The Last Shots of 2008

A month ago I referred to relying on resolving the Kashmir dispute to accomplish our foreign policy goals in South Asia is akin to relying on resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute to accomplish our foreign policy goals in the Middle East. So, true to form, the ceasefire in Gaza has erupted into violence that may lead up to a major ground offensive.

Just as in Kashmir, we would have to put pressure on a nominally allied country to gain the favor of Muslims. It is unlikely we will see any sort of grand settlement without moving Israel closer to its pre-1967 borders or stopping settlement in the West Bank. Meanwhile, that we supply Israel with billions in military arms does little to endear us to the Palestinians or the broader Islamic community.

That being said, Israel is acting entirely within its rights and responsibilities as a sovereign country. When Hamas launches rockets at Israeli homes, Israel is obligated to retaliate against Hamas. Putting pressure on Israel to make concessions as it responds to these attacks may seem like the sensible step for peace negotiations, but in all likelihood it would only strengthen hawks and reduce our leverage as a broker of negotiations, even if it enhanced our credibility among Palestinians.

So far Operation "Cast Lead" seems to be proceeding well for the Israelis. According to most reports, the IDF has caught Hamas unprepared and landed heavy blows against infrastructure and logistics. Thanks to this surprise advantage (and some new ordnance from Uncle Sam), Israel's tactics of using airstrikes seem to be working reasonably effectively so far, with "50 percent" of capability for rocket attack eliminated. (The IDF actually started its own Youtube channel to highlight its "precision bombing" in Gaza, while Arab networks have already brought Gaza to the center of their attention.)

But with 20,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza and the party's non-military wing firmly embedded in the Strip's social services, it's going to take more than a bombing campaign to destroy their operational capability. So far, the Israeli government has alluded to new phases of operations, possibly involving ground troops in an operation "to totally change the rules of the game." Even if this was enough to destroy Hamas, would Israel really want to? Because destroying Hamas would require destroying the government of Gaza, does Israel really have a Phase IV planned to pick up the pieces?

On top of all of this, the man who has the most riding on Operation Cast Lead, Ehud Barak, is also the man most to bring progress in negotiations - and with the election coming up soon, he cannot afford to bring Israel another July War.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan's offensive against the insurgents in Pashtunistan has closed off the Peshawar corridor. Since the majority of our supplies come through Pakistan, this is just one more reason why they will have to remain an ally in the war on terror. But since this route is becoming less and less reliable, we will need a new solution. This requires us to deal with two possible alternatives:

1. Strengthening the route through Russia into Central Asia. This means dropping human rights claims against the 'stans and increasing our reliance on Russia through rail transport. While Russia is generally glad NATO is doing its job in Afghanistan and fighting Islamic terror there, this course isn't particularly palatable to people concerned about human rights or worried about Russia's future course.
2. Trying to open the "East-West Corridor" from the Caucasus across the Caspian into Central Asia. Once again, we have to concede human rights issues to countries like Uzbekistan. This time, though, we would likely end up increasing our military presence in the Caucasus in a way Russia would be very unhappy with, possibly stressing the Western European NATO members who fear they will suffer the most from Russia's response to American penetration of the post-Soviet sphere.
   

An Afghan Awakening?

The US is hoping to launch a second "Awakening" of tribal militias - this time in Afghanistan. While this idea might seem commendable, the more one examines Afghanistan, the less viable it seems without some significant changes from how it was accomplished in Iraq. While it will be important that we bring Afghans in the South and East who might otherwise ally themselves with the fundamentalist militias on board, accomplishing this by empowering the militias themselves will likely be a major mistake. Iraq's government had far more credibility at the national and local level, and provided both a pathway for integrating the militias in such a way that the government could eventually monopolize force in those areas, and in the transition could theoretically check potential excesses on the part of the Sons of Iraq, and thus helped balance power between combatant factions.

In Afghanistan, however, actual local governance is incredibly weak, since many officials aren't elected but appointed. If we pursue these tactics, we will be delegating more power to the tribes and people of Afghanistan in some ways, yes, but we will not be doing so in a sustainable manner. The Awakening in Iraq is working because it built on ties between Sunni communities and the militias; through the plan to integrate the militia members with the government, it in turn helped bind the militias to the government and thus would help reinforce the credibility of the Shia dominated government to Sunnis. The militia program in Afghanistan, however, seems to bypass the idea of building government credibility or ties between the militias and the government entirely:

During a weekend visit, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the U.S. focus on establishing a strong central government in Afghanistan may have been "overstated." He said the U.S. would now focus more on "enabling the communities, the tribes and their leaders."

"How strong the central government will be in the future, I think, is yet to be determined," he told reporters.

This is focusing on a legitimate problem but responding in a very risky way. I certainly have been critical of a Kabul-centric Afghan policy. That said, I don't think the solution is to create a parallel security force that does what the government is supposed to. Now, the creation of these militias is indeed only a first phase, but until we can integrate them with the de jure local governments they will require constant US handling to prevent them from further destabilizing Afghanistan in the long run. However, that integration cannot be effective until the people of Afghansitan see their local governments as legitimate, which means without fixing the problem of governance in Afghanistan this entire effort may be wasted.

To be fair, similar criticisms were voiced at the beginning of the Anbar Awakening, and fortunately many of these fears have not (yet) been realized. But again: different country, different problems. As we've already seen, Afghanistan there are the issues of governance to sort out. But there are also underlying problems in our military strategy, too. Where the United States had a significant ground presence in Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq, the ground presence in the turbulent regions of Afghanistan has proven inadequate. America cannot effectively combat today's hostile militias because when Americans (or whatever other ISAF force there is) go back to their bases, the Taliban can control the countryside. Replace "Taliban" with "warlords" and one can see why revitalizing non-governmental militias could be so dangerous. If warlords do come to control these militias, checking them will not be easy, since they, not the US, not ISAF, and not the Afghan government, will have the last words. Counterinsurgency needs to be population-centric to succeed, and without our soldiers being deployed accordingly, the militia strategy will indeed be counterproductive. If we do not want to send another hundred thousand or more troops into Afghanistan for a long, long time, we will need to begin deploying our men into the midst of the villages we hope to defend. Such a strategy may carry a higher cost in both blood and treasure, but there is no easy way to win this war.

Also in the news...

As the global economy flounders, Russia is organizing the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, in hopes of... "not creating a cartel." Keep in mind that Putin came up with the idea of a "Gas OPEC" in 2002 and that Gazprom board member and nominal Russian "executive" Medvedev hoped this organization would achieve OPEC's level of influence. How such an organization could achieve OPEC's influence without the power to manipulate the flow of gas is beyond me. And while yes, there are Russian ships cruising in the Carribbean again, those interested in geopolitics should be more concerned about Russia's energy deals than its military deployments. Russia's fleet is still not a viable challenge to the US on the open seas, and even if the era of "cheap gas" and today's falling energy prices ends, it still won't be enough - even when the gap between the US and USSR was narrowest, the US still had a clear naval advantage outside of the USSR's regional waters. However, because Gazprom intends to invest more in energy resources outside the post-Soviet sphere, Latin America is more important to the Kremlin for economic reasons than military ones. While countries like Bolivia and Venezuela are ideologically opposed to American influence and globalization, this does serve as a good reminder of why the US needs to stay politically active and economically open around the world - there are countries waiting to pick up where we left off, and they may not use such an advantage to our best interests.

Piling it On

This is not looking like a good week for optimists.

The NBER threw in the towel and decided that despite the discrepancy between quarterly GDP forecasts and the official definition, the US downturn started in December 2007. Before people start grumbling about the worthless academics taking too long to get in touch with reality, remember when the stimulus package to "real Americans" was supposed to save the economy? Those were the days...

Mankiw and Cowen have good NYT editorials on the economy, in particular on what lessons we should really be taking from the '30s.

But, you shouldn't become too wrapped up in worrying about the economy. According to a bipartisan Congressional task force, you should also be worried about an attack on the US using weapons of mass destruction, the odds of which "are now better than even" between now and 2013. The report points out that a biological attack is more likely than a nuclear one, though nuclear proliferation and the destabilization of Pakistan will make loose nuclear weapons likely threats. It says the next attack on the US will also most likely originate from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

But, before we decide to stick to that promised policy of preemptive intervention to kill terrorists on Pakistani soil, it might be worth considering the precedent we're setting. Because there's a country that already has and it believes it has been once again attacked by terrorists based in Pakistan. Already, India has taken Obama's stance to indicate that it too has the right to kick down doors in the pursuit of justice. As Robert Kaplan, India faces a far graver threat from Islamic terrorism than the United States does.

