A new Great Game?

Well, it's August 18th and the Russians don't exactly seem to be withdrawing... What a surprise. Indeed, even as Russia slightly reduces its combat presence, it reserves the right to resume them and has fortified its positions in South Ossetia and the Georgian highway system. Essentially, Russia has ensured that if fighting resumes in Georgia, it will completely crush the government in Tblisi. Russian troop deployments along the strategic highway to Georgia, along with the deployment of SS-21 SRBMs to separatist regions (missiles that would be able to strike virtually anywhere in Georgia) compound on Russia's strengths while compensating for its weaknesses. Controlling the highways of Georgia provides a major strategic advantage in any land battle. The ballistic missiles, on the other hand, would allow Russia to launch on Georgian targets without having to risk its air force, which, regardless of the actual number of aircraft downed (anywhere between 4 and 21), significantly underperformed.

This may provide some additional explanation for Russia's anger at recent developments in Poland. Even though in 2007 only 30% of Poles supported the Ballistic Missile Defense program, support has jumped to 58% and the government has agreed to host interceptors. Now that Russia has put military force back on the table, Eastern Europe is unquestionably looking for help. However, to call BMD meaningful help for Eastern Europe or a check on Russia is to misinterpret the situation. BMD - in its current form - poses no significant threat to Russia's strategic arsenal - with only a few dozen interceptors, it cannot hold a candle to hundreds of Russian missiles that could be targeted against Europe. Nor does it endanger the world by altering the balance of MAD - Russian missiles targeted against America would completely bypass Europe and travel over the Arctic Circle. This is why NORAD's EW systems for defending the American mainland require the cooperation of Canada more than they do Europe.

What the new agreement does provide that it did not before is enhanced military cooperation - access to new weapon systems that would provide real gains for Poland's secrity. Patriot missiles and other advanced arms would top whatever aerial embarrassments the Russian air force suffered in Georgia. Perhaps in light of these favorable terms for Poland, Ukraine has offered to participate in the BMD program as well. Given that Ukrainian greivances about Russia directly threaten Russian military power, Ukraine has a major incentive to bulk up its miltiary and, preferably, secure NATO entry. If America continues such a strategy against Russia, the straining of relations between the US and countries like France and Germany may worsen - this gap may prove more significant than the one America opened with the invasion of Iraq.

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To shift direction, here's a few other items of interest...

• There have been no protests at the Beijing games. 74 of the 77 applications were withdrawn, while the government refused or delayed the other three. The supposed liberalizing effect of the Games has yet to be seen. (As far as I've noticed, I've seen Americans usually apathetic about politics responding very negatively to the Chinese. But the Olympics, of course, are likely meant more to impress the Chinese people than placate the world's concerns.)
• Pervez Musharraf is stepping down from the Presidency. It's too early to say whether his replacement will be a boon or a hindrance to long term American interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• Disturbing news from Iraq - the Maliki government may turn against the Sunni "awakener" militias.
  

Why Georgia Matters

What is happening in Georgia is one of the most important geopolitical milestones of this decade, on par with 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. To refer to Putin's Russia as a new Nazi Germany or Soviet Union that must not be "appeased" is a major exaggeration. However, neither is it something the United States or the Western world should passively accept. The ongoing (sadly, the ceasefire does not seem to have done much) conflict has profound implications for world politics and American interests and principles both.

Firstly, the world is officially unipolar no longer. While some would call other events in the past few years the "high water mark" of America's status as hyperpower, there can no longer be any question to America's ongoing unipolar "moment." It is over. In a fait accompli, Russia has demonstrated it too now has a sphere of influence, one from which it can effectively deny the United States. Russia does not have any apparent intent to recreate the Soviet Union by force of arms. Instead, it seeks to do what the United States has traditionally done in Latin America - exclude its "backyard" from major foreign influence. It still has a long way to go, but it may have had its first success. Russia's actions in Georgia serve as a valuable demonstration to Ukraine and other states - go too far towards the West, and Russia will make you suffer as soon as it has an excuse. While Georgia clearly offered one, Russia would not have found one in the Ukraine. Now, however, Russia can confidently interfere with whatever non-NATO members it wants. To grant Russian citizenship to the Crimean Tatars or Russians in Donetsk is not so difficult, and Russia could, in a decade or so, separate these provinces with greater ease. The Ukrainians, knowing that NATO will not commit to a non-member, would be far less likely to attempt Saakashvili's military leap of faith.

