombing police stations. Now, the Russians haven't said anything yet and I doubt they'll say they did it - using Russian jets to harass Georgia is nothing new. The last time the Georgians claimed the Russians bombed them, the Russians said it was likely an incident fabricated by the Georgian government. To be fair, Georgia does operate a half-dozen or so Su-24s. Russia operates 458. Choose your verison of the truth, I suppose. However, even if Russia isn't "officially" fighting Georgia, that isn't going to stop them from helping out the Ossetians (or the Abkhaz). They can always supply weapons to the resistance movements themselves - even when it wasn't Kremlin policy, many Russian officers voluntarily did it (or were bribed) during the initial '91-'93 conflict. Russia's going to come down hard on Georgia for a number of reasons. One is letting American soldiers into Georgia from 2002-2004. Another is Georgia's continuing efforts to expand this relationship into NATO membership. Don't forget Georgia's offer to take part in the US missile shield - something that's gotten Poland in trouble too. Consider also Russia's promise to step up support for Georgian breakaway regions in light of Kosovar independence. If Russia really throws their weight into this, it's not just because Russia cares so much about regions that have the population equivalents of Providence, Rhode Island and Gary, Indiana - it's because Russia wants to reassert its traditional role in the Caucasus - hegemon.

UPDATE: Russia is throwing their weight into this. The 58th army has entered Georgia.

So, it being an Olympic year, we can look forward at least to some spirited matches between Russia and Georgia in the Olympics. The IOC's efforts to the contrary, the Olympics are a political event. China's using it as a nationalist popularity boost. The Uighurs are using it as an opportunity to lash out at the Chinese government (perhaps to gain some visibility with the Free Tibet crowd). The US has put a Sudanese refugee as its flag-carrier. But remember guys, the Olympics are not political. At all. Ever. So this one's won't be either. Believe it, and it will be true.

Pakistan's Parliament seems on track to impeach Musharraf. This, if it works well, is good news - Pakistan's civilian government hasn't been perfect, but it's better to forge a new relationship with a legitimate government than lose Pakistan moderates by clinging to an unpopular strongman. Of course, Musharraf (and the military), if they choose to fight it out, can shut down parliament, declare emergency law again, and throw the whole process for a loop. On the other hand, if this succeeds against the army's wishes, who knows how tight a leash the Pakistani government can keep on the army and ISI? Nevertheless, the US should do everything to ensure that Pakistan has a strong, legitimate government - we aren't ready for Kagan's nightmare.

Nuclear talks with Iran aren't progressing swimmingly, either. The risk-reward ratio is still skewed too far to justify a military attack, but this logic might not convince Israel. To go on a bit of a tangent, I consider an Israeli attack on Iran the worst of all possible options. Firstly, the political blowback in Iran and the wider Middle East would be just as catastrophic for the US - especially because geography necessitates we green-light any Israeli strike. However, there are so many nuclear sites in Iran (and Iran's air-defense network is well enough along) that a decisive blow against Iran's nuclear infrastructure would require the might of the USAF, not just the relative handful Israeli aircraft capable of reaching Iran's inland sites. I do not think such strikes are inevitable, though. I would, however, rate the Iranian chance of acquiring a bomb as higher than the chances there will be a conflict.

With a Friend Like This...

Pakistan is one of the most frustrating countries for the US to deal with in the war on terror. It's a massive state sponsor of Islamic fundamentalism - something we found out the hard way when we had to subcontract their ISI to get into Afghanistan in the '80s. It has nuclear weapons, and thus has intentionally and unintentionally become a potential source of nuclear proliferation. And even if it becomes completely intolerable to American interests, it is far too massive for the US to invade.

Why has our Pakistan policy gone so badly?

First of all, America is not the hub of all international interests. Especially Pakistan's. Pakistan has plenty of built-in faults, like its hodgepodge of ethnic groups and a virtually permanent state of inferiority to its rival. Consequently, Pakistan's overriding motives are maintaining internal stability and checking India.

Which means that unless we can convince Pakistan we're going to destroy them, or give them real advantages against India, it's going to be really hard to get Pakistan's government to act the way we want. Let alone its people, which the government often has had a hard time getting to act the way it wants.