Yet a policy that allows such attack on India's part could easily end up with a nuclear exchange - note that Pakistan does not have a "no first-use" policy on nuclear arms. While launching nuclear weapons at the United States would be futile, Pakistan does have a credible deterrent against India. This will likely be the second time that the United States must navigate its way through an Indo-Pakistani crisis while fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan.

Calls for Obama to take the "regional approach" and use Kashmir to convince Pakistan to contribute more troops to dealing with Islamic fundamentalists in its own borders and cease support for them outside of them seem more unrealistic than ever. India was hostile to the idea before the attacks, it will not be amenable to them now. The ideal outcome would be greater cooperation between the two powers on counterterrorism, but this is incredibly unlikely. As tensions increase, the US will find that Kashmir negotiations will not be able to proceed without taking sides, and treating Kashmir as a way to deal with American concerns about Afghanistan will inevitably draw the US to a pro-Pakistani line.

India has endured decades of Islamist violence on its own soil. If this sort of thing happened to the United States, we'd have taken up Armitage's cry and bombed them into the stone age. But we cannot expect that they will continue to tolerate such tragedies in a manner conducive to our goals. One way or another, Indians will feel compelled to respond. Relying on the Kashmir approach to win the war on terror is not viable. India, for its part, however, must improve its counterterrorist efforts. Watching Indian footage, city police fired at Kalashnikov-wielding terrorists with ancient bolt-action rifles while the response of more professional units has not impressed American analysts either. While there's obviously a lot more than small arms deficiencies that contributed to the problem, they are symptomatic of a deeper problem. India has invested well in its regular military but left the provincial-level counterterrorist and police forces underfunded. Terrorist attacks are thus more effective against India, and India cannot respond with its regular military without triggering a nuclear crisis. (We, too, struggle with managing the traditional gap between domestic law enforcement and the use of our military abroad. Fortunately we've managed to get by without a nuclear war scare... So far.)

The important thing to remember during all of this is that al Qaeda is hoping we'll overreact. Based on the latest tapes, they're having trouble coming up with an effective message against Obama without any policies of his they can criticize. Al Qaeda needs to provoke Obama into making a big mistake that involves perceived aggression and injustice against Muslims to maintain its base of support. This is something his cabinet should keep in mind as January 20th approaches. While I still take issue with sending Hillary Clinton to Foggy Bottom, I'm far more pleased with Obama's other national security picks. That being said, no matter what happens to the economy, sidelining foreign policy will come with consequences. Obama had really better trust his staff, because he is going to be a busy, busy man.

Pirates & More on Pakistan

With Somali piracy back in the international spotlight, I'd figure now would be a good time to relate the issues of Somalia to the wider world - because what's happening does reflect on larger trends, and the immediate problem is not to be discounted either.

The largest tanker organization in the world called for a UN-lead naval blockade of Somalia. Citing the immense area of pirate operations, they have deduced that short of arming or escorting every tanker, intercepting pirate vessels before they reach shipping routes is the only effective prevention. Now, while this seems logical in theory, it will be much more difficult to implement in practice. Relying on the United Nations to stabilize Somalia has a pretty poor track record. However, it may be difficult for the United States to draw in non-NATO powers without one. Reluctance to intervene without a mandate aside, the Somali piracy episode is illuminating the effects of America's decline in relative power.

Proponents of stabilizing hegemons might note that American dominance cannot perform a function that seemed to be a given a decade ago - protecting the sea lanes and providing the basic security necessary for free trade. Unless the UN can effectively step in to create a genuine partnership to secure the seas, the natural result will be great power intervention. Though domestic concerns will make it difficult for Americans to concern themselves with a region that's frustrated us for the past 15 years, we should not be surprised when other powers pick up where we left off. Since rising and resurgent powers lack true blue water navies, the United States must recognize that a contribution by other great powers to stability in the Gulf of Aden must come with an expansion of rival powers' naval bases. The expansion of naval bases will further the decline in relative American power and de facto balance against US interests and capabilities.

On the other hand, the other great powers would be just fine with the US and NATO dealing with the problem. Russia's Ambassador to NATO suggested that they launch an invasion of the Somali coast. Of course, Russia may have ulterior motives for wishing such a maneuver. After all, with an American war in Iraq, a NATO war in Afghanistan and many other commitments, every new NATO deployment outside of Eurasia is one that may force western troops to leave Russia's desired "sphere of influence."

Speaking of which, go check out the Global Trends 2025 report.

Keep watching Pakistan. As support for Kashmir negotiations continues to grow in the west, it's important to remember just how risky pinning our hopes in Afghanistan on Kashmir will be.

Firstly, alienating India (as would be necessary to placate the Pakistani Army) will risk Afghanistan's long term stability, as India has been a major investor in Afghanistan and will likely play a large role in the region when NATO leaves. Secondly, negotiating on Kashmir does not automatically make fighting Afghanistan easier. Pakistan would have to decide India was no longer a threat, even though the rising wealth disparity due to India's economic success will likely contribute to a widening gap in relative military power. Ongoing religious/nationalist enmity will continue, and will likely be amplified in India as the US is forced to placate Pakistan. Even if Pakistan still didn't feel that India was its primary threat, it would have to remake its military for counterinsurgency warfare. Just as the surge required tactical and operational changes to work, so too will units trained and equipped to fight conventional warfare against India have to adapt to the nature of the NWFP and FATA conflict. Considering we arguably have yet to make this move, it may be unreasonable to expect the Pakistanis to do the same.

Furthermore, we must remember Islamic fundamentalists will have grievances with the Pakistani government for supporting the US and for its failure to live up to cultural, political, and economic expectations, regardless of how Kashmir goes. The fighting on the frontier will not disappear because not all terrorists and insurgents have the same motivations. If Pakistan feels it must play off tribal groups and political factions against each other to succeed (a tactic we should not complain about, given our trumpeting of the success of the surge), they will. Indeed, Pakistan supports anti-American and fundamentalist groups not only to fight against India in Kashmir, but so they can fight against anti-government groups on the frontier. Will support for these groups end, too? Dealing with Kashmir certainly won't end the radicalizing effect of American occupation in Afghanistan and intervention in Pakistan.

Relying on Kashmir to fix Afghanistan is similar to relying on Palestine to fix America's Middle Eastern problems. It is a nice idea on paper and could yield benefits if resolved in a manner pleasing both sides, but it has proven incredibly difficult to accomplish effectively. At least we have a well-established team of public servants with Arab-Israeli expertise. Do the same resources exist for Kashmir? What's worse, unlike in the Palestinian debate, America has a significant national interest in maintaining good relations with both sides. While America can afford to disagree with Israel and has already dealt with alienating the Palestinians, America needs the support of Pakistan in Afghanistan and India in broader, strategic terms. And, like Israel and Palestine, even when we manage to get the negotiations right, there are still plenty of other grievances against the US. We've had to have a Plan B for a Middle Eastern policy without the resolution of Israel and Palestine. What's our Plan B for dealing with South Asia without resolving Kashmir?

Eurasian Rumor Mill

Interesting day for news in Afghanistan...

First up is Karzai's offer to protect Mullah Omar (whose head is worth $10 million as far as the US is concerned) so long as he agrees to hold talks with Kabul. If ISAF or anyone else has a problem, Karzai said they could remove him or leave Afghanistan - unappealing options for a coalition that is committed to an Afghanistan that is both stable and democratic. I doubt Omar trusts the Afghans to protect him that well, but if they could (and kept their word), it might put the US and its new President in an unenviable situation.