That Russia can rely on this exposes another major consequence of the Georgian invasion, that the interests of Western Europe and the United States are gravely divergent on Russian issues. Russia is still fundamentally doomed as a superpower - but on a solid foundation as a great power. As such, the consequences of angering Russia are far greater for Europeans than for Americans - no longer because Russian tanks threaten to cross Europe's borders, but because Russian natural gas pipelines already do. When European nations stand against the NATO bids of Georgia and the Ukraine, they do so not primarily because of fears of war, but of the diplomatic consequences. Even admitting more Russian border states into NATO might trigger pipeline shut offs, diplomatic lockouts, or the nationalization of European assets in Russia. As such, cheerleaders for the EU as a new, "moral" world superpower should quiet. Many Western papers hail Sarkozy, the EU's nominal representative, for the cease-fire; Europhiles should take this news with a shaker of salt at least. For one thing, the "cease-fire" is questionable at best. Not only that, but the decision to even claim an end to combat is likely motivated by Russian convenience - Russians do not want to have another Chechnya on their hands - and desire to put a PR smiley-face on the 58th's tanks, which still sit in Georgian territory. As for the challenges to the European superpower, they are twofold. Firstly, the EU, if it is truly a power, is more than the United States bound to petty, mercantile self-interest. The EU's fundamental accomplishment is that it provides a framework for a Europe at peace - to idly allow such a war to occur in its own backyard undermines any notion of a European policy based on values of peace and sovereignty. Secondly, Russia's new "sphere of influence" excludes not only the United States, but the EU as well. Europe is not willing to maintain the politico-military infrastructure and policies necessary to extend them, which means that Europe as a whole is a paltry excuse for a superpower. Of course, soft power is still a factor - but what did it accomplish here? A cease-fire that has done anything but end the conflict or tensions? What use is soft power as a primary substitute for conventional power when it cannot accomplish the same goals? What lies for the future of European soft power when the EU is increasingly reluctant to lift a finger in service of its core values? Is "sticky" power going to save the EU? While it does have a large economy, its use of economic might is neither unified nor independent - Russia has an economic veto over Europe's interests and will for the foreseeable future, especially with regards to the post-Soviet world. Of course, some EU countries have offered peacekeepers, but this seems entirely contingent upon Russian approval. The answer from the Russians, who still title their forces "peacekeepers" and have no interest in foreign meddling, will likely be nyet. Again, if Russia possesses such a veto, how much can we truly call this power?

America, too, has demonstrably become unable to reconcile its principles and its interests. That America only now is sending aid to Georgia - aid that is not ending the conflict by any means - is a severe blow to America's credibility among Eastern Europeans and our remaining allies. The message is clear - you can bleed and die for us in Iraq when so many would not, but ultimately, we will throw you to the wolves when your most critical national interest of all - the integrity and sovereignty of your state - is in question. Saakashvili undoubtedly made a severe error in judgment when he forced this question. While true, it is perception, not the facts that will matter for many countries. Will Eastern Europeans be as willing to stick their necks out for the United States without NATO membership? Will other countries threatened by more powerful rivals risk reaching out to us? Will the fervor remain for "color revolutions" and liberalization? At the very least, we have not done much to promote our country or our ideas to the rest of the world. Hence, Americans must recognize that a new foreign policy based on multilateralism, soft power, and the international rule of law has become a much greater challenge. Western Europe, our "lost ally" has shown it has less common ground with American interests than we thought, while Eastern Europe has found that the reward for cooperation is not as high as they thought. Europe has made it clear it will not risk political action, let alone military cooperation, that will anger Russia, while America's new allies will think twice before committing to any military cooperation that does not shield them from their former master.