Until now, we've gotten Pakistan to ignore it's natural interest of exploiting Islamic sentiments to shore up support in the lawless Northwestern Frontier and check India by bribing them with military aid to India. Given the returns, however, this doesn't make much sense in the long run - India is a far more valuable ally than Pakistan, to be frank. Nevertheless, we need Pakistan's cooperation to deal with Afghanistan and terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Obama has suggested a policy of intervening in Pakistan without the government's permission. This makes sense when it is absolutely vital to, say, killing key al Qaeda members or existential threats to Afghanistan, but it is not a cure-all replacement for Pakistani cooperation. Indeed, even using this method when it is vital could have dire consequences - either it will induce a government extremely hostile to US interests, or US intervention could induce internal unrest and destabilization in Pakistan, especially given the fragile nature of Pakistan's parliamentary governments. Either way, worse for the US at this point.

It's important to note that nobody really wants Pakistan to collapse - its neighbors don't want to deal with the refugees, al Qaeda doesn't want to lose the shield of protection (if Pakistan were already in anarchy, there'd be no reason not to cross the border and mess around), China doesn't want to lose a client, Iran doesn't want to fight off the Baluchis, Saudi Arabia doesn't want to lose the ISI as a partner, and India doesn't want to lose a common enemy. Finally, the vast majority of the world doesn't want loose nukes. Even if they become more hostile, until they start handing out nuclear weapons, they're probably an enemy we want intact.

Also, if you believe Jared Diamond, this collapse is inevitable since Pakistan is committing ecological suicide.

The Post-Election World

Americans are slowly being robbed of purpose. Between our ideological successes of the past 50 years and the policy failures of the past 10, we have created a world which we are fundamentally unprepared for.

That's the impression I'm getting, anyway. I picked up The Post-American World and The Return of History, and I liked both, despite their conflicting worldviews. I am inclined to agree with the claim of the former, that economic growth is not zero-sum, and the fear of the latter, that power politics is. Both, in their own ways, make this point - Zakaria in hopes of helping America find a new one, Kagan in deference to the "return of geopolitics".

This, of course, is political suicide. There is wistful speculation about McCain's "realist" tendencies, but ultimately his view of American purpose seems just as influenced by Kagan's earlier works as his latest (quite literally so [oh, the pun]). McCain's issues with the new Russia and stances on Iraq may be guided by some realist political assumptions, but they converge with international perceptions of neoconservatism. In the world's eyes, it is more important for America's next leader to not be a neoconservative than for him to be a realist. Even his less belligerent positions still rely on a sense of American purpose that now seems outdated - specifically, the League of Democracies. Now, Kagan actually proposes this, but I think there are some issues - mainly, I do not think it can reconcile a commitment to objectively democratic values and American interests without being seen as a US-dominated institution.

Using the Freedom House definition of democracy, countries like Mongolia are farther ahead than Turkey or Colombia. Yet it is hard to imagine a successful US policy in Latin America without Colombia, or a successful US policy in the Middle East without Turkey. At the same time, how will the League act effectively when it must consult countries like Argetnina or South Africa (the latter of which does not seem to be much of an ally of democracy in its own neighborhood). Maintaining an organization that is both inclusive of the world's liberal democracies and conducive to independent action and McCain's worldview would require constant application of US pressure - something that will grow less and less feasible with the "rise of the rest."

At the same time, Obama seems to significantly overestimate US power in diplomatic terms. The fundamental point behind Obama's foreign policy strategy is that the US can accomplish more with diplomacy than it can with its military. This is in many ways true. However, it's important to note that the US is and will be far more of a unipolar actor in terms of military power than it will be in economic or soft power in the future. The gap between the West and the "rest" is closing far faster in economic than in military terms, while countries are beginning to look to their fellow developing nations rather than the West thanks to the success of the BRIC bloc. The ideological influences of both candidates often like to point to Roosevelt and Harry Truman - neoconservatives because of their confrontation of totalitarianism, liberals because of their commitment to multilateralism and development. But just as radical Islam nowhere near rivals the power of the Axis or the USSR, so too does US "soft" and "sticky" power in the wake of WWII have little relevance to today.