Another interesting development: Apparently, Gordon Brown floated the idea of placing Chinese troops in Afghanistan. Though there hasn't been much to substantiate this report, if true, could signal an interesting development in Chinese policy. One possibility is that the Chinese want to prove they're a responsible member of the international community, prepared to work with the west on common issues (after all, China has its own issues with Islamic militants in Xinjiang). Fighting in Afghanistan would give Chinese troops valuable counterinsurgency experience and allow them to observe the COIN tactics of other coalition members. The other possibility is that China might finally want to make the inroads into Central Asia commensurate with its status as a world power. Many analysts have speculated that China is preparing to get into Central Asia to secure its borders (by developing Xinjiang and Tibet through trade) and economic resources (energy, energy, energy).

From a realpolitik angle, building up a presence in Central Asia could provide China with access to resources the US cannot easily exclude. Despite a generally warm attitude and a vital trade relationship, China remains paranoid about its reliance on sea transport across the Indian Ocean for many of its raw material imports, since the US Navy patrols the Straits of Malacca. It's just one reason why the US cannot afford to shun free trade or economic integration with China if it wishes to avoid the pitfalls of multipolarity.

Medvedev changes his tune on Obama... Sort of. Given the combination of the missile movements and now this supposed overture, Medvedev may be putting on a bit of political theater to put the onus on Obama to make concessions even as he tries to embarrass or frustrate American goals. Such maneuvering would sour the strategic or domestic political climate to making those concessions, allowing Medvedev to sour Russian opinion about Obama by making it appear as if he is less reasonable or cooperative than otherwise believed. Given what occurred in Iran after the congratulatory letter incident, we may want to expect this sort of thing as more anti-Bush leaders attempt to shore up domestic credibility in the wake of Obama's victory.

Transitional Rumors, International Omens

The big buzz about Obama's foreign policy is that Hillary Clinton is going to be Obama's secretary of state. It seems like a brilliant political move - something you'd expect from a guy who's read Team of Rivals. However, I question the wisdom of such a decision.

Obama needs to be heading into the real world, 2009, not cleaning up old grudges from 2008. Of course Obama, as a politician, is going to want to consolidate his support and prevent an internal struggle that one would expect from a big-tent political party like the Democrats. However, American foreign policy is already losing attention to the economy and it cannot afford to lose any more attention to domestic political maneuvering. To be frank, Obama's foreign policy is not going to work itself out. Once the soft power buzz of his own election wears off (and it will not be long), the President will need to attempt to help keep old allies on board, warm relations with former friends, and carefully engage rivals and enemies. Thanks to American unipolarity, the last two administrations have relied on force and the absence of balancing rivals to assert American diplomatic objectives. America's economic stability contributed to these ambitious foreign policies. With a general decline in relative American power (due more to the rise of others ) and the potential for economic disaster at home, the US will have its work cut out for it abroad.

Managing the complex negotiations to come - and all their attendant trade-offs, treaties, and concessions - will require an exceptional secretary of state. While many foreign leaders respect and admire Obama, once they begin interacting with him at the negotiating table questions of national interest will take precedence. Hillary Clinton is not entirely unqualified to be secretary of state. But she is by far not the most qualified, and claims that her experience as first lady will offer some unique advantage are mostly irrelevant. Firstly, the US already has the soft power namedropping advantage - his name is Barack Obama. Secondly, the first lady functions in a PR role, not as a major negotiator and her friendliness with the leaders of the '90s is not pertinent to today's leadership. Whatever personal connections she formed then, many are with leaders out of office now, or who never had to have Mrs. Clinton tell them anything they didn't want to hear. Memories of the good times will quickly fade when those countries national security and economic concerns go on the line. These personal connections also fail to address the secretary of state's biggest challenge - working with states like Iran, Syria, and North Korea that the US has previously shunned diplomatically.

As for secretary of defense, word is that Robert Gates will be held on for the transition. It's a good call and I hope that those rumors are true. Gates has done a lot to turn around American defense strategy, and given that Obama will be more than busy enough during the transition, it would be good to keep a competent, relatively strategically compatible cabinet member managing things to minimize disruption to American defense policy and distraction from the economic agenda.

Elsewhere, I suspect the Obama administration is keeping a close eye on what's happening in the DRC and Rwanda. The situation is already ugly and may be spiralling further out of control, as neighboring countries volunteer deploying their own "peacekeeping" forces in a scene reminiscent of foreign interventions of previous decades. Obama (not to mention his staff) has said a lot about humanitarian intervention. Given that a humanitarian operation in the Congo is more plausible from an international perspective (no great power like China looming over, and stronger, broadly supported UN presence), it may be the site of this administration's first big humanitarian intervention rather than Darfur.

Other places to watch out for - North Korea. China is taking Kim's disappearing act very seriously, and regime change could drastically alter US plans for the region. From Pakistan, we have the usual bad news and then the (seemingly) unusual bad news. It's worth remembering that the Iranians dislike the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban about as much as we do, and cooperating in stabilizing the region could be one of the fruits of a truly grand (though by no means assured) bargain with Tehran.

Also, this bit of Hayden's assessment of al Qaeda is interesting. Osama is cut off from regular AQ operations and focused more on his own survival - good. But what this should tell us is that we should not prioritize killing or capturing him over the broader effort against al Qaeda. One of the reasons why terrorism cannot be treated purely as a law enforcement issue is that AQ's organizational structure is complex and flexible enough to endure disruptions to its leadership. If we have to go into Pakistan guns blazing to take out someone already out of the organizational loop, we are probably going to create a lot more anti-American Pakistanis without necessarily severely disrupting AQ's ability to conduct a retaliatory attack. This isn't to say getting OBL isn't important, it's just an example of how we need to balance political objectives in the wider strategic context. An attitude that sees killing OBL as the "game over" in the fight against AQ will be disappointing at best and counterproductive at worst.

On another note, congratulations to General Ann Dunwoody, America's first female four-star general.

The world isn't waiting

While Americans (and to some extent, everyone else) have a lot to be excited about, it sure hasn't taken long for the post-election euphoria to wear away. Obama's judgment and temperament helped him win the election, they will be among his best attributes going forward. However, Americans must remember that they are neither infallible nor may they necessarily lead to the policies we've come to expect.

On fiscal matters, the money for Obama's healthcare and other spending plans is gone - spent in the Paulson bailout plan. At least Paulson is moving towards the Dodd plan equity stake strategy rather than directly purchasing toxic assets, but the plan is (as we must expect) far from perfect. However, the fact remains that our financial sector is too vital to collapse - it is the engine of growth for our economy, especially in the long term. Eliminating or rolling back the bailout plan would be disastrous - not just for the immediate impact on the market, but for creating a climate of uncertainty hostile to investment. Nor will Obama's tax plans help very much. During a recession, increasing taxes on the very wealthiest and capital gains will have diminishing marginal returns - recessions, especially centered in the financial sector, will disproportionately reduce the incomes of wealthy investors (even if they suffer far less than ordinary Americans in absolute terms).

Though we should not foolishly cling to the impossibility of balancing the budget, we must spend wisely. So when the Big Three begin requesting billions in their own bailouts, we should not be so eager to appease them. While the auto industry and media will naturally claim that these companies, like the banks, are "too big to fail," the reality is that finance and manufacturing play vastly different roles in the American economy. Without solvent banks, simple but incredibly vital economic functions - saving and loaning money, for example, come into peril. Allowing for massive amounts of bank failures deprives the market of liquidity, crippling economic growth and innovation (starting a new company requires investment, after all). Car companies simply cannot claim to be this vital to the American economy, however important they are. Though undoubtedly the Big Three will get some form of bailout (Obama wouldn't want someone like Mitt Romney taking the industrial Midwest in 2012), it is likely this money could be better spent elsewhere. The jobs lost by these major companies will be highly visible - but not the jobs that will be lost in other companies due to the difference in allocation of resources. Even if someone were to point out this unemployment, the natural response would be, "good thing we bailed out those automakers, or they'd have gone under too!"

America cannot afford to constantly prop up every industry whose management and labor organizations legislate themselves into stagnation. We have bailed out the Big Three in better times - why do we think doing it now will help them finally achieve the magical recovery they've wanted? Even if we did stipulate the management be sacked and some new visionary team be put in place, can we really expect them to fix when even successful automakers are facing a hard year? Eventually, Washington will have to realize that doing the best thing for the workers will mean spending more money on new industries and trade adjustment assistance. This is the economic equivalent of "Weekend at Bernie's," and at some point we may have to stop waiting for the miracle that makes Detroit great again.