So, indulge me as I once again bring out our two unlucky candidates for President for another tongue (keyboard?) lashing. Let's assume this all happened in August 2009. What would this mean for an Obama administration? Well, his rapprochement with Western Europe would be in a bit of trouble, unless he too decided to abandon Georgia and anger Eastern Europe. I suspect that up until now, Obama's response would have been quite similar to Bush's - afterwards, though, he would have the choice between accommodating Russia (giving us multilateralism without principle) or ratcheting up pressure, and in turn driving Europe away. Either way, a strategy of multilateral cooperation would be even more difficult for all but the most brilliant diplomatic team. John McCain would be in perhaps deeper trouble - the Georgian invasion would force any "League of Democracies" to sacrifice legitimacy (ie, the opinions of Western Europe) or functionality in its response to this crisis. McCain is also more likely to turn the Georgian conflict into WWIII. Enough said.

Assuming, as I so often do, that the US should have a more substantive response to the Georgia crisis, what steps would such a policy involve?

• Major pressure to create an EU/multinational UN peacekeeping force for Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia used the presence of its so-called peacekeepers to gain casus belli against any attempt by Georgia to restore its sovereignty by arms. Meanwhile, Russia appears to be undermining the "cease-fire" by using irregular militants from the Chechen wars, and Cossacks. (Side note: What better example would there be of Putin's purported "Tsarist" tendencies than the use of Cossacks to terrorize challengers to Moscow!). However, given that Russia is likely continuing drives into Georgia, it is unlikely they would agree to such a measure, which would sap its appeal to the Europeans. Even if such monitoring was permitted, Russia would certainly not allow them to interfere with the Russian occupation.
  
• Make it clear the United States stands against regime change in Georgia or further combat operations, and provide non-combat (but militarily transported) aid to Georgia. Bush has taken these steps, and regardless of what happens in response, Georgia is going to need to be rebuilt anyway. Continued Russian presence in Georgia is unacceptable not only because it violates the agreement, but also because it likely signals an underlying desire to depose Saakashvili if negotiations do not go as planned (note the Russian tank commander's comment).
• Make Ukrainian membership in NATO a major US foreign policy objective. Of course, many will argue this would only further enrage Russia - but the Ukraine's already made their NATO intentions clear, while unlike Georgia, Ukraine's potential separatist regions would make clear Russian provocation necessary for such a conflict (handing out guns and citizenship). The best way to ensure that Crimea and Donetsk do not become Ossetia and Abkhazia II is to a) force the Ukraine to agree to a no-first-strike clause on those regions in return for NATO membership, which b) would force the Russians to press their interests through non-military channels - people forget NATO's deterrent effect. The US should also contemplate supporting a Ukrainian denial of Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
• Make any effort possible to gain Russian cooperation on Iran, Zimbabwe and other issues. If the US still has to sacrifice its interests in Georgia, it should make sure it gets something in return. Iran would be a good start, but it is a bit of a long shot they'll cooperate.

Georgia on my mind

It's hard to know where to begin after such an absence, but anyone at all concerned with foreign affairs should be paying close attention...

EDIT: Damn. Matt Yglesias got the idea for the title first on his new blog, about 18 hours ago. Not that I think my title was particularly clever.

Let's begin at the beginning. The very first thing to remember is that this did not begin with a Russian invasion of Georgia, it began with a Georgian invasion of South Ossetia. Saakashvili made an enormous miscalculation in thinking he could retake these areas - held by Russian "peacekeepers" and populated by Russian "citizens" - with the explicit backing of the West. His increasingly desperate pleas to the West to stand up for its values indicate he thought otherwise. Saakashvili's diplomatic and military mistake notwithstanding, Russia cannot escape a large part of the blame. Firstly, its diplomatic casus belli is shaky at best. The idea that Russian troops are acting as peacekeepers, when tension and violence has been escalating for years, is a propagandic fantasy. They are not UN blue helmets. UNOMIG has only a few hundred personnel, while Russia was allowed thousands of troops. Furthermore, as both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have actively expressed interest in joining Russia (look for shots of the "Vladimir Putin - our President" billboards in these regions), Russian troops are completely inappropriate for a neutral peacekeeping role. Would you have Croats peacekeeping in Bosnia in 1995? Syrians peacekeeping in Lebanon in 2006? The idea that Russia should have troops to protect its citizens in Georgia is similarly questionable. Russia granted citizenship to some members of an armed rebellion in a foreign country. Once they become citizens, they become armed Russians attempting to detach territory to Russia. If the US granted citizenship to Balochi and Khuzestani rebels in Iran, and then decided it needed troops to protect its new citizens from the reprisals by the Iranian government, what would one call it but raw bellicosity?