It is common practice to invoke the Marshall Plan, but it is it really relevant? The Marshall Plan kept countries that were already friendly to us in that state. It shored up pre-existing institutions. Its success would not have been possible without significant structural reforms in many countries (Germany's economic miracle arguably came more from economic policy changes than US aid). It is not at all relevant to what the US is trying to accomplish today, certainly not to American policy in the Middle East. [As a sidebar, another rather irritating cliche is the comparison to some gargantuan program like getting off of fossil fuels to "putting a man on the moon" or "the Manhattan project." Yes, these programs were very ambitious but they did not reform society. The Manhattan project produced research, some nuclear facilities, and bombs. It did not switch the US over to an all-nuclear society, nor an all-nuclear military, within the course of its existence. The 10-year moon goal launched a handful of men to the moon, a few times. It did not reform society. It did not make landing on the moon cheap or easy - note we haven't done it since. The "fossil fuel" effort, on the other hand, would require changes to virtually every aspect of life and cost an enormously larger part of the economy and take much longer than a decade. There is no comparison to what a program to get off of fossil fuels would require.]

Obama also has yet to engage on issues that are specifically relevant to, well, our actual allies. So far, most of what I've seen involves simply conducting US policy in a way less offensive to the rest of the world. This will buy us some goodwill, but it is not building the foundation for some kind of new wonderful multilateral order, or Joffe's Bismarckian "spoke and hub" system. Assuming the US can win back world support by granting countries the concession of not bombing them or someone else without consulting them first takes a lot of hubris, too. Zakaria's first point about a new US policy is making choices - Obama cannot be all things to all people, nor, I suspect, will he be able to simultaneously build up international cooperation and goodwill while following Democratic policies to their full extent in Latin America (trade issues), China (trade, human rights, environment, etc), and the Middle East (Israel, and likely more).

To build a truly successful multilateral system, the next President will have to address genuinely foregin concerns, not just things America does that concern foreign countries. This applies to the claims that McCain's anti-torture positions will dramatically improve US relations, too. As I always seem to get around to saying, the next President will have to be more than Not George W. Bush.

"Future: That period of time in which our affairs prosper, our friends are true and our happiness is assured."
- Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary.

Random Thoughts

Jon Chait writes a great review of the Shock Doctrine.

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Tyler Cowen's point about Europe becoming more like the US in economic terms seemed like a fairly simple suggestion at the time, and it's an interesting metric by which to evaluate European news... France is liberalizing their labor market by scrapping the legendary 35-hour mandatory work week and leaving it up to union-business negotiation. I am shocked to see such a thing could pass without some sort of disaster to psychologically subjugate the people. Also, Italy is cracking down on illegal immigrants. Actually, this latter part isn't necessarily becoming more like America, because Europe has its own proud tradition of not getting along with foreigners, too.

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Weird news lately about Russian involvement in the Western Hemisphere. First a replay of the Cuban missile crisis comes up for some bizarre reason. Then Chavez starts talking about Russian troops in Venezuela to defend it from the Americans. While in today's climate, Russia would never be able to wage an effective war across an ocean, the fact that this is even being discussed or worried about is a good reminder that old-style geopolitics aren't over yet.

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McCain is now running for god of war and victory.

Something longer later. As requested, I toned it down a bit.

Winning Battles, Winning Wars

I think Maliki's endorsement of a 16 month timetable for withdrawal (Obama's Iraq plan, essentially) is great news. Firstly, it reflects the confidence of the Iraqi central government in the country's future - in 2006, you would not have seen this kind of discussion. Secondly, it validates my opinion that electoral pressures do not make for good foreign policies.

Why isn't this an unquestionable win for Obama? Well, because, as I mentioned earlier, in 2006, you would not have seen this kind of discussion between Bush and Maliki or Maliki and anyone else. Obama was wrong when he endorsed rapid withdrawal before the surge. Assuming all these reports are accurate: McCain was right on the surge, Obama was wrong; Now, McCain is wrong on withdrawal, and Obama is right. Ironically, both candidates have, at times, hinted of deviating from their stances. As mentioned earlier, there has long been suspicion that Obama wouldn't stick to 16 months if the "situation on the ground" didn't favor it. And McCain said he would support leaving Iraq if the government requested it.

After all the political "flip-flopping" on Iraq (and on other issues) in recent months, the message I am coming away with is notthat any particular candidate is more correct - though it seems barring a major reversal, Obama is certain to win - but that the next foreign policy is not going to be a drastically significant "improvement" - if you hadn't figured it out already.

One of the McCain staff's early responses to news of Maliki supporting a 16 month withdrawal was that Maliki was speaking out of "domestic political pressures" or something similar. Yet it appears that after examining the long, sordid history of both Obama and McCain, we can take away the same message. Given McCain's admissions and criticisms in the war of 2004, I think it is almost unquestionable that McCain has trapped himself on this issue by refusing to concede anything to the center for fear of angering his party's base.