How far Obama deviates from his original platform is still unknown, but we should not be too shocked when - not if - he does. We can only hope that the deviations he does make will be positive - like promoting global cooperation on recovery by affirming free trade.

As for foreign policy, goodwill has failed to erase many of the expected dilemmas. On election day, Russia forced Obama to take Eastern Europe's side of the missile defense dispute by deploying missiles to Kaliningrad. This, combined with his preference for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership, will make Russian cooperation on Iran more difficult. Speaking of Iran, don't hold your breath for a great breakthrough there, either. Within days of the election, the mood of the BBC went from this to this. As for Pakistan, the economic crisis has only made intervening in the country more dangerous, while the recent calls for mediating the Kashmir dispute have the potential to harm our interests in the region even more. Germany, not just Britain, seems to be growing more skeptical about committing to Afghanistan - if this is indicative of a greater trend among ISAF members, we have a problem:

A new strategy would only work if Western countries openly discussed their
objectives in Afghanistan. They would have to admit that they cannot establish a
democracy, equal rights for women, or a welfare state in Afghanistan. Shifting
the focus from nation building to simply combating al-Qaida terrorists would
presumably be the only basis for Europeans and Obama to formulate a joint
policy.

And it isn't even January, yet.

Denial is a River in the Hindu Kush

Obama continues to ignore the ramifications of his Pakistan policy. Osama bin Laden is killing Americans now. Pakistan is unable and unwilling to clear out the FATA and NWFP now. We likely have intelligence to put the heat on a lot of AQ and Taliban members now. By his standards, we should be lighting up the Pakistani frontier. This isn't a hypothetical, this is a reality. Either he is willing to resume raids in Pakistan or he isn't, and if he is he needs to acknowledge that attacking Pakistan is going to be just as damaging to support for the war on terror as supporting Musharraf in Pakistan. They were shooting at us. This isn't an academic question for point-scoring - this is a real policy decision, and Obama needs to tone down the rhetoric or prepare for a conflict that will be nowhere near as clear-cut as he would have us believe. Pakistan made a truce with the Taliban because they were tired of killing their soldiers and their citizens and because in counterinsurgency, sometimes you have to deal with the devil. Letting us smack around Pakistanis and tribal kinsmen is only going to create more attacks on the Pakistani government. We too will have to make deals with those tribes if we want to stabilize Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, McCain's Afghan policy continues to buy into the fantasy that another "surge" will save Afghanistan. It won't, unless you want a larger surge (let's talk 3-4x larger), and a replication of one of the pre-surge reductions in violence - an Anbar awakening. That means allying with some of the fundamentalist tribes that used to harbor or support al Qaeda, not hunting down and destroying every formerly anti-American tribe in Afghanistan (or, Senator Obama, the NWFP or FATA). We essentially have two options to stabilize Afghanistan without a massive long-term presence that will last generations - installing a less-than-democratic central government that has made peace with some of the belligerents and delegated to the tribes, or a new Iron Amir with dictatorial powers. America wants stability, democracy, and withdrawal within a few years - it will get two if it is lucky.

McCain had a stronger performance than his last debate, and seemed to tackle the real long-run issue for the "American empire" - domestic expenditures - more directly than Obama did. Both, however, were mum on Medicare, the biggest and faster growing of the American entitlement programs. Both made legitimate points on their own healthcare proposals, but ultimately as far as the "elephants in the room" are concerned, nobody really knows what to do about the immediate problems of global financial meltdown (especially since this will increasingly require linking foreign and domestic policies), and nobody really wants to talk about how many planks of their platforms will have to be torn out in January.

I haven't needed to wait long for the geopolitical hysteria over the financial crisis to start. Iceland, unable to bail out its financial institutions without compromising its fiscal solvency, hoped the EU would be able to bail it out. No such luck. Now Russia may offer the capital injection, and already some observers think it may be part of a Russian attempt to subvert NATO (and perhaps even establish a security presence in the North Atlantic!).

As usual, everything in the Middle East is going swimmingly.

Going long on dollars and bullets

Recent rumors from Saudi Arabia, while very much overstating the militant-AQ split, are emblematic of the uncomfortable choices Americans may be forced to make in the future. If the United States is concerned about more than a manhunt, then we must accept some previously politically unacceptable things. Unfortunately, those American politicians who might otherwise support "talking to our enemies" are more concerned with the manhunt than winning the war. Going, guns blazing, into "where Osama lives" will, at best, severely undermine our ability to effectively deal with the Pashtun tribes, and at worst, start a war of truly catastrophic proportions.

More bad news for "the long war" - Congress seems set to choose pork-laden weapons systems over manpower expansion. Despite the fact that the military is already overworked and will be facing personnel strains in the near future, there's simply little politico-economic incentive to support military expansion when fighter planes with parts made in 48 out of 50 states might have to be chopped. One of John McCain's few good points during the last debate was that the government has to curtail wasteful defense spending. Given the economic constraints facing the next President (well, let's be frank -Obama), he will need to take on Congress if he wants a military ready for a future of counterinsurgency. Or we can just keep laying down firepower from standoff positions, aircraft and provincial capitals until OBL dies or we get tired of dealing with Afghanistan. I guess the realistic question is - which comes first?

On the subject of catastrophe, the American bailout has not done much to shore up confidence in the European economy. The inability of European governments to effectively cooperate to deal with bank failures that individual member states can no longer handle. As previously noted, European banks are often more ponderous than their American counterparts, at least proportional to the countries they reside in. Like the Georgia crisis, the coming weeks may be another test and indicator of the strength and cohesiveness of the EU.

Of course, things are going pretty poorly in the US too. As for the debate - expectations are low. The economic issues are too complex for reasonable political discourse and perhaps too global for a single government to effectively cope. Anyone who claims the next four years are going to be great is probably lying, at least as far as the economy is concerned. But what we should really all be worried about, with the "American" crisis clearly taking a global dimension, are the consequences of globalization "failing" - if history is any lesson, they will not be easy to ignore.

Global chaos aside, we can at least comfortably predict the outcome of the election (and so I invite the world to prove me wrong).

On Nonsense - Liveblogging the VP debate

2100: I now have money riding on this.

2102: Biden - the failure of the government to respond to the economic crisis proves that the market has failed. Everyone who opposes Biden is a rabid laissez faire capitalist, even though both campaigns support the bailout.

2105: Palin thinks that John McCain is responsible for the probable success of the bailout bill and future oversight.

2107: Palin - McCain not wrong on the economy being sound because American workers are "the best" and saying the economy isn't doing well makes them feel bad.

2109: Palin - "Darn right it was the predator lenders." Wall Street is corrupt, also evil. Good to hear that Palin is on board with the 'fix the economy by putting people in jail' plan. I'm also glad to know that we're thinking of putting usury back on the list of threats to society.

2110: Biden is pulling out the old deregulatory trope and blaming it on George Bush. Never mind that the '90s were a massive period of deregulation, or that that regulatory expenditure expanded massively under George W. Bush.

2114: Oh God. Is Palin listing her record as Mayor as a qualification to be President and manage the American economy? She is right about McCain wanting to regulate whatever tickles his fancy, though.

2115: Biden reinforces the real issue of this debate - massive run on sentences. Corporations are not part of America now, too.

2116: Palin thinks patriotism is refusing to be regulated or taxed. Do either of these people know what patriotism is? Also - Palin makes a legitimate point about healthcare regulation across state lines.

2118: Biden argues that redistributing wealth is just "fairness," while demanding that the government not tax the wealthy's healthcare to pay for healthcare for the poor. Tyler Cowen is right - Americans really, really, really don't like means testing.

2120: Biden says that he will cut John McCain's tax cuts from his administration's future programs to counterbalance Barack Obama's spending. Unfortunately, budgetary credit may not transfer across alternate universes where Obama and McCain are simultaneously President. Hiring foreigners is now "unpatriotic" too.

2122: More oil company tax break football. She refuses to take anything off the table, simultaneously leave Americans alone while eliminating greed and passing a massive financial bailout bill.

2125: Great. They all agree on the windfall profits oil tax as a solution to our economic woes. Lowest common denominator politics at their finest.

2126: Please. Stop. Saying. Corruption. And. Greed. Does the term "market failure" mean anything to you?