However, this is war. At war, what anyone ought to do is inseparable from what can be done.

This is something Georgia must keep in mind as it wages against a power that is unquestionably its military superior. Russia, which of course occupied the entirety of South Ossetia, deployed the 58th Army to the region, engaging in the battle for Tskhinvali, until sometime on August 10th, when Georgia reported it withdrew all troops from South Ossetia. Now, there's more to this sketchy overview. First of all, who was winning the battle of Tskhinvali? Of the conflicting accounts mentioned, I'm inclined to believe the government official giving the worst news for his own side. There is little incentive to lie in that direction for the South Ossetians. After all, the Georgians did have some advantages - the quality of their military has increased significantly since Operation Enduring Freedom, and they were fighting the kind of battle NATO always hoped to fight against Soviet troops - with the superior manpower of the Soviets stacked up behind them. Indeed, Russia's reinforcements to South Ossetia consisted not of regular troops, but airborne units flown in - indicative of either a lack of troops on hand, inability to move through South Ossetia quickly, or major risk to transit from the border, which must pass through the Roki tunnel (Incidentally, the Georgians claimed to destroy this tunnel earlier, though the Russians denied this).

But, Georgia has said it wants to observe a ceasefire and has pulled out of Ossetia. Given Saakashvili has been calling for a ceasefire since the Russians rolled in, this isn't unexpected. Most likely, given the physical and political geography favored a confrontation at Tskhinvali, Georgia hoped pulling to antebellum positions would increase the chances of such a ceasfire. No such luck. Russia appears to be pushing on Gori, and the Russian government didn't deny reports of clashes outside the city. Gori is key to Georgian military operations - they've relocated their primary combat hospital there, and it was expected to be the center of an Ossetian war. A loss there would spell the end of Georgia's defense short of reverting to a guerilla war a la Chechnya (Not a pleasant prospect, as Chechnya lost something like 50% of its usable land to combat).

But there are broader implications to Russia's intention to take the war to Gori. Gori is indisputably Georgian territory - Russia's already disproportionate response is rapidly losing legitimacy. So it does not appear Russia will be constrained much by international public opinion - perhaps fitting as they assault the hometown of Josef Stalin. However, it also lends credence to rumors that Russia hopes not just to detach Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but truly ruin Georgia and depose Saakashvili. The author suspected such earlier, when Russia initially refused to even acknowledge that Georgia had requested a ceasefire. Any chance of Georgians ceasing combat is unlikely as long as Russia remains operating outside Ossetia but hasn't finished the fight by taking Gori.

So... Why should we care? Allowing Russia to respond so disproportionately - taking the fight beyond the disputed regions - is not a step the West should allow Russia to take lightly. It is a severe blow to American interests in Eastern Europe - not only does the West stand to lose an ally if Russia gets its way, but it stands to lose even more in the post-Soviet sphere. We have shown that when its allies stand up to Russia by embracing the West, the West will not stand up for its allies - unless, of course, they're in NATO, as Ukrainians and Georgians mulling over their failed membership bids might conclude. A successful action on Russia's part, without backup from the West, may dissuade non-members from taking pro-Western actions. Pro-Western actions being anything and everything Put-... Er... Medvedev does not approve of. On the other hand, as a threat to other Eastern European countries, we might expect renewed strength in the NATO bids of Ukraine or other countries. After all, what, in the mind of a Ukrainian, would stop Russia from doing the same thing over time in Donetsk and Crimea within the next few decades? Indeed, Russia is not very happy about Ukraine's lack of interest in renewing the Black Sea Fleet's lease on Sevastopol. This is especially critical as Ukraine has threatened to deny this base to the fleet even as it operates against Georgia.