In the spirit of The Shock Doctrine, I'll make a pretty questionable claim about foreign policy and the democratic system: the American democratic systems impede effective, transformative foreign policies. Ancient emperors didn't have to get elected, nor did William III of England. Bismarck and Metternich were not monarchs, but neither did they inhabit a democratic system. The internationalism of Wilson could not succeed until FDR marginalized the Republican Party and refused to follow the two-term limit tradition. Even the British prime ministers can adjust the times for general elections and have much more flexibility about the lengths of their government. There are obviously some exceptions - Nixon's foreign policy was a pretty big break, and he wasn't in power that long. But for many, his system was not necessarily a good or moral one, and as I've said, the grandest systems rely in large part on their creators, and you need only look to Bismarck to see the consequences of what happens when a system fails. Perhaps, even if we would like a Great Man as President, it is better we have the threat of popular referendum to adulturate their aspirations. After all, for every potential great policy, we have even more failures, with disastrous consequences.

Nevertheless, if John McCain's transition from having all the right policies on Iraq to the farthest right positions on Iraq (barring a pride-swallowing admission that would probably kill his campaign anyway) is something of a tragedy; then that this downfall was made possible by the vindication of his ideas is a suitably dramatic twist. If John McCain does not go back four years and state what he believed (believes, we can only hope), then all he will have left is to say he was right about the surge.

But he should think carefully before attempting to gain credit from past insights made obsolete:

Obama, after all, was right about the war.

Schlock Tactics

DISCLAIMER: I read Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine between Thursday and Friday, in the interests of balancing out my reading material. The following post is likely extremely sloppy, but the fact people consider this book a legitimate critique of capitalism amazes me. I decided to take a break from reviewing before I got to some even more ludicrious assertions about China, the UK, and other things.

This is possibly one of the most overrated books since The World Is Flat. As a critique of free market capitalism, it fails by lacking a solid empirical basis or a clear definition of what free market capitalism is. As a critique of American interventionism and neoconservatism, it says nothing that has not been stated better by other authors, and what original things it does say are too inextricably bound up in haphazard analogizing and inconsistent theory to be of much use.

The book suffers from major problems. One of which is its obsession with Milton Friedman. Friedman was indeed an orthodox libertarian - this is exactly why Klein's interpretation of him is incorrect. Klein's analysis presents a "conspiracy" in the truest sense of the word - it seems as if every single person, institution and belief system Klein disagrees with has been boiled into an evil, capitalist, warmongering gruel. The Shock Doctrine does not just oversimplify. When convenient, it does the reverse, obfuscating systems to the point where vastly different beliefs are indistinguishable. It presents us with a clear double standard. She attacks the notion that developmentalism and mixed economies were steps on the path to authoritarian communism. Her critique in that sense is legitimate, in many cases American leaders fell so far into anticommunist paranoia that social democracy and socialism, socialism and Stalinism, became inextricable.

Yet Klein asks us to reject a slippery slope on the left and embrace wholeheartedly one on the right - "neoliberal" market reforms is indistingusihable from "libertarian" free market orthodoxy is indistungishable from "neoconservative" statism and militarism. We find overwhelmingly that this is not the case. Neoconservatism and libertarianism are almost diametrically opposed belief systems. Libertarianism seeks a small government at home and a noninterventionist one abroad. A libertarian would not support "no bid" contracts, nation building, enormous increases in military expenditure, faith based initatives, torture, detention camps, wiretapping, and crony capitalism. Klein, of course, feels no need to qualify or even attempt to explain her categorization of the Cato Institute as "neoconservative" - perhaps because doing so would force her to acknowledge the overwhelming opposition of libertarians, Milton Friemdan included, to foreign intervention and torture, thus undercutting two thirds of her view of the "disaster capitalist" M.O. - invade, liberalize, repress.

Klein's selective misappropriation of Friedman's words and ideas does not end with foreign intervention. Her thesis, and her claim that Milton Friedman is its ideological lynchpin, begins in force with this quote from one of his "most influential [1962] essays:" (Oddly, the correct 1982 introduction citation comes 174 pages in)

“Only a crisis produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.”