2128: Palin always has to answer her last topic before addressing the current one. Someone's finally matched Biden in blowhardiness. She's also passed the essential political test of blaming foreign people and their filthy foreign oil for our economic problems.

2130: Being from "our nation's only Arctic state" qualifies her on environmental issues, too. "Real changes are goin' on in our climate." "Effect the impacts." Also, switching to domestic oil apparently will reduce warming, since, as we all know, everything foreign is more dirty.

2132: Biden really shouldn't be criticizing McCain for coming out against biofuels.

2133: Palin is proud of hosting the country's most expensive pipeline? I guess they're only wasteful earmarks when Alaskans don't like them. She also pronounces nuclear the "folksy" way.

2136: Same old conservative gay marriage trope. But she's tolerant and her family is diverse, so it's OK. Of course, nor does Biden support redefining marriage. Can these two agree on a good idea?

2139: More adulation for Petraeus. Why don't we let this guy be President?

2141: Barack and Joe think it's time for the Iraqis to start fixing their own stupid country. Since when is it our responsibility to take care of countries that we destroy?

2142: Palin - SURRENDER! THE SURGE! THE SURGE! THE SUUUURRRRRRGGGGE! More backhanded compliments to Biden on opposing all of Obama's votes.

2143: Biden argues that McCain was incorrect in arguing Iraq could pay for its own reconstruction, yet argues exactly this position now.

2145: Time to roll out the Pakistani disaster bandwagon. Biden thinks Pakistan is going to nuke Israel? I wasn't aware Pakistan gave a damn about that part of the Middle East. Biden wants to support the Pakistani democracy by illegally violating its borders whenever we feel like it.

2146: Palin - Petraeus thinks the central front of the war on terror is in Iraq, so it is. Always and forever.

2150: There really is no point to discussing diplomacy as a contrast issue without "nuance," is there?

2151: "Never again" applies to both Israel and... American homeowners. Took until now for Palin to apply it to the former, though.

2152: Joe Biden needs to stop referring to Joe Biden in the third person.

2153: Barack Obama and Biden are against ill-advised wars against Muslim countries unless they're Pakistan or... Lebanon? Do any Americans really think putting troops into Lebanon again is a good idea? Why is this a talking point now?

2154: "I'm so encouraged to know we both love Israel."

2155: Biden wants to know how John McCain's position differs from Bush's on Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq - increasingly, McCain differs by not moving toward's Obama's positions, for better or worse.

2156: Palin wants to implement the "surge principles" in Afghanistan... Without mentioning what exactly those are.

2158: For all Biden's bluster about arms control, he needs to explain how this is going to be possible when we go after Osama in Pakistan.

2159: Palin knows McClellan's name! Too bad she's about 150 years off.

2200: Biden thinks the American public has the stomach for success. Biden is against wars that aren't his idea. Good to know.

2202: Yes, Sarah Palin, it is very obvious you're a Washington outsider. But we can't blame you for trying to fit in with that flip-flopping speech.

2204: Biden think he can revoke the sovereignty of other countries and then invade them - that makes it OK.

2205: John McCain, on the other hand, knows how to win wars on his own.

2210: "Joe Biden's Neighborhood" sounds like it has potential as a CSPAN children's show.

2211: Shout out to 3rd graders. Is this a first?

2208: Palin winked again. What does it all mean?

2214: I WIN PALIN BINGO. A great day for all Americans who are me.

2218: "America is a nation of exceptionalism." Exceptional something, I'll give you that. Wait. Did she just misattribute "City on a hill?"

2224: Biden brings up the one court case Palin still knows.

2228: It's almost over. Thank God, it's almost over. Please let this never happen again. These are by far two of the most - "national security freedoms?" What?

2230: Joe Biden makes one last gasp attempt to show he hates CEOs more than Sarah Palin. Anyway, please let these two never appear in tandem for an extended period ever, ever again.

A Good Fight?

If there's one thing Americans appear to agree on, it's Afghanistan - the war is winnable, but it needs more troops. Untainted by the stigma of preemption or unilateralism, Afghanistan is the "good war" that everybody can get behind. However, we should not confuse righteousness with feasibility.

There is no mistake that Afghanistan has been shortchanged since the beginning of the conflict. The effort to rectify this, however, is much larger than many imagine. Afghanistan, were it to have a level of military presence proportional to successful counterinsurgency campaigns, would likely require 400,000 troops for stability. Counting current NATO deployments and the Afghan security forces, that is twice the number of troops we have in Afghanistan today. Neither candidate has proposed sending anywhere near 200,000 troops to Afghanistan, nor could they feasibly be expected to do so. Nor is it likely that the United Kingdom, France, Canada or Germany will be willing to commit thousands more of their soldiers. Indeed, the British ambassador to Afghanistan has allegedly written off the Afghan campaign as futile, with a dictatorship that holds the country together as the optimal outcome - a new Iron Amir.

Of course, one might retort that a "surge" in Afghanistan could work as well as the one in Iraq did. However, this is far less likely to work out in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has dozens of millions of people, just like Iraq, and far more difficult terrain - a brigade in Afghanistan simply isn't as helpful as a brigade in Iraq. The surge in Iraq was also accompanied and preceded by significant changes in tactics that are far less likely to occur in Afghanistan. The Pashtun tribes that harbor al Qaeda and the Taliban are far less likely to switch sides, and in many cases al Qaeda is too deeply integrated with tribes to make such a strategy effective. Nor would the assassination campaign that JSOC conducted in Iraq work effectively in Afghanistan - enemy leaders are less accessible, and crossing the border into Pakistan is only making us more enemies on the other side of the border.

A strategy to stabilize Afghanistan would likely require rebuilding the tribal structure, perhaps even at the expense of the "national" level strategy, and placing more troops in harm's way. While Americans might have the stomach for such a war, European reactions to attacks indicate they may not, while the effects of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq should remind us that empowering tribes may create friction with the central government. We would also need to establish a long-term political, military, and economic commitment to Afghanistan. But with billions of dollars in bailouts down the pipe and an American public that will be clamoring for relief in the months to come (perhaps in Europe, too), NATO members will have a tough time convincing their people that Afghanistan is worth it. Success in Afghanistan is not likely to occur within the next four years. Perhaps not even within the next eight. Should we add a war in Pakistan into the mix, it may not be won at all. There is nothing wrong with believing Afghanistan is a just war. But if it is just, and we wish to win it, we're going to have to commit enormous resources to it. Something Americans should keep in mind as they throw all besides the economy to the wind.

Elsewhere, the Somali pirate drama has spotlighted a more disturbing trend - the looming escalation of the conflict between the Sudanese government and southern (ie, not Darfuri) separatists. Simultaneously, skepticism about AFRICOM does not bode well for American response capability or a "revolutionized" military policy in Africa.

Citizens of tomorrow, be forewarned

Regardless of the merits and problems of the Paulson bailout plan, it emphasizes a lot of key trends and disturbing points about the direction in which the global economy is moving. Firstly, the US, for better or for worse, is still a major standard-bearer for Western and Westernizing economic norms. What we do will echo in the rest of the world, and we should not undertake any action that we would not want turned against us later on. As Drezner points out, the US, so far, is doing fairly well; other countries experiencing such financial turmoil have not been so lucky. The US, like its banks, is too big to fail - with around a fifth of world GDP, a financial collapse here would reverberate with massive consequences around the globe. The EU faces a huge test of its fiscal prowess even now, while China cannot afford a world economic downturn that would halt its rapid growth. The world economy for the past 60 years has increasingly been a positive-sum game. While this is not inherently enough to pretent catastrophe, there is no doubt turning it into a zero sum game only encourages it.

To cast a further cynical light on things, the bailout, from a separation-of-powers perspective, should be terrifying. The executive branch, in tandem with the Federal Reserve, can issue hundreds of billions of dollars without judicial review or much legislative oversight. What makes this all the worse is that the Federal Reserve is the only institution that has performed reasonably well throughout the crisis. Congress refused to back down from a program of aggressive homeownership expansion even in the midst of a housing bubble, while opportunities for both parties to reform the GSEs went unexploited. Confronted with the crisis, Congress passed an utterly useless fiscal stimulus bill. I have little confidence constructive responses will emerge in an expedient timeframe barring some massive shift in attitudes and norms in the legislature (Dodd's proposal is decent, but given some of its provisions, it is unlikely to fly through Congress and into law fast enough for Wall Street's liking). Ultimately, the economic crisis may give the executive - the one sitting, and likely whoever wins in November - powers the Iraq War could not grant them. These powers may remain theoretical, though. The burden of financing these bailouts will severely impede whatever discretionary programs they now promise - whether they be tax cuts or spending on social programs. If there is "Caesarism" in 21st century America, it will be centered around national power, rather than "bread and circuses."