So, what should the NATO/EU/US response be? Well, trying to broker a peace without the Russians overthrowing Saakashvili hasn't worked so far. Indeed, in the UNSC Russia has gone so far as to try to get the UN to support its actions in Georgia, and shows no signs of letting its veto power allow anything less to pass. Ideally, this situation would end with neutral (perhaps EU, if not UN) peacekeepers taking over duties in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and holding a proper referendum. Practically, this is unlikely to be an option. So, what diplomatic pressure can the West put on Russia? It can demand that Russia comply with their demands on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for giving some concessions on Georgia. This, however, would make it appear the West allowed Georgia as a sacrifice to Russia, so is somewhat undesirable. Other options to pressure Russia could include stepping up US presence in Eastern Europe, refusing to cooperate with Russian demands in other regions, allowing the Ukraine into NATO, supporting its threat to refuse Sevastopol to the Black Sea Fleet, or promising to increase aid to Georgia after the war, or a variety of other options. Obviously, starting WWIII is a bad idea, but so is letting Russia roll over Georgia and oust Saakashvili.

Incidentally, some Russians claim we did something very, very disturbing: According to this newspaper (translated), Russian troops in Tskhinvali caught Georgian saboteurs after the claimed withdrawal, including a black (and thus likely non-Georgian) NATO advisor. This story has not been corroborated, and I wouldn't be surprised if it was entirely fabricated, but if it is going on... Yikes.

This will get updated in lieu of constant new posts, unless something major develops that deserves its own.

UPDATE: 9K Russian troops and 300+ AFVs in Abkhazia... and they're moving on to Senaki, which is another zone of Georgia proper. Gori fell, and Georgia is mounting a last ditch defense of the capital at Mtskheta.

May We Live in Interesting Times...

"Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating."
- Carl von Clausewitz

The Georgians are moving in on South Ossetia and they don't look to be pulling any punches. This wouldn't be very worrying if it weren't for the way Russia's reacted. According to the Georgians, the Russians flew three Su-24s into Georgia and started bombing police stations. Now, the Russians haven't said anything yet and I doubt they'll say they did it - using Russian jets to harass Georgia is nothing new. The last time the Georgians claimed the Russians bombed them, the Russians said it was likely an incident fabricated by the Georgian government. To be fair, Georgia does operate a half-dozen or so Su-24s. Russia operates 458. Choose your verison of the truth, I suppose. However, even if Russia isn't "officially" fighting Georgia, that isn't going to stop them from helping out the Ossetians (or the Abkhaz). They can always supply weapons to the resistance movements themselves - even when it wasn't Kremlin policy, many Russian officers voluntarily did it (or were bribed) during the initial '91-'93 conflict. Russia's going to come down hard on Georgia for a number of reasons. One is letting American soldiers into Georgia from 2002-2004. Another is Georgia's continuing efforts to expand this relationship into NATO membership. Don't forget Georgia's offer to take part in the US missile shield - something that's gotten Poland in trouble too. Consider also Russia's promise to step up support for Georgian breakaway regions in light of Kosovar independence. If Russia really throws their weight into this, it's not just because Russia cares so much about regions that have the population equivalents of Providence, Rhode Island and Gary, Indiana - it's because Russia wants to reassert its traditional role in the Caucasus - hegemon.

UPDATE: Russia is throwing their weight into this. The 58th army has entered Georgia.

So, it being an Olympic year, we can look forward at least to some spirited matches between Russia and Georgia in the Olympics. The IOC's efforts to the contrary, the Olympics are a political event. China's using it as a nationalist popularity boost. The Uighurs are using it as an opportunity to lash out at the Chinese government (perhaps to gain some visibility with the Free Tibet crowd). The US has put a Sudanese refugee as its flag-carrier. But remember guys, the Olympics are not political. At all. Ever. So this one's won't be either. Believe it, and it will be true.