The first statement is essentially obvious. Crisis is definitionally linked with change. The second is also true. When governments and societies respond to crisis, they generally come to ideas that have been floating in the undercurrent, unimplemented but nevertheless developed. Theories about the utility of mixed economies existed long before the Great Depression, and theories about a proper, internationalist role for the United States existed before World War II. Free market theories were "lying around" during the economic crisis of the 1970s, as were the ideas of neoconservatives during the crisis of American foregin policy in the wake of Vietnam and Iran. Klein essentially acknowledges this a third of the way through the book. However, Klein refuses to acknowledge the difference between a descriptive and a prescriptive statement. Milton Friedman was making a basic observation about how the world worked, not how it should work. Milton Friedman and other economists did not invite disasters, precisely because of the implications of what ideas were "lying around." As Klein states, Milton Friedman and the Chicago School knew their ideas were deeply unpopular - thus, during a crisis, the ideas likely to be lying around were those of the socialist and left wing variety. The point of the preface was that believers in the free market should popularize their ideas, so economic freedom and the democratic system would not be at cross purposes. It is clear that Friedman prefers gradualism in a democratic system rather than induced crisis. Klein, however, ignores the intent of her ideological enemies' remarks, so long as they contain her favorite catchphrases. One is Friedman's preference for gradual reform over "shock therapy". Friedman, in the letter published on Klein's own website, notes that:

"For a country like the US, where inflation is around 10 per cent a yer, I favor agradual policy of ending it in two or three years. But for Chile, where inflation is raging at 10 to 20 percent a month, I believe gradualism is not feasible. It would involve so painful an operation over so long a period that I fear the patient would not survive."

Indeed, Friedman advocates shock therapy (that he also advocates Pinochet "[p]rovide for the relief of any cases of real hardship" is unsurprisingly omitted from Klein's analysis). Yet he explicitly states this is not the ideal form of treatment. A preference for the gradual implementation of free market reforms and macroeconomic adjustment, of course, helps to undermine Klein's thesis that a "Friedmanite counterrevolution" should consist of the inducement of crises. Nevertheless, Klein spends so much time and effort detailing Friedman's desire to separate the market and the state, she ends up, in her description of "Shock Therapy in the USA," describing a program in which enormous amounts of government spending are used to outsource government functions to corporations as "the pinnacle of the Friedmanite counterrevolution." Klein's vision of "disaster capitalism" and Friedman's views alternates between the (more accurate) laissez-faire doctrine in which industrialists hoping for government support are told to "go to hell" and a "corporatist" doctrine in which Friedmanites are purported to support what Klein herself calls a "vast protectionist racket." Klein is absolutely correct to note that Milton Friedman supported laissez faire even at the expense of industrialists and corporations. Many of the passages of Free to Choose are directed at corporations that benefit from government regulation and trade protections. She is also correct to note that the interactions between the Bush government and contractors often amount to a "mafia" arrangement between the market and state. However, to conflate Friedman's views with those of Bush for convenience is ludicrous. The fact she even uses the term Friedmanite after explicitly stating that "Chile under Pinochet and the Chicago boys was not a capitalist state... but a corporatist one" demands a serious explanation that Klein never delivers. The Shock Doctrine's tenuous linkage between these various forms of systems best summed up as "economic systems Naomi Klein doesn't like" employs fallacies of division and composition - that Friedmanite policies are perceived to favor business makes any pro-business policy automatically Friedmanite. She also presumes that since the Chilean government could only conduct free market reforms by political repression, advocating free market reforms, as Friedman did, is tantamount to promoting political repression. However, a government imposed by an unpopular coup requires political repression in some form merely to exist - any of its reforms, except ones to abolish itself, would require repression. Does Klein propose that third world dictatorships seeking to return to developmentalism and asking advice be rebuffed by technical advisors? (I await her condemnation of mixed-system and Keynesian economists for meeting with the USSR in the interwar years, and that of economists meeting with the vast majority of African and Central Asian countries today.) Even if the Chicago Boys of Chile can be blamed for the coup, foreign economists cannot. Milton Friedman wrote a letter to Pinochet and met with him for barely an hour. Friedman was not the architect of the arrangement that put Chicago economists into Chile - Klein admits that occurred long before Friedman became the dominant thinker at Chicago. The junta picked right wing economists, the economists did not pick the junta.