On the other hand, we may have that Congressional oversight and those bread and circuses. The current proposal could easily be stacked with Democratic "riders" to bail out whoever that party thinks needs additional relief. Doing so, of course, would only further implicate Congress with a possible (some would say likely) failure of the bailout plan. With an election coming up, too many incentives are on politicians to wash their hands of current problems rather than take on the much more difficult task of fixing them. We may well be stuck between gridlock and the unchecked executive.

Meanwhile, much of the rest of the world so rudely refuses to act according to our preferences. Despite suffering a major terrorist attack which could have decapitated the government, Pakistan continues to stand against American intrusion. This seems illogical until one considers how al Qaeda started out - attacking "apostate" governments which turned to the US for security. Should Pakistan allow American intervention, it is reasonable to expect more bombs, not fewer, targeted at the Zadari government.

The Myth of Omnipotence

A big commonality between any two American Presidential candidates these days is an overwhelming belief in American power. While candidates may argue that their opponent or predecessor has squandered this power and influence, rarely will they ever argue that they have permanently diminished it. Even if they privately feel their country is in irreversible decline, it's politically infeasible to admit as such - American exceptionalism is not dead, and will not be for some time. With the "good" people in charge, the problems that prevented the previous administration's grandiose schemes from working will disappear.

Neither candidate is immune from this fallacy. John McCain, despite his criticism of the Bush administration's implementation of neoconservative strategy, still thinks that those same botched wars could have worked if only someone who put "country first" and devoted the country fully to the task was in charge. So too does he believe that "big government" would work a lot better if the government shaped up to his values. Obama, for his part, holds some similar beliefs. America can undertake unilateralist actions - like attacks against Pakistan - so long as somebody sufficiently "understanding" of our allies is there to soothe their concerns. Similarly, many Democrats (likely Obama included) argue that if only "someone else" had been in charge, regulation could have been put in place to stop the current economic crisis - despite a lack of any clear steps the government could have taken to prevent it. So too has the government's heavy-handed response been underwhelming. But Bush is "laissez-faire," so if we had people who believed in government, it would have worked, right?

Returning to foreign policy and, (once again), Pakistan, there's one further danger to bring up. Obama, to his credit, has staked a huge amount of his foreign policy experience on nuclear nonproliferation. A successful nuclear attack could derail globalization, a constructive post-Bush fight against terrorism, and intensify animosity among great powers. However, it is impossible to develop an effective nonproliferation regime without the cooperation of Pakistan - a nuclear power and serial proliferator of technology. Between its offers to help other Muslim countries to develop nuclear technology or AQ Khan's black market, viewed in light of the cozy relationship between most organs of the Pakistani security establishment and Islamist militants, securing Pakistani arms and technology is absolutely essential to effective nonproliferation. However, it is difficult to imagine Pakistan cooperating on an issue it views as essential to its own security while the US violates its borders. Worse, the Pakistani nuclear program could easily be detached from civilian control, and a humiliated military would likely cling to its nuclear arms to compensate for its inability or unwillingness to retaliate to American attacks.

There are other dangerous precedents. Just as the next American President will want to rebuild America's relationships with its allies, America is demonstrating (and the candidates often affirming) that some allies (and the American national interest) are more important than others. This would be sensible and acceptable were not so much of Obama's campaign staked on rebuilding America as a moral leader in the world. Many Americans speak of rebuilding America's relationship with Europe - but Europe itself does not have a unified foreign policy. It will be difficult to please both pro-Russian natural gas customers like Germany and paranoid post-Soviet states like Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltics.

Meanwhile, the American abandonment of Georgia will likely lead other minor states near regional powers to question our commitment. When America will not even protect their territorial integrity, it may seem like a better idea to accommodate rising regional powers (Russia, China, Iran) rather than rely on the US Cavalry that may never come. There are fears this is already happening in the Persian Gulf. Allowing relationships between the US and states on the peripheries of rising powers to erode will be especially dangerous. If a strategy of negotiations and engagement fail, the US will have to turn to a strategy of containment. Without those peripheral states, such strategies can become much more difficult.

Ultimately, successful diplomacy cannot occur without clear objectives, and we cannot have clear objectives without acknowledging what concessions we will make and what goals we will not pursue. Is the United States willing to make concessions on free trade, environmental regulation, military aid, and tolerance of human rights abuses to keep other countries working with us? Sure, there are unilateral decisions the US can make - closing Camp X-Ray, ending torture, taking the lead on climate change legislation - but eventually the US will have to sacrifice degrees of either its idealistic aspirations or material ambitions to make multilateralism work. Rejecting the Bush Doctrine is not a concession; declining to invade other countries without the sanction of the international community is the bare minimum of accepted behavior for most states. Undoubtedly, the candidates do privately know what specific goals and concessions they are willing to work towards. The problem of course, is getting the American people to accept them when the illusion of Washington's omnipotence can no longer be upheld.

If it is Worth Doing...

Usually one does not cite William Tecumseh Sherman in a rumination on military restraint, but...

Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and defeat.

... seems to be an appropriate turn of phrase lately. The war in Iraq was fought by exactly such a metric. It was a plan to fight the war from the air, move in with less troops than we used to liberate Kuwait, and spend a few dozen billion to have them sit around in a country where only a few hardened Baathists would resist our lovely presence. Five years later, here we are.

So, forgive me when I recommend an outspoken war critic and Presidential candidate not be so cavalier about attacking Pakistan, especially when he has no real plan for how to prevent such a conflict from escalating, or what the boundaries of such a mission would be. I will not go so far as to argue there are no circumstances under which we can attack Pakistan and buy into a foreign policy based on multilateral cooperation and support for Pakistani democracy. Faced against an increasingly uncooperative Pakistani government, attacks into the frontier may not be the worst option as far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned. Nevertheless, to be "realistic" about this aspect of the strategy means to stop clinging to any notion that we intend to pursue a policy of cooperation or support for democracy in Pakistan.

We are making a lot of enemies, ones with uniforms and nuclear bombs. I can't tell you how it will end, but I can say how it won't - there is not going to be a friendly Pakistani government. There is not going to be a cooperative Pakistani army willing to absorb thousands of casualties fighting tribesmen backed by the ISI while a foreign power humiliatingly violates their sovereignty. Do you want a prime example of the US shelling a society into support for extremism? Start watching Pakistan. Even if there is no escalation into a shooting war with Islamabad, we will poison democracy in Pakistan. The most basic function of a government is not education, or healthcare or welfare. It is protecting its citizens from coercion. Either the leader who allows his citizens to die will be replaced, or the system that put him into power will. Whether a stronger nationalist is voted into power or a coup occurs, Pakistanis are highly unlikely to tolerate such transgressions.

However destabilizing Iraq was, fomenting a crisis with Pakistan will be just as troubling with the international community in general. Sure, India might be happy, but who else will be? Europe operates in Afghanistan, too, and given the unease that many Europeans already feel about their Afghan troop presence, attacking Pakistan, if anything, would expedite their withdrawal. China will be very angry about an attack on its strategic partner, while the world public in general will see the unsavory aspects of the "Bush Doctrine" as permanent fixtures in America's 21st century policy, rather than a 7 year phase. In short: if you believe in soft power, you should be pleading with Obama-Biden to tone down their rhetoric on Pakistan. If you think attacking Pakistan is a good idea, maybe liberal internationalism shouldn't the keystone for your foreign policy this term. Perhaps the best Vietnam analogy isn't Iraq. Cambodia, after all, came from the guy who was going to "end the war," too...

Lest one assume I'm being too hard on Obama, let me point out that Palin's Charlie Gibson interview is more than proof enough that she is unfit to be Vice President come 2009. The idea that Mr. "Country First" would put her on the spot is extremely disturbing. Yes, she was a smart choice to unify the base. However, we've had 8 years of an folksy, outsider, common-man conservative ex-governor with no foreign policy experience. Excuse me if I am not willing to risk a few more.