Pakistan's Parliament seems on track to impeach Musharraf. This, if it works well, is good news - Pakistan's civilian government hasn't been perfect, but it's better to forge a new relationship with a legitimate government than lose Pakistan moderates by clinging to an unpopular strongman. Of course, Musharraf (and the military), if they choose to fight it out, can shut down parliament, declare emergency law again, and throw the whole process for a loop. On the other hand, if this succeeds against the army's wishes, who knows how tight a leash the Pakistani government can keep on the army and ISI? Nevertheless, the US should do everything to ensure that Pakistan has a strong, legitimate government - we aren't ready for Kagan's nightmare.

Nuclear talks with Iran aren't progressing swimmingly, either. The risk-reward ratio is still skewed too far to justify a military attack, but this logic might not convince Israel. To go on a bit of a tangent, I consider an Israeli attack on Iran the worst of all possible options. Firstly, the political blowback in Iran and the wider Middle East would be just as catastrophic for the US - especially because geography necessitates we green-light any Israeli strike. However, there are so many nuclear sites in Iran (and Iran's air-defense network is well enough along) that a decisive blow against Iran's nuclear infrastructure would require the might of the USAF, not just the relative handful Israeli aircraft capable of reaching Iran's inland sites. I do not think such strikes are inevitable, though. I would, however, rate the Iranian chance of acquiring a bomb as higher than the chances there will be a conflict.

With a Friend Like This...

Pakistan is one of the most frustrating countries for the US to deal with in the war on terror. It's a massive state sponsor of Islamic fundamentalism - something we found out the hard way when we had to subcontract their ISI to get into Afghanistan in the '80s. It has nuclear weapons, and thus has intentionally and unintentionally become a potential source of nuclear proliferation. And even if it becomes completely intolerable to American interests, it is far too massive for the US to invade.

Why has our Pakistan policy gone so badly?

First of all, America is not the hub of all international interests. Especially Pakistan's. Pakistan has plenty of built-in faults, like its hodgepodge of ethnic groups and a virtually permanent state of inferiority to its rival. Consequently, Pakistan's overriding motives are maintaining internal stability and checking India.

Which means that unless we can convince Pakistan we're going to destroy them, or give them real advantages against India, it's going to be really hard to get Pakistan's government to act the way we want. Let alone its people, which the government often has had a hard time getting to act the way it wants.

Until now, we've gotten Pakistan to ignore it's natural interest of exploiting Islamic sentiments to shore up support in the lawless Northwestern Frontier and check India by bribing them with military aid to India. Given the returns, however, this doesn't make much sense in the long run - India is a far more valuable ally than Pakistan, to be frank. Nevertheless, we need Pakistan's cooperation to deal with Afghanistan and terrorism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Obama has suggested a policy of intervening in Pakistan without the government's permission. This makes sense when it is absolutely vital to, say, killing key al Qaeda members or existential threats to Afghanistan, but it is not a cure-all replacement for Pakistani cooperation. Indeed, even using this method when it is vital could have dire consequences - either it will induce a government extremely hostile to US interests, or US intervention could induce internal unrest and destabilization in Pakistan, especially given the fragile nature of Pakistan's parliamentary governments. Either way, worse for the US at this point.

It's important to note that nobody really wants Pakistan to collapse - its neighbors don't want to deal with the refugees, al Qaeda doesn't want to lose the shield of protection (if Pakistan were already in anarchy, there'd be no reason not to cross the border and mess around), China doesn't want to lose a client, Iran doesn't want to fight off the Baluchis, Saudi Arabia doesn't want to lose the ISI as a partner, and India doesn't want to lose a common enemy. Finally, the vast majority of the world doesn't want loose nukes. Even if they become more hostile, until they start handing out nuclear weapons, they're probably an enemy we want intact.

Also, if you believe Jared Diamond, this collapse is inevitable since Pakistan is committing ecological suicide.