The abuses of logic are carried further - since the Chicago School taught a few Argentines and was associated with a junta in Chile, it occurs naturally to Klein that Argentina must have been a "Chicago School junta" as well. Yet there is little evidence of Argentina having anywhere near the same economic experience as Chile under its junta. While Jose Martinez de Hoz, Argetine financial minister, did reduce developmentalist trade barriers and deregulate the finance sectors, she fails to note that during the he allowed for massive amounts of inflation and his most infamous economic policy tools were wage and price controls coupled with the a bond and treasury policy that essentially amounted to fraud - he ws hardly a free market acolyte, but an economic nationalist seeking to strengthen Argentina's economy. Klein uses a letter describing torture and "planned misery" as "Chicago School" despite Klein's earlier admissions that a pro-business policy is not automatically a Chicago School policy; simultaneously it is clear Argentina's alternations between crackdowns on anti-business groups, government interventions and mixed deregulation point to crony capitalism or "corporatism" rather than the Chicago School. Of course, these ideas are only separate when they suit Klein's purposes. Klein only bothers to connect Argentina's government with actual "Chicago Boys" two decades later during the Argentine fiscal crisis, long after the terror.

Argentina's true "financial" shock of deregulation and "Chicago Boy" policy comes long after its shocks of intervention and repression. Klein, in the opening of her book, outlines Chile, Iraq, and other countries as examples of a clear pattern - disaster, economic change, and repression to protect it. She also stresses continually that "shock" requires these things occur in concert. No such thing occurs in Argentina, and her example falls apart elsewhere. Where was the torture in New Orleans after Katrina (and no, simply having the presence of security personnel and the National Guard doesn't count as "repression")? What, beyond the school reform, were the free market reforms?

Klein delights in the fact that no multiparty democracy has gone "full-tilt free market." By her own admission, Chile was corporatist, Iraq is a racket, and any reasonable examination of China today demonstrates a country practicing something closer to mercantilism or "state capitalism" rather than laissez-faire. So what society then, has gone "full-tilt free market?" Although Milton Friedman himself supported anti-trust legislation and emissions taxes, he is certainly a laissez-faire economist (though not as much as the Austrians, again something Klein admits). The reality is that the main flaw of Friedman's laissez-faire economics is not that they cannot be implemented in a democracy or without repression, but that they cannot be implemented. The government with the power to implement such laissez-faire reforms over the natural voting interests of people and lobbyists would naturally taint its economic reforms with "corporatism" just as naturally as the government with the power to implement complete socialism over the natural voting interests of people and lobbyists would taint its economic reforms with bureaucratic cronyism. There is nothing wrong with critiquing the practicability of laissez-faire or the brutality of armed corporatism. But the amount of self-contradictions in Klein's work, the twisting of history to fit an "all-encompassing" thesis, and its attempt to refute "neoliberal" reforms by conflating everything that smells of capitalism into an impossible system with no true ideological constituents is absurd. Free market economists widely acknowledge that successful free market reform is better taken in gradual doses rather than extreme "shock therapy"- the Chicago School is not representative of mainstream free market economic thought, nor has it ever been. In focusing her attacks on Friedman, she forfeits a legitimate critique of entirely separate economic systems. So too does she ignore the small triumphs of capitalism in the developing world, slowly liberalizing but rapidly growing. Klein is absolutely correct to state that extreme free market ideals are unpopular, but she is incorrect to assume then that this encourages "laissez-faire" "disaster capitalists" to team up with "corporatists" to try and implement them forcibly. The median economist, as Bryan Caplan and others note, is a centrist Democrat - supportive of a government role and sensible policy changes, but agreed on basic economic principles about the dangers of price controls, excessive regulation, and protectionism - policies that Klein seems to be very supportive of. Many support this book on the basis that the overwhelming praise for Friedman must be balanced out. This is foolish, firstly because Milton Friedman's most basic premise - that in general, economic liberty is a positive thing - is as true as any general claim about the benefit of responsible government. But secondly, much more reasonable and balanced criticisms of Friedman's economic policies come from left-leaning and centrist analysts with peer-reviewed, empirical studies. The deeper the left draws from the gutters to attack Friedman and other systems, the more the left plays into the conservative claim that the ultra-capitalists are in the "true" mainstream, and everyone else is supporting socialism - "unfettered capitalism" emerged after such crusades against its supporters, and it would be wise for the American left not to prime such another swing for the future. You do not need to prove that Milton Friedman and capitalism are the spawn of Satan to critique either.