Elsewhere in the world, OPEC has decided $100 is too low for a barrel of oil Any politician who tells you they've got a plan to enrich Americans by "lowering gas prices" or taxing "windfall profits" from oil companies is full of it - especially when the Gods seem to be on the side of higher oil prices, too. Also in unsurprising news today, Hugo Chavez has "had enough of so much shit" from the US.

A Few Words on Pakistan

While it's great that Pakistan transitioned to a civilian Presidency peacefully, Zadari is likely to have a rough ride from here on out. Let's face it - if you think an American Presidential candidate has experience problems, wait until you hear about Zadari. As Robert Kaplan points out, his primary qualification is being the widower of Benazir Bhutto. Character aside, there is no indication he will be able to rein in the army or Inter-Services Intelligence, let alone the "Islamic Emirate" on the Afghan frontier. The Pakistani government is by no means in the clear, nor is it clear it has overcome the specters of the past. Zadari may be no friend of the courts, given the "Mr. 10%" moniker, which will ensure friction with the populace. While General Kayani is hardly another Musharraf, the military will become the de facto government where instability looms. The ISI, on the other hand, still sees Islamic extremists as viable proxies for the Pakistani national interest. Given recent tensions over Kashmir, it is important to remember that no matter what happens in Afghanistan, Islamabad will always have an interest in waging asymmetric warfare against its economically and militarily superior rival.

The US, for its part, is certainly not showing much faith in the Pakistani government. American troops attacked Pakistani soil without authorization, and have kept up bombing for good measure. While the President of the US and the one to follow will undoubtedly pay lip service to Pakistani democracy, Americans are going to have to accept that that democracy doesn't care for the direction the Afghan war is headed in. On top of it all, we have a ticket with two vocal Pakistan hawks. No, they're not Republicans (McCain has followed Bush's old line on Pakistan, while I doubt Palin's campaign manager has finished briefing her on what her opinion is supposed to be). While Obama gets praise for tracking Osama down to the "cave where he lives," Biden was way ahead of him. They absolutely have a point in criticizing Pakistan's response to the war on terror threat, but Pakistanis (who have lost over 1000 soldiers and 3000 civilians in the North-West War) were tired of the US line beforehand, and certainly not warming up to it. Countries that have sacrificed thousands of their own people for their partners only to get invaded by them tend to have grievances over such treatment. The Bush-Obama policy of military intervention in Pakistan would force Obama to do some major backpedaling if he hoped to gain any cooperation from the government in Islamabad, especially as the US-India nuclear deal moves forward.

Of course, given Pakistan's struggling economy, wouldn't it make sense to use non-military aid as leverage to elicit Pakistani cooperation? Yes, but that doesn't mean we can rely on it. After all, Pakistan is already quite cozy with a government less picky about their behavior in Afghanistan. In the long run, Pakistan might not need the US so much after all...

More of the Same

For anyone wondering in what direction Russia is traveling, look to the headlines.

Medvedev's five principles of the new Russian foreign policy bode ill for America's next foreign policy. This will not be a new Cold War - hence the difficulty. America knows how to fight and win a Cold War, because we already did for half a century. The position Russia is turning to now - one with spheres of influence, halfhearted deferences to "laws of nations" and refusal to submit to a unipolar world - seems far more 19th century than 20th. These sorts of politics, based on the balance of power rather than the confrontation of superpowers, are exactly the sort Americans like to think they have historically avoided. During the 19th (and much of the first half of the 20th) century, we secluded ourselves from European realpolitik and played hegemon in our own hemisphere. Then, in the second half of the 20th century, we were the "good" in bipolar world. Both Democrats and Republicans aspire to this sort of situation. While the neoconservative movement is oft criticized for its desire to turn any foreign policy problem into a "good versus evil" struggle, so too do many modern liberals. "Talking with our enemies" does not exclude liberals from this trend. Ultimately, restoring America's moral leadership is a meaningless idea without some immoral force to oppose. While some countries will have a smoother ride than they might get with another neoconservative President, some will have rougher ones (think of trade and human rights disagreements). The communities formed in liberal internationalist systems have boundaries. On those boundaries, even morally upstanding Presidents are forced to practice realism rather than liberalism.

What kept those sorts of politics less prevalent within the liberal community in the 20th century were common interests. While globalization and interdependence undoubtedly produce huge common interests, they are not all equal. If Europe's economic interests in Russian petroleum outweigh its political interests in standing with the US, can we be sure they will stand with us? Recent history suggests they will not. The 19th century was one of constantly shifting alliances, where ethnic ties increasingly took precedence over moral ones, though back then those moral ties were often conservative rather than liberal in nature. Nevertheless, America's next President needs to understand more than how to restore moral or protect morals. We don't need another Truman, because this isn't the Cold War. We don't need another Reagan, because this isn't the Cold War. If anything, we need a Teddy Roosevelt (and I'm waiting for McCain to prove he is) - a pragmatist that does more than simply "stand up" for American ideals.

Other items of interest...

• Fukuda resigns as PM, most likely successor, Taro Aso, is a China hawk and has all the ethnic sensitivity of Pat Buchanan. If you thought going back to the 19th century in Russia was bad, hope it doesn't happen in Asia.
• Anbar goes to the Iraqis. Now if only they can integrate the Sons of Iraq, that 2011 timeline might look pretty nice.
• Iranian nuclear deal with Nigeria. I'm not going to panic, but it makes you think...
  

A new Great Game?

Well, it's August 18th and the Russians don't exactly seem to be withdrawing... What a surprise. Indeed, even as Russia slightly reduces its combat presence, it reserves the right to resume them and has fortified its positions in South Ossetia and the Georgian highway system. Essentially, Russia has ensured that if fighting resumes in Georgia, it will completely crush the government in Tblisi. Russian troop deployments along the strategic highway to Georgia, along with the deployment of SS-21 SRBMs to separatist regions (missiles that would be able to strike virtually anywhere in Georgia) compound on Russia's strengths while compensating for its weaknesses. Controlling the highways of Georgia provides a major strategic advantage in any land battle. The ballistic missiles, on the other hand, would allow Russia to launch on Georgian targets without having to risk its air force, which, regardless of the actual number of aircraft downed (anywhere between 4 and 21), significantly underperformed.

This may provide some additional explanation for Russia's anger at recent developments in Poland. Even though in 2007 only 30% of Poles supported the Ballistic Missile Defense program, support has jumped to 58% and the government has agreed to host interceptors. Now that Russia has put military force back on the table, Eastern Europe is unquestionably looking for help. However, to call BMD meaningful help for Eastern Europe or a check on Russia is to misinterpret the situation. BMD - in its current form - poses no significant threat to Russia's strategic arsenal - with only a few dozen interceptors, it cannot hold a candle to hundreds of Russian missiles that could be targeted against Europe. Nor does it endanger the world by altering the balance of MAD - Russian missiles targeted against America would completely bypass Europe and travel over the Arctic Circle. This is why NORAD's EW systems for defending the American mainland require the cooperation of Canada more than they do Europe.

What the new agreement does provide that it did not before is enhanced military cooperation - access to new weapon systems that would provide real gains for Poland's secrity. Patriot missiles and other advanced arms would top whatever aerial embarrassments the Russian air force suffered in Georgia. Perhaps in light of these favorable terms for Poland, Ukraine has offered to participate in the BMD program as well. Given that Ukrainian greivances about Russia directly threaten Russian military power, Ukraine has a major incentive to bulk up its miltiary and, preferably, secure NATO entry. If America continues such a strategy against Russia, the straining of relations between the US and countries like France and Germany may worsen - this gap may prove more significant than the one America opened with the invasion of Iraq.

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To shift direction, here's a few other items of interest...

• There have been no protests at the Beijing games. 74 of the 77 applications were withdrawn, while the government refused or delayed the other three. The supposed liberalizing effect of the Games has yet to be seen. (As far as I've noticed, I've seen Americans usually apathetic about politics responding very negatively to the Chinese. But the Olympics, of course, are likely meant more to impress the Chinese people than placate the world's concerns.)
• Pervez Musharraf is stepping down from the Presidency. It's too early to say whether his replacement will be a boon or a hindrance to long term American interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• Disturbing news from Iraq - the Maliki government may turn against the Sunni "awakener" militias.
  

Why Georgia Matters

What is happening in Georgia is one of the most important geopolitical milestones of this decade, on par with 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. To refer to Putin's Russia as a new Nazi Germany or Soviet Union that must not be "appeased" is a major exaggeration. However, neither is it something the United States or the Western world should passively accept. The ongoing (sadly, the ceasefire does not seem to have done much) conflict has profound implications for world politics and American interests and principles both.

Firstly, the world is officially unipolar no longer. While some would call other events in the past few years the "high water mark" of America's status as hyperpower, there can no longer be any question to America's ongoing unipolar "moment." It is over. In a fait accompli, Russia has demonstrated it too now has a sphere of influence, one from which it can effectively deny the United States. Russia does not have any apparent intent to recreate the Soviet Union by force of arms. Instead, it seeks to do what the United States has traditionally done in Latin America - exclude its "backyard" from major foreign influence. It still has a long way to go, but it may have had its first success. Russia's actions in Georgia serve as a valuable demonstration to Ukraine and other states - go too far towards the West, and Russia will make you suffer as soon as it has an excuse. While Georgia clearly offered one, Russia would not have found one in the Ukraine. Now, however, Russia can confidently interfere with whatever non-NATO members it wants. To grant Russian citizenship to the Crimean Tatars or Russians in Donetsk is not so difficult, and Russia could, in a decade or so, separate these provinces with greater ease. The Ukrainians, knowing that NATO will not commit to a non-member, would be far less likely to attempt Saakashvili's military leap of faith.

That Russia can rely on this exposes another major consequence of the Georgian invasion, that the interests of Western Europe and the United States are gravely divergent on Russian issues. Russia is still fundamentally doomed as a superpower - but on a solid foundation as a great power. As such, the consequences of angering Russia are far greater for Europeans than for Americans - no longer because Russian tanks threaten to cross Europe's borders, but because Russian natural gas pipelines already do. When European nations stand against the NATO bids of Georgia and the Ukraine, they do so not primarily because of fears of war, but of the diplomatic consequences. Even admitting more Russian border states into NATO might trigger pipeline shut offs, diplomatic lockouts, or the nationalization of European assets in Russia. As such, cheerleaders for the EU as a new, "moral" world superpower should quiet. Many Western papers hail Sarkozy, the EU's nominal representative, for the cease-fire; Europhiles should take this news with a shaker of salt at least. For one thing, the "cease-fire" is questionable at best. Not only that, but the decision to even claim an end to combat is likely motivated by Russian convenience - Russians do not want to have another Chechnya on their hands - and desire to put a PR smiley-face on the 58th's tanks, which still sit in Georgian territory. As for the challenges to the European superpower, they are twofold. Firstly, the EU, if it is truly a power, is more than the United States bound to petty, mercantile self-interest. The EU's fundamental accomplishment is that it provides a framework for a Europe at peace - to idly allow such a war to occur in its own backyard undermines any notion of a European policy based on values of peace and sovereignty. Secondly, Russia's new "sphere of influence" excludes not only the United States, but the EU as well. Europe is not willing to maintain the politico-military infrastructure and policies necessary to extend them, which means that Europe as a whole is a paltry excuse for a superpower. Of course, soft power is still a factor - but what did it accomplish here? A cease-fire that has done anything but end the conflict or tensions? What use is soft power as a primary substitute for conventional power when it cannot accomplish the same goals? What lies for the future of European soft power when the EU is increasingly reluctant to lift a finger in service of its core values? Is "sticky" power going to save the EU? While it does have a large economy, its use of economic might is neither unified nor independent - Russia has an economic veto over Europe's interests and will for the foreseeable future, especially with regards to the post-Soviet world. Of course, some EU countries have offered peacekeepers, but this seems entirely contingent upon Russian approval. The answer from the Russians, who still title their forces "peacekeepers" and have no interest in foreign meddling, will likely be nyet. Again, if Russia possesses such a veto, how much can we truly call this power?

America, too, has demonstrably become unable to reconcile its principles and its interests. That America only now is sending aid to Georgia - aid that is not ending the conflict by any means - is a severe blow to America's credibility among Eastern Europeans and our remaining allies. The message is clear - you can bleed and die for us in Iraq when so many would not, but ultimately, we will throw you to the wolves when your most critical national interest of all - the integrity and sovereignty of your state - is in question. Saakashvili undoubtedly made a severe error in judgment when he forced this question. While true, it is perception, not the facts that will matter for many countries. Will Eastern Europeans be as willing to stick their necks out for the United States without NATO membership? Will other countries threatened by more powerful rivals risk reaching out to us? Will the fervor remain for "color revolutions" and liberalization? At the very least, we have not done much to promote our country or our ideas to the rest of the world. Hence, Americans must recognize that a new foreign policy based on multilateralism, soft power, and the international rule of law has become a much greater challenge. Western Europe, our "lost ally" has shown it has less common ground with American interests than we thought, while Eastern Europe has found that the reward for cooperation is not as high as they thought. Europe has made it clear it will not risk political action, let alone military cooperation, that will anger Russia, while America's new allies will think twice before committing to any military cooperation that does not shield them from their former master.

So, indulge me as I once again bring out our two unlucky candidates for President for another tongue (keyboard?) lashing. Let's assume this all happened in August 2009. What would this mean for an Obama administration? Well, his rapprochement with Western Europe would be in a bit of trouble, unless he too decided to abandon Georgia and anger Eastern Europe. I suspect that up until now, Obama's response would have been quite similar to Bush's - afterwards, though, he would have the choice between accommodating Russia (giving us multilateralism without principle) or ratcheting up pressure, and in turn driving Europe away. Either way, a strategy of multilateral cooperation would be even more difficult for all but the most brilliant diplomatic team. John McCain would be in perhaps deeper trouble - the Georgian invasion would force any "League of Democracies" to sacrifice legitimacy (ie, the opinions of Western Europe) or functionality in its response to this crisis. McCain is also more likely to turn the Georgian conflict into WWIII. Enough said.

Assuming, as I so often do, that the US should have a more substantive response to the Georgia crisis, what steps would such a policy involve?

• Major pressure to create an EU/multinational UN peacekeeping force for Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia used the presence of its so-called peacekeepers to gain casus belli against any attempt by Georgia to restore its sovereignty by arms. Meanwhile, Russia appears to be undermining the "cease-fire" by using irregular militants from the Chechen wars, and Cossacks. (Side note: What better example would there be of Putin's purported "Tsarist" tendencies than the use of Cossacks to terrorize challengers to Moscow!). However, given that Russia is likely continuing drives into Georgia, it is unlikely they would agree to such a measure, which would sap its appeal to the Europeans. Even if such monitoring was permitted, Russia would certainly not allow them to interfere with the Russian occupation.
  
• Make it clear the United States stands against regime change in Georgia or further combat operations, and provide non-combat (but militarily transported) aid to Georgia. Bush has taken these steps, and regardless of what happens in response, Georgia is going to need to be rebuilt anyway. Continued Russian presence in Georgia is unacceptable not only because it violates the agreement, but also because it likely signals an underlying desire to depose Saakashvili if negotiations do not go as planned (note the Russian tank commander's comment).
• Make Ukrainian membership in NATO a major US foreign policy objective. Of course, many will argue this would only further enrage Russia - but the Ukraine's already made their NATO intentions clear, while unlike Georgia, Ukraine's potential separatist regions would make clear Russian provocation necessary for such a conflict (handing out guns and citizenship). The best way to ensure that Crimea and Donetsk do not become Ossetia and Abkhazia II is to a) force the Ukraine to agree to a no-first-strike clause on those regions in return for NATO membership, which b) would force the Russians to press their interests through non-military channels - people forget NATO's deterrent effect. The US should also contemplate supporting a Ukrainian denial of Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
• Make any effort possible to gain Russian cooperation on Iran, Zimbabwe and other issues. If the US still has to sacrifice its interests in Georgia, it should make sure it gets something in return. Iran would be a good start, but it is a bit of a long shot they'll cooperate.